OBSERVATORY

CYBERSECURITY

IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Cybersecurity
Are We Ready in Latin America
and the Caribbean?
2016 Cybersecurity Report

www.cybersecurityobservatory.com

Organization of
American States

Organization of
American States

Copyright © 2016 Inter-American Development Bank. This
work is subject to Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs IGO 3.0 (CG-IGO 3.0 BY-NC-ND)(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/legalcode)
and
may be reproduced for any non-commercial use providing the
respective recognition of the IDB and the OAS. No derivative
works allowed.
Any disputes regarding the use of the work that cannot be resolved amicably shall be submitted to arbitration under the
UNCITRAL rules. Use of the name of the IDB and/or the OAS
for any purpose other than the respective recognition and use
of the logo of the IDB and/or OAS are not authorized by this
CC-IGO license and require an additional licensing agreement
from the corresponding organization.
Note that the URL link includes additional terms and conditions of this license.
The opinions expressed in this publication are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the
Inter-American Development Bank, its Executive Directors, or
the countries they represent, or the Organization of American
States or the countries that comprise it.

Inter-American Development Bank

Organization of American States

Luis Alberto Moreno
President

Luis Almagro
Secretary General

Project Coordination

Project Coordination

Miguel Porrúa
e-Government Lead Specialist

Belisario Contreras
Cybersecurity Program Manager

IDB-OAS Technical Team

Global Cyber Security
Capacity Centre University of Oxford

Kerry-Ann Barrett
Robert Fain
Catalina García
Gonzalo García-Belenguer
Catalina Lillo
Barbara Marchiori
Emmanuelle Pelletier
Diego Subero

Prof. Sadie Creese
Prof. Michael Goldsmith
Dr. María Bada
Taylor Roberts
Lara Pace

Cybersecurity
Are We Ready in
Latin America and the Caribbean?
2016 Cybersecurity Report

Table of Contents
Institutional Messages
ix

Foreword IDB

xi

Foreword OAS

xiii

Expert Contributions
3

Building and Diplomacy
in Latin America and the Caribbean
Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSIS

7

Cybersecurity, Privacy and Trust: Trends
in Latin America
Fundação Getúlio Vargas
FGV

About this Report

13

Capacity Building
in the Americas
Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
FIRST

19

The State of Cybercrime Legislation in Latin
America and the Caribbean – Some Observations
Council of Europe

25

Digital Economy and Cybersecurity in Latin
America and the Caribbean
World Economic Forum
WEF

31

Sustainable and Secure Development: A
Framework for Resilient Connected Societies
Potomac Institute
POTOMAC

Methodological Framework
39

Overview

43

Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model

45

The Levels of Maturity

OBSERVATORY

CYBERSECURITY

IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

v

Country Reports

vi

Detailed Methodological Framework

127

Policy and Strategy
Documented or Official National
Cyber strategy
Cyber defense

131
132
135
136
139

Culture and Society
Cybersecurity mind-set
Cybersecurity awareness
Confidence and trust on the Internet
Privacy online

141
142
144
145
146

Education
Availability of cyber education and training
Development of cybersecurity education
Training and educational initiatives within public
and private sectors
Corporate governance, knowledge and standards

147
148
152
155

Legal Frameworks
Legal frameworks
Legal
Responsible reporting

157
158
161
163
166
168
173
175
177

Technologies
Adherence to standards
Coordinating organizations
Incident response
National infrastructure resilience
Critical national infrastructure protection
Crisis management
Digital redundancy
Cybersecurity marketplace

48
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
110

Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
The Bahamas (Commonwealth of)
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela

123
124

115

Reflections on the Region

www.cybersecurityobservatory.com
The dataset can also be downloaded at:
https://mydata.iadb.org/idb/dataset/cd6z-sjjc.

List of Acronyms

APWG
Anti-Phishing Working Group

FGV
Fundação Getúlio Vargas

AusCERT
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team

FIRST
Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams

CARICOM
Caribbean Community

GGE
Group of Government Experts

CBM
Confidence-building measures

ICANN
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers

CMM
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model

CNI
Critical national infrastructure

CoE
Council of Europe

CSIRT
Computer Security Incident Response Team

CSIS
Center for Strategic and International Studies

CTU
Caribbean Telecommunications Union

ICS
Industrial control system

ICT
Information and communications technology

IDB
Inter-American Development Bank

IGF
Internet Governance Forum

ITU
International Telecommunication Union

IXP
Internet exchange point

DDoS
Distributed denial-of-service attack

OBSERVATORY

CYBERSECURITY

IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

vii

ITU-IMPACT
ITU International Multilateral Partnership
Against Cyber Threats

SEI
Software Engineering Institute
(Carnegie Mellon University)

LAC
Latin America and the Caribbean

SMART goals
Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and
Time-Bound goals

LACNIC
Latin America and Caribbean Network Information
Centre

UDHR
Universal Declaration of Human Rights

MMWG
Multiregional Modeling Working Group

WEF
World Economic Forum

NCI
National Cybersecurity Institute

OAS
Organization of American States

OSCE
Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe

POTOMAC
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

PKI
Public key infrastructure

SCADA
Supervisory control and data acquisition

viii

If readers are to take only one message from this 2016 Cybersecurity Report for Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC), it would be that the vast majority of our countries are not yet prepared to counteract cybercrime. The
analysis is a call for action to start taking the necessary steps to protect this 21st century key infrastructure.
There is a great deal at stake. According to some calculations, the cost of cybercrime worldwide is US$575
billion a year,1 which represents 0.5% of the global GDP. That is almost four times the annual donation for
international development. In LAC, we face a cost equivalent to US$90 billion a year due to this kind of crime.2
With those resources, we could increase fourfold our region’s scientific researchers.
Connectivity advantages cannot be denied and people from LAC embrace these new technologies eagerly.
Nowadays we are the fourth biggest mobile market in the world; half of our population uses the Internet and
our governments make use of digital media to communicate and provide services to citizens.
However, we fall short in prevention and mitigation of criminal or malicious activity risks in cyberspace. The
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model developed in this report is a good benchmark to start finding solutions
that can remedy the problem.
The analysis of its 49 indicators shows that several countries in the region are vulnerable to potentially
devastating cyberattacks. Four out of five countries do not have cybersecurity strategies or critical infrastructure
protection plans. Two out of three do not count on command centers and cybersecurity control. The vast
majority of prosecutors lack the legal capacity to pursue cybercrime actions.
If we are to make the most of the so called Fourth Industrial Revolution3, we need to create not only a modern
and robust digital infrastructure but also a secure one. Protecting our citizens from cybercrime is not a mere
option; it is a key element for our development.
As many of the challenges we face in the pursuit of development, this one transcends the capacity of any
institution. Our individual efforts have a greater effect when we work with allies who share our aims and values.
The report has benefited from this kind of collaboration thanks to the contribution of the Organization of
American States, the University of Oxford, Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Getulio Vargas
Foundation, the FIRST Organization, the European Council, the Potomac Institute and the World Economic
Forum.
I hope this systematic and rigorous assessment and its helpful indicators serve as guide and motivation for those
responsible for cybersecurity in our region so they can advance quickly in the right direction. Cybercriminals
will not allow a moment of hesitation.

Luis Alberto Moreno
President
Inter-American Development Bank
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It is a defining reality of our time that the Internet has revolutionized how we interact with each
other and the world around us. Increasing Internet connectivity links ever-greater numbers
of people together in a transnational and largely public space, and provides a growing and
dynamic platform that enables communication, collaboration, and innovation in ways we
could have scarcely imagined not long ago. This is especially so in Latin America and the
Caribbean, where over half of our population is now online and the rate of growth in Internet
users is among the highest in the world. In the Americas and Caribbean, we are using the
Internet to share ideas and culture; to improve government and social services; to collaborate
in education, sciences and the arts; and to do business—all with greater accessibility and
efficiency. Chief among the benefits of this rapidly emerging new paradigm is the impact it
has had in stimulating new regional economic and social growth and development.
It must not be overlooked, however, that our increasing connectivity to and dependency
on Internet-based platforms and services has significantly raised our risk exposure—that
of our citizens, commercial enterprises, and governments—to a host of security and crimerelated actors and activities. The available data clearly indicates that cyberattacks and
incidents, particularly those carried out with criminal intent, are increasing in frequency and
sophistication. Government agencies and companies have come to recognize the need for
strong cybersecurity frameworks, measures, and capabilities, as well as the imperative for
cooperation and information sharing. It is now widely understood that cybercrime does not
recognize national borders, and that a multilateral and multidimensional effort is required to
address the range of cyber threats. Indeed, important progress is being made.
The Organization of American States (OAS) has been centrally engaged with issues of
cybersecurity and cybercrime for over a decade, encouraging and supporting the work of our
Member States to strengthen their capacity to protect the people, economies, and critical
infrastructure of our region against cybercrime and other cyberattacks or incidents. In 2004
the OAS Member States adopted the Inter-American Integral Strategy to Combat Threats to
Cyber Security, which called for a coordinated, multi-stakeholder effort to countering cyber
threats in the hemisphere, and provided an initial framework to cultivate and guide such an
approach. Our Member States showed great foresight in embracing this vision early. In so doing,
we created a space where meaningful cooperation between a wide range of stakeholders has
improved information sharing, enhanced the protection of information and communications
technology (ICT) infrastructure, strengthened our governments’ capacity to respond to and
mitigate cyber incidents, and bolstered our individual and collective resiliency in the face of
cyber threats. These commitments have been reaffirmed and strengthened in the years since
with the adoption of numerous official declarations—including one as recently as March of this
year—regarding the role and responsibilities of the OAS and its Member States in promoting
cybersecurity, combating cybercrime, and protecting critical information infrastructure.
The Cybersecurity Program of the OAS Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE)
has played a key role on this front. The program has assisted Member States in developing
National Cybersecurity Strategies, provided training to national and regional Computer Security
Incident Response Teams (CSIRT), facilitated crisis management exercises with critical national
industry (CNI) operators and emergency response assets, engaged civil society and the private
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sector, and helped to raise awareness about cybersecurity-related threats and opportunities within
our region. In these and other ways, CICTE has directly contributed to a more secure and vigilant cyber
domain in the Caribbean and Latin America.
Despite the promising progress we’ve achieved thus far, the need for continued multilateral cooperation
and capacity building is as pressing as ever. Information technologies and the innumerable ways we
utilize them continue to evolve at a rapid pace, as do the vulnerabilities they pose and the actors and
threats which seek to exploit them. Only by working together can we keep pace and ensure that the
benefits of this new and expanding digital domain outweigh the risks and costs.
This requires that we cultivate an understanding of the full scope of threats to our cyber domain, based on
the most complete and up to date information available. Yet there is a dearth of comprehensive literature
regarding cybersecurity in Latin America and the Caribbean. Since 2013, OAS’ CICTE Cybersecurity
Program has sought to address this information gap through a series of comprehensive reports, prepared
and published in partnership with cybersecurity industry leaders. These reports have been highly
informative, providing the most detailed and accurate picture to date of cybersecurity and cybercrime
in our hemisphere.
In continuing this tradition, the OAS is proud to present to you, in partnership with the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) and the Global Cyber Security Capacity Center at the University of Oxford, Are
We Ready in Latin America and the Caribbean? 2016 Cybersecurity Report.
This study aims to deepen our understanding of the cybersecurity risks, challenges and opportunities
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Utilizing surveys and other data provided by experts and officials
from 32 OAS Member States, the report examines each country’s cyber maturity in five dimensions: i)
Cybersecurity policy and strategy; ii) Cyber culture and society; iii) Cybersecurity education, training and
skills; iv) Legal and regulatory frameworks; and v) Standards, organizations, and technologies. It should
also be noted that the OAS Cybersecurity Program received generous assistance from Microsoft, which
helped identify key areas to be presented in the project’s inception phase. The report’s country-by-country
approach should help us to develop a more nuanced understanding of each of our States’ cybersecurity
regimes and assist policymakers and technicians to strategically improve existing cybersecurity efforts,
and to design and implement new initiatives going forward.
It must be acknowledged that these findings merely represent a snapshot in time of an ever changing
landscape. Further studies will be necessary to continue to keep abreast of the state of cybersecurity in
the Americas and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, we hope that by improving our collective understanding
of the cybersecurity challenges and opportunities presently confronting our region, the information
and analysis contained in this report will assist stakeholders in all sectors government, private sector,
academia, and civil society to better work together to build a more secure, resilient and productive
cyberspace in our hemisphere. We look forward to continuing to play a role in this vital mission.

Luis Almagro
Secretary General
Organization of American States
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About this Report
This report is the result of a collaborative effort between the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Organization
of American States (OAS) to present a comprehensive an up-todate picture of the state of cybersecurity of countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC). Using an online tool designed in
partnership with the Global Cybersecurity Capacity Centre (GCSCC)
of the University of Oxford, the OAS-IDB gathered data from
cybersecurity stakeholders representing different sectors. These
stakeholders include: government agencies, critical infrastructure
operators, the military, law enforcement, the private sector and
academia. Additional information was acquired through various
secondary sources, cited throughout the report.
This report comprises two main sections. The first section, “Expert
Contributions”, consists of essays on cybersecurity trends in the
region contributed by international cybersecurity experts. In
“Cybersecurity, Privacy and Trust: Trends in Latin America and the
Caribbean Region and the Way Forward”, James A. Lewis of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) explores the
role of international cooperation in norm creation and regulation
for cybersecurity and cybercrime. Lewis highlights the work of
regional and international mechanisms to promote international
cooperation in protecting cyberspace. In “Cybersecurity, privacy
and trust: Trends in Latin America and the Caribbean region and
the way forward”, Marília Maciel, Nathalia Foditsch, Luca Belli
and Nicolas Castellon of the Center of Technology and Society
of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) discuss the challenge
of balancing information exchange with privacy and freedom
of expression, noting the importance of measures such as
privacy and data protection regulatory frameworks and multistakeholder platforms, among others. In the following segment,
Maarten Van Horenbeeck, Cristine Hoepers and Peter Allor of
the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST)
write on the need for training and educational opportunities
for Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT), as well
as a “strong, inclusive community of CSIRTs”. Next, Alexander
Seger of the Council of Europe (CoE) examines how countries
in LAC have designed and updated their legislative frameworks
for dealing with cybercrime, with special emphasis on the
Budapest Convention, and presents a number of case studies.
In “Digital Economy and Cybersecurity in Latin America and the
Caribbean”, the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Agenda
Council on Cybersecurity discusses the connections between
ICT development, cybersecurity and the national economies
of LAC. Finally, Melissa Hathaway and Francesca Spidalieri of
the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies offer their thoughts on
how sustainability and security are essential to ensure long-term
economic viability of ICT innovation and growth.

The second section, “Country Reports”, provides an overview
of the current state of cybersecurity in the countries in the LAC
region based on information gathered through the online tool
designed in partnership with GCSCC, interviews with Member
States officials and desk research. The data collected was
analyzed using the 49 indicators of the Cybersecurity Capability
Maturity Model developed by the GCSCC, which are divided into
five dimensions: i) National Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy;
ii) Cyber Culture and Society; iii) Cybersecurity Education,
Training and Skills; iv) Legal and Regulatory Frameworks; and
v) Standards, Organizations and Technologies. There are five
levels of maturity for each indicator: i) Start-up; ii) Formative;
iii) Established; iv) Strategic; and v) Dynamic. Professor Sadie
Creese, of the GCSCC at the University of Oxford, introduces the
country reports and gives her perspectives on the findings and
some of the regional trends they suggest. Each country profile
provides a short overview of recent cybersecurity developments
in the country, statistics on the country’s population, number of
people with Internet access, mobile phone subscriptions, and
percentage of Internet penetration. In addition, each profile
shows the country’s maturity level for each indicator.
The Report is intended to present a comprehensive depiction
of cybersecurity in the region. National stakeholders from
diverse sectors can utilize this information to gain a better
understanding of their country’s cybersecurity situation within a
regional context. It can also help governments and cybersecurity
experts explore new ideas for strengthening cybersecurity in
their respective countries and across the hemisphere. Overall,
the findings represent a snapshot in time, which can be used
as a reference point as countries continue to develop their
cybersecurity capabilities.
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Building Cyber Confidence
and Diplomacy in Latin America
and the Caribbean
CSIS | Center for Strategic and International Studies
James A. Lewis

Policy
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Internet connectivity accelerates economic growth and creates
opportunities for business, trade and commerce. Maximizing
the value of the Internet and cyberspace should be a central
part of government planning. But with these opportunities
comes risk. The technologies of the Internet are not yet mature.
Criminals can easily exploit them. This risk is manageable, but
it requires the attention of national leaders. Whether the issue
of cybersecurity reaches the top level of political leadership
still depends on several factors—personal interest, the direct
experience of malicious cyber action, and relations with other
states, but an increasing number of Presidents and Prime
Ministers around the world have made cybersecurity a priority.
A broad international discussion of cybersecurity has developed
in the last few years, reflecting the desire of nations to respond
to disturbing trends and to reinforce the stability and security
of global cyber resources. The international community has
focused on the topics of cybersecurity norms, confidence
building measures, and capacity building.
This is the international agenda for cybersecurity, and four sets
of discussion deserve particular attention. These are the talks
in the UN Group of Government Experts (GGE), Organization for
Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), and OAS. It is also worth noting the leading role of the
London Process, launched by the United Kingdom’s then Foreign
Secretary William Hague in 2011. This is a series of informal
international meetings whose aim is to generate a consensus
on responsible behavior in cyberspace. There have been four
meetings, the last of which was in the Hague, produced a robust
Chairman’s Report that recommended a number of possible
norms and established the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (the
OAS is a founding member). The Forum will facilitate the sharing
of experiences, expertise, and best practices, between policy
makers and cyber experts from different countries and regions.
The next London Process meeting is tentatively scheduled for
the spring of 2017 in the Western Hemisphere.
The GGEs have been most important for setting the global
agenda. There have been four in the last decade. The third
GGE in 2013 was an unexpected success and defined a historic
change that shifted the political landscape of the Internet. This
was the recognition that national sovereignty, the UN Charter,
and international law apply to cyberspace upending, in a few
words, the entire edifice of a “global commons.” The UN General
Assembly endorsed this applicability of sovereignty, law and the
UN Charter, and this changed the politics of the Internet and
its governance, and usefully embeds international discussion
of cybersecurity in the existing framework for obligations and
understanding among States.

4

The fourth GGE, which concluded in June 2015, was chaired
by a senior Brazilian diplomat and involved the participation
of Colombia, Mexico and the United States. It was able to
reach consensus (in good measure because of the skill of
the Chair), but the Report has not yet been endorsed by the
UNGA. This GGE endorsed an additional set of norms and
steps to build capacity, and identified a number of voluntary
confidence-building measures to increase transparency and to
strengthen cooperation. Unexpectedly, it was not norms that
proved the most contentious topic but rather the application
of international law to cyberspace, an area that will need more
work in future international discussion.

Addressing these challenges requires
diplomatic efforts and international
cooperation. One thing we have
learned in cybersecurity is that no
nation by itself can adequately secure
its networks. Cooperation is essential.
In its work, the 2015 GGE was guided by the precedents created
by a 2014 OSCE agreement on CBMs. After difficult negotiations,
the OSCE decided on a foundational and initial set of voluntary
measures to increase transparency and cooperation. These CBMs
focus on transparency and coordination. Voluntarily measures
agreed to in the OSCE include the provision of national views
on cyber doctrine, strategy, and threats. OSCE members will
also share information on national organizations, programs, or
strategies relevant to cybersecurity, identify a contact point to
facilitate communications and dialogue on ICT-security matters,
and establish links between national CERTS.
The work of the GGEs and the OSCE has useful implications for
other regions around the world, including LAC and for further
progress in building cybersecurity at the regional and national
levels. The OAS plays a leading global role in developing
international cooperation on cybersecurity. Its work on capacity
building is a model for other regions. The OAS has implemented
a significant number of measures to improve cybersecurity across
the Hemisphere. The OAS’s Committee on Hemispheric Security
released a “Consolidated List of Confidence and Security Building
Measures” that includes voluntary exchanges of information

on organization, structure, size of government cyber entities,
the exchange of policy and doctrine papers, the establishment
of national points of contact regarding critical infrastructure
protection and the exchange of research between Member
States.
The OAS has also organized an extensive series of workshops
and training events on national strategies, confidence-building
measures and developing cyber expertise. The OAS’s efforts
(now aided by the Inter-American Development Bank) to link
cybersecurity to effective governance initiatives helps Member
States work to implement e-government ion a secure manner. One
area for consideration is how to further extend the OAS’s work on
confidence-building measures to cover cybersecurity issues.
These efforts to facilitate the development of national strategies
and to build capacity have made the Americas a global leader
in cybersecurity. Yet, in LAC, as in all regions, the efforts to
bring stability and security to cyberspace are at an early stage.
The primary challenges facing the region in cybersecurity are
building capacity in all countries, improving cooperation on
cybercrime, and sharing information on best practices, threats,
and vulnerabilities.
Addressing these challenges requires diplomatic efforts and
international cooperation. One thing we have learned in
cybersecurity is that no nation by itself can adequately secure
its networks. Cooperation is essential. This makes regional
efforts all the more important, particularly given the links
between cybersecurity, development and economic growth.
National economies that are connected to the global Internet
and that take advantage of Internet services grow faster and
become wealthier. Better cybersecurity lets countries take full
advantage of these opportunities.
For this reason, it is useful to consider what additional measures
could be pursued within the framework of the OAS on a
regional basis, not only among governments but also among
the academic and business communities. LAC, building on the
work already accomplished within the OAS, should focus on
four steps:
First, the region should continue its work to create a harmonized
legal basis for dealing with cybercrime. The best vehicle for
such cooperation is the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime,
but there are political obstacles to reaching agreement. Some
nations object to the Convention on the reasonable grounds that
they were not involved in its negotiation. These nations have not
said what they would change in the Convention, however, and it

is worth noting that countries with weak cybercrime laws suffer
greater losses to their economy.
Second, it would be useful to make further progress in arriving
at common understandings on critical infrastructure and its
vulnerabilities (a point raised by the Colombian expert to the
GGE), including a shared definition of crucial infrastructures.
Third, there would be benefits to a more formal regional approach
to confidence building, building upon the “Consolidated List of
Confidence and Security Building Measures” and drawing on the
work of the OSCE. This would entail the exchange of national
policy documents and laws, regular meetings among relevant
officials, including officials at the political level, to discuss issues
of stability, commerce, and security, and the strengthening
of cooperative networks of responsible officials available for
immediate consultation or assistance in the event of an emergency.
Fourth, the region would benefit from the continued elaboration
of national strategies for cybersecurity. There already has been
progress in this regard, but this progress is not universal. A strategy
brings a degree of organization and coherence to national efforts
and provides transparency and assurance to both citizens and
neighboring countries. The development of a strategy is, of course, a
national prerogative, but there are many benefits to a collaborative
approach in discussion and in developing such strategies.
The general elements of a national strategy can be briefly
described as follows. Countries need a coordinating body
in Presidential or Prime Ministerial offices to oversee
implementation, coordinate agency efforts, and, at times, to
adjudicate disputes. The strategy must allocate responsibilities
for cybersecurity among relevant ministries, and these ministries
must develop strong ties with the private sector to create a
collaborative approach, particularly with regard to electrical
power, telecom and finance. National governments need
adequately staffed cybersecurity organizations that include,
at a minimum, a national computer emergency response team
(CERT) and cyber-capable police. Finally, there must be an effort
to build confidence and cooperative relations with neighboring
countries and that contributes to the global effort to make
cyberspace more secure. Capacity-building remains essential
and all nations benefit from the exchange of best practices and
of information on threats and vulnerabilities. Having a national
strategy is essential for building confidence and security among
the nations of the region.
There has been good progress, but governments ignore
cybersecurity at their peril. As all societies become more
dependent on computer-enabled machines and networks (and,
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this is inevitable as computers are embedded in everyday items
such as cars, and in industrial machinery), the need for action will
grow. In this, the Western Hemisphere has made great strides,
but there is still more work to be done.

James Andrew Lewis
Director
and
Senior
Fellow,
Strategic
Technologies Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
James Andrew Lewis is a senior fellow and
program director at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS). Before joining CSIS,
he worked at the United States (U.S.) Departments
of State and Commerce as a foreign service officer
and as a member of the Senior Executive Service.
His government experience includes work on
Asian politico-military issues, as a negotiator on
conventional arms and technology transfers, and
on military- and intelligence-related technologies.
Lewis led the U.S. delegation to the Wassenaar
Arrangement Experts Group on advanced civil
and military technologies and was the rapporteur
for the UN Group of Government Experts on
Information Security for their successful 2010 and
2013 sessions. He was assigned to U.S. Southern
Command for Operation Just Cause, U.S. Central
Command for Operation Desert Shield, and U.S.
Central American Task Force. Since coming to
CSIS, Lewis has authored numerous publications.
His recent work focuses on cybersecurity,
including the best-selling Securing Cyberspace
for the 44th President, which was commended by
President Obama. Lewis received his Ph.D. from
the University of Chicago.
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Cybersecurity, Privacy and Trust:
Trends in Latin America
and the Caribbean
FGV | Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Marília Maciel, Nathalia Foditsch, Luca Belli and Nicolas Castellon

Introduction: key issues at stake
The goals of cybersecurity strategies are usually twofold: i) To
protect society against cyber threats; and ii) to foster economic
and social prosperity, in a context in which key activities
are based on the use of Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs). In order to fully achieve these goals,
national cybersecurity strategies should be harmonized with
fundamental values and rights, such as privacy, freedom of
expression and due process, as well as with key technical
principles that have allowed innovation on the Internet, such
as openness, universality and interoperability. 1 The respect
for human rights and these architectural principles is key to
strengthening trust and fostering economic growth.

The respect for human rights
and these architectural principles
is key to strengthening trust and
fostering economic growth.

In developed regions of the world, cybersecurity strategies have
a holistic approach, encompassing economic, social, educational,
legal, law-enforcement, technical, diplomatic, military and
intelligence-related aspects.2 Sovereignty considerations in
cybersecurity policy making are increasingly relevant and more
involvement from the military and the intelligence branches
of the government are evident.3 When cybersecurity strategies
are exclusively centered on military and intelligence concerns,
however, they may not encompass the adequate balance

between security and rights, such as privacy and freedom of
expression and association.
The more data that is exchanged with the use of ICT, the more
that cybersecurity and privacy concerns will rise. Moreover,
a growing trend of mandatory data retention requirements
justified under security reasons may conflict with privacy,
anonymity, and freedom of expression, if the limits of data
retention and the use of retained data are not grounded on
principles, such as necessity, proportionality and due process.

Tendencies at the Latin American
and Caribbean level
Awareness of the importance of developing cybersecurity
strategies is increasing among countries in the Latin American
and Caribbean (LAC) region. Some of them already have a
strategy in place, such as Colombia, Jamaica, Panama, and
Trinidad and Tobago. Other countries are in the process of
developing one, such as Costa Rica, Dominica, Peru, Paraguay
and Suriname. The level of maturity of these strategies varies,
including in terms of providing a framework for cooperation
among governmental agencies and with external actors.
In the LAC region, the army and the national security
agencies have not been widely established as coordinators
of cybersecurity policy development. This provides a positive
window of opportunity to develop cybersecurity policies in
multi-stakeholder platforms, including different governmental
branches, academia, the technical community, civil society, and
the private sector. LAC countries will be able to advance a new
notion of cybersecurity that is not derived only from the military
and defense domains, but also from human rights.
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Multi-stakeholder cooperation is noticeable in many LAC
countries. It can be found, for example, in the creation of Computer
Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT), which are widespread
across the region. The collaboration among national CSIRTs has
allowed the exchange of knowledge and good practices, leading
to more secure and robust communications systems. Improvement
of national capabilities is important to boost confidence in private
and public digital services, which paves the way for an emerging
digital economy and reliable e-governance.
One of the main concerns raised in LAC countries has been
defining and penalizing cybercrimes, by either creating new laws
or updating existing ones.4 Brazil offers an interesting case. A
draconian bill containing cybercrime provisions was proposed
before Congress and met strong opposition from academics
and civil society.5 The government was convinced that, rather
than a criminal law, Brazil needed to define the rights and
responsibilities of Internet users. This culminated in the approval
of the Civil Rights Framework for the Internet (Marco Civil),
relating to issues such as the protection of fundamental rights
online, network neutrality, intermediary liability, responsibilities
of the public sector and data retention.

Another regulatory trend in the LAC region is an increasing
concern about the protection of online privacy and personal
data. After the Snowden revelations in 2013, the awareness of
the intersection between cybersecurity and personal data has
become clearer, as it involved daily electronic communications.
As the Internet has become essential for Latin American and
Caribbean socio-economic development, the consequences
of failing to protect it can impact trust in online activities, and
potentially have negative consequences on the Internet economy
and society as a whole.
In his 2014 study entitled, “Latin America and protection of
personal data: Facts and figures (1985–2014)”, Nelson Remolina
Angarita found that 70% of LAC countries have some type of
data protection within their constitutions.6 Moreover, different
countries have already enacted (e.g., Argentina, Antigua and
Barbuda, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay) or
are currently drafting data protection laws (e.g., Brazil).7 In spite
of this, mandatory data retention is a growing practice in the
region and, in many cases, stored data can be obtained without
a court order.
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Data retention may be necessary in some cases to collect
evidence and to enable the investigation of cybercrimes.
However, the collection of personal data for investigation
purposes should be limited to what is necessary for the
prevention of a real danger or the suppression of a specific
criminal offense.8 Therefore, bulk data collection is at odds with
this provision. Although national legislations further regulate
special cases, this should be done in a way that does not
undermine these core principles. Data processing should also be
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose
for which they were stored.9 Without establishing the limits for
data retention, privacy rules will continue to be curtailed and this
may seriously jeopardize the fundamental rights of Internet users.
Moreover, this might represent a costly regulatory burden for
companies, especially those that are of small and medium size.
These are some examples of how these provisions are applied
in the region.
In Argentina, a law 10 was challenged before the Supreme
Court as it authorized the interception of phone and electronic
communications without proper guidelines for the applicability
of the provisions.11 Moreover, it required that data be stored for
10 years. The law was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme

It is also necessary to balance
the costs and benefits of data retention
provisions

Court in 2009.
In Brazil, the Civil Rights Framework for the Internet (Marco
Civil)12, enacted in 2014, is perceived as a progressive document
protecting citizens’ interests. Nevertheless, its provisions relating
to mandatory data retention might arguably tip the balance
towards security concerns over privacy and civil liberties.
According to the Marco Civil, service and application logs should
be stored for six months, whereas connection logs should be
stored for one year.13

10

In Mexico, a telecommunications law 14 with different data
retention provisions was enacted in 2014. Retained data can be
accessed by public authorities without a court order. Moreover,
some data should be stored up to 24 months, which corresponds
to a 12-month increase compared to the standard that was
already in place.
In Paraguay, a proposed bill known as “pyraweb”15 required
Internet service providers to store metadata for one year.16
Moreover, no court order was needed for public authorities to
request the data. After facing political pressure from civil society
groups, the bill was rejected by the Senate.

The way forward
Considering the trends described in this document as well as
the necessity to protect the full enjoyment of Internet users’
human rights, some recommendations can be made. These
recommendations do not encompass the wide range of issues
pertaining to the balance between security and the protection of
human rights. However, they address some fundamental points
to be considered by countries willing to safeguard rights while
tackling important security concerns.
Defining and enforcing sound privacy and data protection
regulatory frameworks
It is essential to balance the provision of security with the need
to properly safeguard the rights of individuals. The approval
and implementation of sound privacy and data protection
frameworks help to achieve this goal. It is also necessary
to balance the costs and benefits of having data retention
provisions. While civil society groups are worried about privacy
issues, industry is concerned with the regulatory burden they
would have to face, which translates into higher costs to operate
their businesses. Principles such as necessity and proportionality
should be used to assess the adequacy of these provisions.
Creating national sustainable multi-stakeholder platforms
It is important to consider the different aspects and implications,
as well as the technical feasibility of enacting new regulations.
Civil society groups, the academic and technical communities,
as well as industry representatives are able to provide valuable
expertise from their perspectives, and help design sound
regulatory frameworks in a sustainable fashion. These multi-

stakeholder networks could help to develop a forward-looking
approach to cybersecurity in the region, which takes into
account technological developments, such as datafication, big
data and the Internet of Things, and considers the impacts of
these technologies on security and privacy.
Strengthening international cooperation
Cybersecurity has been increasingly mainstreamed at the
international level. 17 It is important to create channels for
multi-level cooperation between national governments and
the regional and global international organizations working in
the field. Strengthening regional cooperation can also facilitate
a meaningful inclusion of countries from the region in ongoing
global discussions. The borderless nature of the Internet
enhances the importance of international cooperation and the
harmonization of legal frameworks.

Conclusion
This document provided a brief overview of how LAC countries
have tackled the interplay between cybersecurity and
fundamental rights, focusing particularly on the right to privacy
and to the protection of personal data. It also offered suggestions
on the way forward, such as the development of sound
privacy and data protection frameworks, the strengthening of
international cooperation and the creation of clear frameworks
for collaboration amongst interested stakeholders. It is essential
to encourage the development of appropriate democratic
governance mechanisms—at the national and international
levels—based on a multi-stakeholder effort.
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“A Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT)
is defined as a team or an entity within an agency that
provides services and support to a particular group1
(target community) in order to prevent, manage and
respond to information security incidents. These teams are
usually comprised of multidisciplinary specialists who act
according to predefined procedures and policies in order
to respond quickly and effectively to security incidents and
to mitigate the risk of cyberattacks. There are hundreds of
CSIRTs in the world that vary in mission and scope. One of
the chief ways to classify CSIRTs is to group them by the
sector or community they serve. Below are some of the
national CSIRTs within OAS member states.”

CERTuy
Uruguay

ICIC-CERT
Argentina

OBSERVATORY

CYBERSECURITY

IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

13

Introduction
The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a
global association of incident response teams members in over
70 countries, that enables them to respond more effectively to
security incidents by providing access to best practices, organizing
events and providing computer security incident response team
(CSIRT) education. This paper explores some of the experiences
FIRST has had catering to such a wide constituency, our view on
incident response capability, and what organizations can do to
improve the overall state of cybersecurity in the region.

smaller incident response teams, this can be a tremendous
challenge.

Meeting these challenges
As such, it is important for the incident response community to
acknowledge these differences, and work on ways of addressing
them. Within FIRST, we see success in this area as follows.
• Responding CSIRTs are able to contact others to mitigate
attacks.

An ever more complex world
When we look back at 1989, when FIRST was originally
established, the world was quite a different place from today.
In those early years, our member incident response teams
already dealt with complex incidents, but the scope and amount
of systems they affected were almost universally less than
they are today. The Morris worm, which started affecting the
burgeoning network in 1988, was rumored to affect about 10%
of the Internet, some 6,000 machines in total.1

• When working with another team on an incident, both CSIRTs
speak the same operational language and have accurate
expectations on the use of the information provided.
• The community has the tools and techniques to enable
automated information sharing. Analysts leverage the
information to truly understand the ramifications of the incident
and make the right choices to reduce risk while mitigating the
attack.

Today, a large number of complex issues include the following:
• Large botnets of malicious software, such as Citadel, which
Microsoft Corporation assessed to have infected over 1.9
million clients.2
• Large distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks of up to
500 Gbps, 3 which risk affecting Internet exchange points
(IXPs).4 In addition, these DDoS attacks are enabled through
misconfiguration of thousands of endpoints, making the issue
impossible to resolve for a single nation or organization.
• Co mp le x ma l ic i ou s co d e a t t a ck s l e ve ra g i n g 0-d a y
vulnerabilities, increasing highly targeted attacks and in
cybercrime activity.
These changes require incident responders to adjust rapidly.
Incident response teams on a national level are increasingly
providing a more diverse set of services, including both the
ability to provide reliable information about security threats to
constituents, work with service providers and vendors to ensure
a healthier Internet ecosystem and have strong investigative
skills to analyze attacks that are less well understood. For
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The CSIRT community cannot be
successful in isolation

In order to get to this point, we see the need for development
of a strong, inclusive community of CSIRTs, the availability of
training and education to community members, and the need
for standardized practices within this community.
The CSIRT community cannot be successful in isolation. One of
the interesting aspects of Latin America and the Caribbean is
that there are wide discrepancies between countries’ awareness
of cybersecurity issues, both in government and in the general
population. This is only expected to continue as more new users
come online, evidenced by impressive user growth rates across
the continent. Security efforts must include the development of
a culture of cybersecurity, such as that proposed by OAS,5 which
creates a fertile environment within which CERTs operate.

Efforts should include awareness training of Internet users
and operators, fostering close public-private partnerships
with the private sector, and the development of appropriate
cybercrime policies that take into account and support privacy.
In addition, security really starts with awareness and the use of
best practices in technology. In this regard, an important role
exists for academia to teach non-security professionals how to
build secure technology.

Rooted in the community
Ideally, the CSIRT community should scale up to the point
where each organization has a well-equipped incident response
capability. This may be a single individual, or a small team, but
every organization should be able to take responsibility for the
traffic it emanates. However, given the large number of networks
and their respective growth, this could be considered wishful
thinking. An alternative is for each country to develop its “CSIRT of
last resort”6—a CSIRT that can be a point of coordination for those
networks that may not have a directly reachable, well trained
incident response team. It should be well understood that each
organization is ultimately responsible for its own security—a
national team can only assist in the coordination, but will not be
able to “pull the plug” or investigate every compromised machine.
In 2014, FIRST and CERT.br led an effort within the Internet
Governance Forum to develop best practices for the CSIRT
community. One thing which was universally stated within the
community of participants was the need for a “CSIRT of last
resort” to be developed outside of the community, rather than
be “top down” through a government decision. For a CSIRT to be
effective, trust is an incredibly important requirement, and the
only way trust can develop is through a history of collaboration
and participation in the security community. Whether the
CSIRT is operated by the government, a network provider, a
commercial entity or academia matters less, as long as it is
developed in partnership with the entire security and networking
community within the region.
The need for robust CSIRT in enterprise, academia and
government cannot be underestimated. Governments have an
important role to play in motivating the development of these
teams, but they also need to realize that they cannot “enforce”
trust—they must identify who have gained it, foster its growth for
the country at large, and work with everyone to enable them to
achieve their goals. Trust is also tied to the services a CSIRT offers.
When a CSIRT is correctly focused on responding and mitigating
an incident, foreign corporations and organizations will often

trust them more, and provide more information to support their
mission. This information may be limited when the CSIRT has a
role in criminal prosecution, or is part of an intelligence service.
The types of information provided to either organization tend to
be different, and hence the roles should be properly segregated.

Developing capacity
When a network of CSIRTs exists, it is important for them to
continuously build up their capability. We see three different
levels for improving the delivery of CSIRT services:
Capability – Can you do it? A capability defines a measurable
activity that may be performed as part of an organization’s
roles and responsibilities. For the purpose of the CSIRT services
framework, the capabilities can either be defined as the broader
services or as the requisite tasks, sub-tasks or functions.
Capacity – How much can you do? Capacity defines the number
of simultaneous occurrences of a particular capability that an
organization can execute before they achieve some form of
resource exhaustion.
Maturity – How well can you do it? Maturity defines how
effectively an organization executes a particular capability
within the mission and authorities of the organization.
In order to be successful at increasing the effectiveness of a
CSIRT program, there will need to be a focus on each of these
three elements.
In 2014, FIRST launched an effort to develop a community-driven
education program,7 which is in the process of publishing an
authoritative list of services offered by a CSIRT, and will make
available at no cost, a detailed curriculum for each service. This
effort is supported by several national CSIRTs, including CERT.br
as well as several international organizations, including the OAS,
and is expected to deliver initial training materials by late 2015.

Standards and Standardization
An additional area of investment for the incident response
community is in standardizing procedures and working on
open standards. There is a strong need for standards to enable
incident response teams to exchange data during an incident,
or agree on appropriate methods to deal with a particular type
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of incident. Standards enable teams to capitalize on the trust
they have built with each other and allocate their analysts on
solving difficult problems.
Here we see a strong need for the community to evaluate the
adoption of information exchange standards such as Structured
Threat Information eXpression (STIX) and Trusted Automated
Exchange of Indicator Information (TAXII), as well as standards to
properly define the risk of a particular vulnerability, such as the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System. FIRST has supported these
and other useful standards through sponsoring their development,8
as is the case with CVSS, or by working with our members to
organize training in teaching standardized practices.

Next steps for the community
There is a lot of work to be done to ensure the further
development of a secure Internet for users in Latin America
and the Caribbean, and this work is becoming more crucial
every day as Internet adoption continues to grow at high rates.
Governments have an opportunity to work with the private
sector, civil society and academia to help motivate them to
develop incident response capabilities within their sector,
and within individual organizations. In addition, governments
should ensure that among the teams with national responsibility,
a “CSIRT of last resort” exists for their country, which actively
builds trust with each of these organizations and has the ability
to not decide on their behalf, but coordinate across sectors when
an incident occurs.
The OAS has a unique role to play in its ability to convene
governments within the region to come together and discuss these
topics. In 2015, FIRST signed a Memorandum of Understanding
with the OAS,9 in which we endorsed the OAS’s strong role in
helping build incident response capability in the region. FIRST
looks forward to providing the OAS with support from the
technical community, in addition to our education efforts, in
achieving these goals.
Organizations that are in the unique position where they can
provide funding for these efforts, such as the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) are highly encouraged to consider
supporting these incident response projects. CSIRTs in the
end will limit the losses the local economy will suffer from
cybercrime, and they be a great force for good in a developing
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community. We encourage these organizations to become
proficient at understanding the type of services that are truly
valuable—supporting the core incident response capability,
rather than more expensive and less effective efforts such as
wide-scale monitoring of end-user networks. FIRST hopes to
contribute to these assessments through the publication of our
updated CSIRT services list in late 2015.

Conclusions
The Incident Response community is undergoing significant
changes, in response to changes in the types and complexity
of attacks it needs to respond to. Within the Americas, maturity
of their capabilities is not very uniform, and in need of
improvement. This paper outlined a number of core areas of
focus for governments in the region, and hopes to inform how
the community is currently in process of addressing these, and
where they are in need of support. It identifies how governments
can most benefit the community by identifying where gaps exist,
and motivating existing mechanisms to improve their capability,
or add additional goals and services to meet their economy’s
strategic security requirements.
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CoE | Council of Europe
Alexander Seger

A legal framework on cybercrime and electronic
evidence: what is required?
Effective criminal justice is an essential part of a cybersecurity
strategy. This involves the investigation, prosecution and
adjudication of offences against and by means of computer
systems and data, as well as the securing of electronic evidence
in relation to any crime for the purposes of criminal proceedings.
The transnational nature of cybercrime and, in particular, of
volatile electronic evidence means that criminal justice cannot
be effective without efficient international cooperation.
Comprehensive legislation covering both substantive law
(conduct to be defined as a criminal offence) and procedural
law (investigative powers for law enforcement) is the foundation
of a criminal justice response. Such legislation needs to meet a
number of requirements:
It must be sufficiently (technology) neutral to cater for the
constant evolution of technology and crime as it otherwise risks
being obsolete by the time it enters into force.
Law enforcement powers must be subject to safeguards to
ensure that rule of law and human rights requirements are met.
It must be sufficiently harmonized or at least compatible with
the laws of other countries to permit international cooperation;
for example, to meet the dual criminality condition.
With the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime,2 an international
guideline helping countries meet these requirements is available
and widely used also in the Americas.
In terms of substantive law, it requires parties to criminalize
illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, system
interference, misuse of devices, computer-related forgery,

computer-related fraud, child pornography and offences related
to infringements of copyright and related rights.
It is noteworthy that these provisions alone or in combination
still cover most of what constitutes cybercrime even now,
fourteen years after adoption of the Convention, because they
have been formulated in a technology-neutral manner. Guidance
Notes, adopted by the Cybercrime Convention Committee, show
how different provisions can be applied to address botnets,
distributed denial of service attacks and other phenomena.3
Of course, an international agreement always represents a
minimum common denominator, and a State is free to decide
to go beyond. However, many States, including in the Americas,
often face public opposition when attempting to criminalize
additional types of conduct.
The Budapest Convention comprises a range of specific
procedural law powers such as orders for the search, seizure,
production of data or the interception of communications, as
well as the power to order the expedited preservation of data.
Importantly, these apply to electronic evidence in relation to any
type of crime. They are to be limited by rule of law conditions
and safeguards.
Finally, this treaty is to ensure effective international cooperation
on cybercrime and electronic evidence by combining “traditional”
mutual legal assistance with expedited means to preserve data in
another country, the latter with the support of a network of 24/7
points of contact. Again, cooperation is not limited to cybercrime
but is extended to cooperation on electronic evidence found on
a computer system in relation to any crime.
The Budapest Convention may thus serve as a checklist for the
development of domestic substantive and procedural law on
cybercrime and electronic evidence. It seems that more than 130
States around the world have used it as a guideline in one way or
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another. However, the Convention as a whole is a mature, balanced
and coherent document and is best considered as a whole.

Parliament. It remains to be seen to what extent it will contain
the necessary specific provisions on electronic evidence.

For States becoming Parties, the treaty serves as a legal
framework for international cooperation. The Budapest
Convention is open for accession to any State prepared to
implement its provisions. 4 Indeed, a number of States in
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have decided to follow
this path.

Colombia amended the Criminal Code in 2009 by Law 1273, and
the Criminal Procedure Code in 2011 by Law 1453. With this,
substantive law seems to be largely in line with international
standards; that is, the Budapest Convention. More specific
procedural law provisions may be needed, including for the
expedited preservation of data.

The situation in Latin America and the Caribbean
Since 2004, the OAS—in particular the Meeting of the Minister
of Justice or Attorneys General of the Americas (REMJA) and its
Working Group on Cybercrime—encouraged members of the
OAS to implement the principles of the Budapest Convention on
Cybercrime and to consider accession to that treaty.5
Following REMJA VI in the Dominican Republic in 2006, Costa
Rica and Mexico requested accession and were subsequently
invited to accede. Since then, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, the
Dominican Republic, Panama, and recently also Paraguay and
Peru, followed their example. The Dominican Republic and
Panama have since become Parties to the Budapest Convention
and several others are expected to complete domestic accession
procedures—these are similar to the procedure of ratifying any
international agreement—shortly.
This process has been accompanied by domestic criminal law
reforms. Here are some examples from Latin America:
In 2013, the Dominican Republic became the first country in
Latin America to join the Budapest Convention. Law 53-07 of
2007 transposed the provisions of this treaty into domestic law,
not only with respect to substantive but also procedural law.
With respect to the latter, this is atypical for Latin America where
preference is given to applying procedural powers to electronic
evidence by analogy.6
Argentina in 2008, through Law 26.388, brought substantive
criminal law in line with the Budapest Convention. With
regard to procedural powers, Argentina seems to face certain
difficulties. Apart from the fact that Argentina is a federation
where procedural law is primarily a provincial matter, general
evidence rules are applied by analogy to electronic evidence.
This approach creates problems in practice. In Argentina, a full
reform of the Criminal Procedure Code is being considered by

Costa Rica had introduced provisions specific to cybercrime
through several amendments to the Penal Code since 1999,
and more recently through Law 9048 (November 2012), Law
9135 (April 2013) and Law 9177 (November 2013). In addition,
special laws apply, for example, if offences involve computers
of the tax administration or of customs. Substantive criminal law
thus seems to be largely in line with the Budapest Convention.
A complementary law on accession to the Budapest Convention
is before Parliament.

The Budapest Convention may
thus serve as a checklist for the
development of domestic substantive
and procedural law on cybercrime
and electronic evidence

In Mexico, amendments to substantive and procedural laws
are about to be finalized which will permit Mexico to complete
accession to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. Broad
consensus among key stakeholders on the need for these reforms
was achieved through a conference in Mexico City on March 31 to
April 2, 2014. This event brought together the executive, legislative
and judicial powers of the country, as well as data protection
authorities, civil society organizations and industry. A number
of other Latin American countries participated and soon after
the meeting, Paraguay and Peru also requested accession to the
Budapest Convention. This example underlines the necessity to
seek broad consensus when undertaking legislative reforms.
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In Paraguay, Law 4439 of 2011 amended the Penal Code which
now covers most of the provisions of the Budapest Convention.
A working group has been established to prepare reforms of
procedural law.
Peru, in October 2013, had passed Law 30096 on cybercrime
(Delitos Informáticos), parts of which met public opposition. It
was amended by Law 30171 of April 2014. With this, substantive
criminal law is now largely in line with the Budapest Convention.
Specific procedural law tools for electronic evidence are not yet
available and other provisions are used by analogy.
Legal reforms have also been undertaken or are underway in
many countries of the Caribbean. Some of them have made
use of the Commonwealth Model Law (2002). Barbados is
one example; the Computer Misuse Act 2005-04 introduced a
fairly complete legal framework on cybercrime and electronic
evidence, including procedural law powers, already in 2005. As
the Commonwealth Model Law of 2002, in turn, was based on
the Budapest Convention, the Computer Misuse Act of Barbados
seems mostly in line with international standards.
In Dominica, several bills are currently under discussion,
including the draft Electronic Crimes Act. Inconsistencies, gaps
and risks in an earlier draft are now apparently being addressed.
It would seem that some other countries of the Caribbean are
encountering similar problems. One reason may be the reliance
on untested “models” or “guidelines”.7

Conclusions
Most LAC states are engaged in a process of legal reform to
address the challenge of cybercrime through effective criminal
justice measures.
The OAS, through REMJA, has recommended for more than
ten years that its Member States use the Budapest Convention
on Cybercrime as a guideline. The underlying assumption is
that legislation based on this treaty is sufficiently harmonized
with international standards to permit effective international
cooperation.
The Budapest Convention was opened for signature in 2001,
but remains highly relevant. The Cybercrime Convention
Committee (www.coe.int/tcy), comprising the Parties to the
Budapest Convention—including now also the Dominican
Republic and Panama—assesses the implementation of the
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treaty by the Parties, prepares Guidance Notes to address new
phenomena and may also prepare additional legal instruments,
such as binding protocols. The Convention and the work of the
Committee are backed up by capacity building programs (www.
coe.int/cybercrime). This triangle of standards, follow up and
capacity building creates a dynamic process.
The provisions of this treaty are hardly controversial. Their
transposition into domestic law is thus less likely to face
opposition if followed correctly and with the required safeguards.
Several LAC countries have encountered major public resistance
when attempting to introduce crimes and procedural law powers

In Latin America, many states have
succeeded in adopting substantive
criminal law provisions largely based
on this treaty. The main challenge in
this region seems to be the adoption
of specific procedural law powers

beyond the Convention.
In Latin America, many states have succeeded in adopting
substantive criminal law provisions largely based on this treaty.
The main challenge in this region seems to be the adoption
of specific procedural law powers. While criminal procedure
codes tend to be rather modern, application by analogy of
provisions that function well in the physical world or reliance
on the principle of evidentiary freedom (principio de libertad
probatoria) are not sufficient to address the specific challenges
of electronic evidence.
The search and seizure of computers and data or the interception
of communications for criminal justice purposes represent an
interference with the fundamental rights of individuals. Such
an interference must be based on specific legal provisions. The
adoption of procedural law powers, such as those of Articles
16 to 21 Budapest Convention and subject to conditions and
safeguards, will help meet rule of law and human rights
requirements.

In the Caribbean, the adoption of procedural law powers as
such appears to be less of an issue. Problems seem to be due to
the fact that international standards are not always followed when
laws are drafted. This sometimes leads to gaps and inconsistencies,
overreach and risks to human rights and the rule of law.
As indicated at the outset, comprehensive legislation is the
foundation for an effective criminal justice response to the
challenges of cybercrime and electronic evidence. A wide
range of additional measures to ensure actual application of
laws and efficient international cooperation will be necessary,
including specialized cybercrime units as recommended also by
the OAS REMJA Working Group on Cybercrime.8 The specialized
prosecutors in Argentina (Buenos Aires), Brazil, Chile or Paraguay
seem to be examples of good practice.
In conclusion, the recommendations of the REMJA with regard
to criminal law reform on cybercrime and electronic evidence
since 2004 remain very much valid today.
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Executive Secretary Cybercrime Convention Committee,
Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France. The views expressed
here do not necessarily reflect the official position of
the Council of Europe or of the Parties to the Budapest
Convention on Cybercrime.
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http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG
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http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/
Source/Cybercrime/TCY/Guidance_Notes/
TCY(2013)29rev_GN%20compilation_v3.pdf

4.

States that participated in the negotiation of the
Convention (Member States of the Council of Europe,
Canada, Japan, South Africa and the United States) may sign
and ratify it. Any other State may become a Party through
accession. The result is the same.

5.
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http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dlc/remja/pdf/recomm_IX.pdf
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyber_experts.htm

6.

Draft Law 4055 of Guatemala also comprises procedural
powers modelled on the Budapest Convention but is
pending adoption.

7.

The Cybercrime Convention Committee in December
2014 decided “to point at the risks and concerns
related to so-called “model laws” on cybercrime
prepared and disseminated by different organizations”
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/Source/
Cybercrime/TCY/2014/3021_model_law_study_v15.pdf | http://
www.oas.org/juridico/PDFs/VIIIcyb_recom_en.pdf

8.

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/
Source/Cybercrime/TCY/2014/T-CY(2014)22_
Plen12AbrRep_V5provisional.pdf See also the related
discussion paper.
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Digital Economy and Cyber
Security in Latin America
and the Caribbean
WEF | World Economic Forum
Global Agenda Council on Cybersecurity

Latin America, the Caribbean and the cyber world
In the span of a few decades, the Internet, also known as
cyberspace, has made the leap from an unknown platform used
almost exclusively by academics and the technologically savvy,
to a critical infrastructure network, competing with energy or
water in importance, and present in almost every aspect of our
daily lives. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have also
been part of this cyber transformation, and though it is far from
leading the digital revolution, the region has made significant
progress in the past few years. On the World Economic
Forum’s 2015 Networked Readiness Index (NRI), an index that
measures ICT readiness across a number of factors ranging from
governance to usage to economic impact, 14 of the 23 countries
in the region increased their scores.
There are many examples of regional governments rising to the
challenges and opportunities in cyberspace. In 2012, Costa Rica
introduced cybercrime penalties into the nation’s penal code,
and established a specialized agency to respond to cybersecurity
threats (rising by 9 spots on the NRI). Peru also recently passed
laws that added cybercrime to the national penal code, as well
as legislation establishing data protection and cybercrime
legal norms (jumping 16 spots on the NRI). Regional cyber
infrastructure has also been improved in the region. Bolivia
more than doubled its mobile network coverage between
2007 and 2015, precipitating a rise in the NRI ranking on this
measure from 128 in 2012 to number one in 2015. On the per
capita Patent Cooperation Treaty ICT patent filings, Barbados
went from an already respectable 34 in 2012 to 6 in 2015, just
ahead of Switzerland, the United States, the Netherlands and
Singapore—all technology heavyweights.
However, LAC countries need to continue to prioritize
cyberspace development in order not to fall behind other
areas of the world in their exploitation of the economic
opportunities, as well as addressing the challenges of

cybersecurity. Several factors, including political and
regulatory environments, workforce skill level, and
development of innovation systems combine to put many LAC
countries behind nations at similar tiers of development in the
NRI. Brazil, the largest economy in the region, is placed at 84 in
networked readiness, with most other medium and large Latin
American economies faring little better or coming in at even
lower rankings.1 The key to unlocking future development in
the LAC region is to understand the trends in cyberspace and
enact solutions to achieve full potential impact in the region.

Room for Improvement
The current state of the digital economy in Latin American and
the Caribbean leaves much to be desired, characterized by a
general lag in quality behind other parts of the world and large
variations within the region. According to the NRI, 65% of the
LAC region falls in the bottom half of the rankings, compared to
56% of Asia, 52% of the Middle East and North Africa and 22% of
Eastern Europe. The top ranked country in the region, Chile (38)
is nearly 100 places ahead of the bottom ranked country—Haiti
(137).2 According to the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Latin America is home to 300 million Internet-users—
over half the region’s population.3 This figure, however, masks
wide disparities in adoption within the region. According to the
Global Information Technology Report 2015, most countries in
the region fall within the bottom half of percentage of citizens
who are Internet users. Even the large economies, such as
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, fall in the middle
of the pack with only 43.5% of Mexicans being Internet users
and only 30.7% of households having Internet access. Much of
Central America fairs even more poorly on Internet usage and
access rates. Availability of new technologies also lags many
other countries at the same level of development with many
of the large economies falling at or below average and some
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countries coming in near the end of the rankings. Additionally,
while mobile phone subscription rates, with the exception of
Mexico, Guyana and Haiti, are higher than the United States,
most of the region falls in the bottom half of NRI mobile
broadband subscription rates. However, reflective of a trend of
lower and middle income countries to rely on mobile broadband
rather than a fixed Internet connection, mobile broadband
subscription rates are higher than fixed subscriptions, and are
growing. Some countries have already embraced mobile Internet
with great enthusiasm—Costa Rica, for example, has 9.7 fixed
broadband subscriptions per 100 people, while it has 72 mobile
broadband subscriptions per 100 users.

With all these developments, cyber
risks are increasingly becoming a
concern and fast becoming a factor in
broader security and economic policymaking considerations

With all these developments, cyber risks are increasingly
becoming a concern and fast becoming a factor in broader
security and economic policymaking considerations.
Cybersecurity awareness is growing as threats and vulnerabilities
are recognized to have the potential to stifle innovation and
advancement of the Internet based-economy, placing individuals
and organizations at risk. While almost all countries in the region
recognize the need for a cybersecurity strategy, hardly any have
moved beyond the outline stage. Only the largest and wealthiest
countries in the region have distinct organizations dedicated to
cybersecurity and even where such organizations are present,
overall cyber preparedness still remains inhibited by a lack of
coordination between sectors and agencies. The private sector
has generally outpaced the government in its recognition of
the importance of cybersecurity, while awareness among the
general public varies across the region.
Awareness is sure to increase, however, as more and more
government services move online and spark more conversations
about security implications—a conversation that is already
underway in much of the region where it concerns e-commerce.
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Issues of privacy on the Internet have led to a patchwork of
standards and different levels of protection across the region.
Part of the problem regarding the underdeveloped state of
awareness stems from the lack of cybersecurity educational
infrastructure—a need that the Organization of American States
(OAS) is actively addressing. A few countries offer educational
programs at the postgraduate level for cybersecurity, and
professional training programs are more common, but vary
in quality. Additionally, they suffer from the problem of skills
dissemination and training infrastructure. One bright spot,
however, exists with regard to cybersecurity legal and regulatory
issues. While there is wide variance in the quantity and quality
of cyber legislation, the region scores well on issues the public is
most concerned with regarding security on the Internet—privacy,
data protection and human rights. Cybercrime law and criminal
procedure are well developed in the region as well, though a
major area with room for improvement is the ability to leverage
cyber skills in law enforcement, as indicated in the data provided
by Latin American and Caribbean countries for this study.

Strategies for cyber success
The diversity of issues facing the digital economy and
cybersecurity calls for an inventive set of responses. The Global
Information Technology Report highlights several simple
government policies that can help increase Internet access to
residents. One approach is to increase government use of ICT
as part of state policy. This increases competitiveness in the
market to provide services, forcing them to innovate while
simultaneously socializing the utility of the Internet among those
who must use it to interact with their government. The report also
recommends nurturing local information technology businesses,
a practice that not only organically fosters development in
information and communication technologies, but also can
develop an industry that understands the local culture, which in
and of itself, speeds up adoption. Overall, the findings indicate
that common successful elements that provide for effective
e-government and improving economies are political support
from the highest levels of authority, knowledgeable and wellplaced human capital (individuals who not only understand
the field, but who can connect with the right authorities and
effectively communicate needs) and financial resources (as well
as the willingness to specifically devote those resources to ICT
development).4
In a 2015 report, the Brookings Institution recommended
several other best practices to improve the quality of the
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digital economy in ways that can be easily implemented in
Latin America and the Caribbean. These include intuitive
solutions such as reducing costs, improving network efficiency
and expanding digital infrastructure. Other solutions are more
novel, such as providing diverse content and encouraging
multilingualism. Brookings even suggests simply lowering
or eliminating taxes on mobile services, pointing to a GSMA
study that found that a 1% decrease in the tax burden leads to
a broadband penetration increase of 1.8%, and an economic
growth increase of.7%, showing that even relatively simple steps
that may not require large infrastructure investment can still
produce results.5
On the cybersecurity front, several major trends are emerging
that could reduce present vulnerability in the system and prepare
LAC for the future. One trending topic in cybersecurity today
is the idea of improving cyber hygiene—teaching individuals
and organizations basic prevention techniques to defend
against low-level cyberattacks (which are the vast majority) and
allow resources to focus on large attacks or develop national
cybersecurity strategies. The advantage of cyber hygiene is that
it can be devised inexpensively and disseminated widely, often
relating to little more than a checklist of behaviors or a simple
training session.
The effectiveness of cyber hygiene stands to be enhanced by
another major development: the fostering of the realignment
of industry incentives to encourage security-first thinking for
technology vendors. The idea is to steer vendors towards making
the security of their products as much a priority as speed or
graphic quality. Ideas being floated to advance this idea range
from incentivizing vendors with a kind of contract windfall
(such as paying software developer a bonus if a defined time
period goes by without a cybersecurity incidents) or driving
the demand from the customer side with a seal of approval,
similar to “cruelty-free” designation on foods. Again, government
investment and involvement in local ICT industries could be the
catalyst that addresses this problem. Governments are often the
largest customers for some vendors, and their demands for more
secure products could force changes in trickle-down products
that are sold to individual consumers and other organizations.
Many in the cybersecurity community advocate for new norms
of collaboration between stakeholders. These collaboration
norms would not only give countries, industries and other actors
rules of engagement within cyberspace but they would also
be a framework to improve the potentially crippling lack of
coordination among and within nations in the event of a large
cybersecurity event. Several international bodies are moving
towards more concrete norms of collaboration on cybersecurity.
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This is an area ripe for regional, if not global, cooperation to better
coordinate policy and identify best practices—a process that Latin
American and Caribbean countries are well positioned to lead.

Governments are often some of the
largest customers for some vendors,
and their demands for more secure
products could force changes in
trickle-down products that are sold
to individual consumers and other
organizations

On all of these fronts, public-private cooperation is essential.
Involving local ICT businesses, as well as large international
vendors and civil society organizations, is the best way to
discover and share best practices and in the design of the
most effective and efficient solutions. The interdependent
nature of the hyper-connected world demands collaboration.
The World Economic Forum’s commitment to cyber resilience
principles are an example of a framework that facilitates
cooperation between multiple groups on cybersecurity. The
principles aim to recognize the issues, develop practical and
effective solutions, and encourage other groups, particularly
customers and suppliers, to make similar commitments towards
improving cybersecurity. This type of multi-stakeholder, multisectoral strategy will need to be applied by Latin America and
the Caribbean and, indeed, every other country if they are to
construct beneficial cybersecurity environments.

Way forward
Creating an efficient, prosperous and secure corner within
cyberspace is easier said than done, and even the most
prepared nations are just a beat away from sliding below the
curve. Deloitte estimates that improved Internet access in the
developing world will lead to productivity gains of over 25%,

GDP growth of over 72%, and a lift of 160 million people out
of poverty.6 The gains reaped from broader integration into
cyberspace are not just felt in the wallet, but in every aspect
of life including education, health, inclusion and human rights.7
These gains are underpinned by trust in the digital ecosystem. No
country, large or small, is immune to cyberattacks, which come
from both state and non-state actors in a constantly evolving
technological landscape.
The networked world is fueling economic growth, and
improving living standards. It is also creating threats that were
unimaginable just a generation ago. LAC countries have a great
deal of work ahead. Closing gaps between countries and moving
the region forward will be a formidable task. It is fortunate that
The region has shown that they are up to the challenge and are
already using existing knowledge to improve cyber capability
and security. The region stands in a good position to not only
learn from best practices, but help create new ones, as well as
realize its full potential as a participant in the global digital
economy.
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Internet penetration and the wider adoption of information
communications technologies (ICTs) are reshaping many aspects
of the world’s economies, governments, and societies. Everything
from the way goods and services are produced, distributed, and
consumed, to how governments deliver services and disseminate
information, to how businesses, and citizens interact and
participate in the social contract are affected. The opportunities
associated with becoming connected and participating in the
Internet economy and the potential economic impact cannot
be ignored.
Two thirds of Internet users today live in the developing world
and are driving most of the global economic growth. McKinsey
estimated that in 2011, the worldwide contribution of the
Internet accounted for almost 3% of global gross domestic
product (GDP),1 and Internet access is growing almost four times
as fast in developing countries than in developed ones. OAS
Member States have especially benefited from ICT penetration
and increased connectivity, thus opening new economic and
social opportunities for urban and rural populations, and have
become the largest distribution platform to provide public and
private services—including banking, education, and healthcare
to millions of under-served people.2 Although a great disparity
in Internet penetration between developed and developing
countries still exists, the demand for 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week at high speed and capacity to Internet-facing services is
increasing exponentially.3
It is not surprising, therefore, that international organizations
such as the OAS, the World Bank, the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), have launched and are funding
projects to close the connectivity gap and leverage the benefits
stemming from the use of ICTs to stimulate economic growth,
to improve service delivery and capacity, to drive innovation
and productivity gains, and to promote good governance. Many
of their reports and publications praise the role that ICTs play

in advancing these countries’ development strategies and
governance accountability, providing strong indicators in
support of increased Internet connectivity and wider digital
ecosystems. The World Bank, for example, estimates that when
10% of the population in developing countries is connected to
the Internet, the country’s GDP grows by 1% to 2%,4 while the
World Economic Forum reported that even doubling mobile
broadband data use can lead to a 0.5% increase in GDP. 5 At
the same time, however, the transformational power of ICT
as a catalyst for GDP growth and social development can be
easily undermined if the security risks associated with the
proliferation of ICT infrastructure and Internet applications
are not properly balanced with comprehensive cybersecurity
and resiliency plan.6
There are two competing interests in realizing the promise
and potential of ICTs and the Internet. First, there is a digital
agenda and economic vision that promises to generate income
and employment, provide access to businesses and information,
increase productivity and efficiency, enable e-learning, enhance
work force skills, facilitate government activities, and spread
prosperity by increasing GDP growth and thus reducing poverty.
Yet, the only way countries can achieve such results is if their
ICT development agenda is sustainable:
• Environmentally, by mitigating the negative environmental
impacts (e.g., greenhouse gas emissions, e-waste generation,
environmental degradation) of the increased growth in ICT
networks and devices.
• Economically, by providing more affordable, reliable, and
persistent Internet access for all.7
• Socially, by maximizing the potential contribution of ICTs to
social equity and inclusiveness.
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• Politically, by enabling citizen participation in government
and decision-making processes.

dependence on the Internet will not permit them to abandon
the path they are on.10

The second is security. It is not enough for increased Internet
connectivity to be sustainable—it must also be secure and cyber
resilient. Indeed, our reliance on this complex infrastructure
has come with a price: by connecting so many aspects of
our economy and vital services to the Internet, we have also
exposed ourselves to a range of nefarious cyber activities that
can undermine the availability, integrity, and resilience of this
core infrastructure, threatening the economic—and also the
technological, political, and social—benefits of the Internet.
For example, several of the Group of Twenty economies have
estimated that they are losing at least 1% of their GDP to
cybercrime, intellectual property theft, and other electronic
fraudulent activities. No nation can afford to lose even 1% of its
GDP to illicit cyber activities. As computing and communications
technologies become more entrenched in the global economy
and as we enter the era of the “Internet of Things”, incentives to
compromise the security of these systems will continue to rise.
We must recognize that the threats to our connected society
are outpacing our defenses and GDP growth is being severely
eroded. Put simply, cyber insecurity taxes growth, and countries
need to demonstrate a commitment to security and resilience
to maintain the promise of connectivity and realize the full
potential of the Internet economy.

OAS and IDB have focused many of their efforts on creating
and engendering a culture of cybersecurity in the region. They
are committed to working with their member states to combat
cybercrime, strengthen cyber resilience, and promote sustainable
ICT development strategies. In particular, the OAS and IDB are
assisting their Member States to anticipate and react to new cyber
threats.

No nation can afford to lose 1% of its
GDP to illicit cyber activities

This Internet infrastracture entanglement is a strategic
vulnerability for all connected societies,8 and there is much
at stake. The positive impact of the Internet on countries,
communities, businesses, and citizens alike can only be sustained
if the service is accessible, available, affordable, secure,
interoperable, resilient, and stable.9 This is why the Internet
and its underlying value proposition has become an economic
and national security imperative. Global leaders must wrestle
with the fact that their Internet infrastructure and services to
citizens are vulnerable to interference and that their economic
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Unfortunately, most nations have yet to do that. Most
development strategies champion the benefits of fast, affordable,
and far-reaching broadband communication and increased
reliance on Internet-facing services in terms of economic
growth. However, few of them consider the exposure and
costs of less resilient critical services, disruption of service(s),
e-crime, identity theft, intellectual property theft, fraud, and
other activities exploiting ICT hyper-connectivity in terms of
economic loss. Global leaders must recognize that increased
Internet connectivity can lead to economic growth, but only
if that Internet connection—and the ICT infrastructure that
underpins it—is secure. If countries do not invest equally in
the security of their core infrastructure and resilience of their
systems, the costs imposed by nefarious cyber activities will tax
their economic growth.
Global leaders can harness the economic power of ICTs while
avoiding irreversible damages to the long-term economic health,
safety, and resilience of their countries only if security plays
an equally important role in their development strategies.
They can then leverage policy, law, regulation, standards,
market incentives, and other initiatives to protect the value
of their digital investments and preserve the security of their
connectivity. They can pursue and fund cybersecurity initiatives
that lower risks and increase resilience.
The Cyber Readiness Index, developed by the Potomac Institute,
addresses these issues and provides the blueprint for countries to
follow.11 It helps inform a country’s understanding of its Internet
Infrastructure entanglement and resulting vulnerability. It also
provides a solid foundation through which each country can
assess its cybersecurity maturity. It identifies seven essential
elements where cybersecurity can be used to protect the
value and integrity of previous ICT investments and enable
the Internet economy, namely, national strategy and policy
formulation; incident response capacity; e-crime initiatives and
law enforcement capacity needs; information sharing initiatives;
investment in research and development; diplomacy and trade;
and military capacity and cyber defense initiatives.

Adopting a security framework and knowing a country’s cyber
readiness level is indeed essential. The first step a country
should take to develop this framework is to articulate a sound
National Cybersecurity Strategy. This strategy must: outline
the problem in economic terms; identify the competent
authority that will ensure proper execution of the strategy;
include specific, measurable, attainable, results- and timebased objectives in the implementation plan; and recognize
the need to commit limited resources (e.g., political will,
money, time, and people) in a competitive environment to
achieve the necessary economic outcomes. Various OAS
Member States have started to devise such strategies to
manage cybersecurity, and have made important strides
in developing cyber-related policies, doctrines, legal
frameworks, and technical capacity. Colombia, in particular,
has had a national policy for cybersecurity and cyber defense
in place for several years (CONPES 3701)12 and, recently, it has
been working on a new comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Strategy to reflect its commitment to being cyber ready in
the areas of governance and institutional leadership at the
national level, strengthening incident response capacity and
private-public partnerships, developing cyber awareness, and
deepening cyber education.
Other essential elements are countries’ ability to establish
and maintain a national incident response capability and an
information sharing mechanism that enables the exchange
of actionable intelligence between government and industry.
Most Latin American and Caribbean countries have already
established and operationalized national CSIRTs or capabilities,
and are expanding the services provided by these units beyond
reactive functions to include proactive, preventive, educational,
and security management services. Establishing formal
information-sharing mechanisms is still a major challenge in the
region, although most national authorities maintain open and
active lines of communication and collaboration with critical
sectors and key enterprises.
Having a strategy and commitment is only the beginning.
Other key aspects to being cyber ready include a country’s
commitment to protect society against cybercrime through
international and domestic legal and regulatory mechanisms,
and the ability to fight cybercrime—including training of
law enforcement agents, forensics specialists, jurists, and
legislators. Panama, for example, is a member of the Budapest
Convention on Cybercrime and has worked tirelessly to update
national legislation to more effectively combat cybercrime
and strengthen data protection. In addition, it has established
a Special Prosecutor for Crimes against Intellectual Property and
Information Security, which is part of the Public Ministry, and

an investigation unit for cybercrime, under the Directorate of
Judicial Investigation. These agencies will lead the investigation
and prosecution of cybercrimes.
Countries must also invest in cybersecurity basic and applied
research (innovation) and fund cybersecurity initiatives broadly
if they wish to take advantage of the opportunities afforded
by the Internet economy while simultaneously sustaining a
strong cybersecurity position. Chile, for instance, has taken full
advantage of its high connectivity and has launched various
initiatives to develop its high-tech industry. The Startup Chile
program, managed by the Chilean Economic Development
Agency via InnovaChile, is helping to transform Chile into an
innovation and entrepreneurship hub in Latin America. This
accelerator program seeks to attract early stage, high-potential
entrepreneurs in Chile, using it as a platform to go global.
Additionally, the University of Chile offers advanced degrees in
cybersecurity and the entrepreneur community is expected to
provide additional lectures and mentorship.
Another key element often overlooked is countries’ willingness
and ability to engage diplomatically or during trade negotiations
on cyber-related issues. Guatemala, for example, showed
strong cyber diplomatic capacity in 2012 while chairing the
OAS Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The country
championed a Declaration on Strengthening Cybersecurity in
the Americas, which resulted in its unanimous adoption and
heightened recognition of the security and resilience of critical
information infrastructure, especially for institutions essential
to national security sectors, such as communications, energy,
finance, and transportation.13
Finally, states are starting to build on the ability of their national
armed forces and/or related defense agencies to defend their
country kinetically to provide similar defense via cyberspace
in response to cybersecurity threats. Brazil, for instance, has
already developed advanced cyber defense capabilities and
recently established a formal Cyber Defense Command—
Comando de Defesa Cibernética—and a National Cyber
Defense School with representatives from all three Brazilian
armed forces.
While Internet penetration and infrastructure modernization are
expanding and maturing quickly, it is essential that countries
establish a framework for cyber-resilient connected societies
upfront, preserving the promise of the ICT dividend—sustainable
development with built-in security. As populations in the OAS
region continue to move, grow, and expand their economic and
social opportunities, and countries start to adopt the Internet
of Things, it becomes increasingly important to address cyber
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risk, security, resilience, and exposure in unison with sustainable
development goals. Countries need to signal that security,
sustainability, and resilience are equally important to their
growth agenda. OAS and IDB initiatives are accelerating Latin
American and Caribbean countries to put policies, plans, laws,
and regulations in place to promote ICT development and use.
They are placing cybersecurity at the top of their policy and
social agenda.
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Overview
Professor Sadie Creese, Global Cybersecurity Capacity Centre
University of Oxford

The manner in which nation states and regions address
cybersecurity capacity is essential for effective, efficient
and sustainable cybersecurity. It is imperative that as an
international community we advocate a comprehensive and
holistic approach to building cybersecurity capacity to foster a
secure, safe, and competitive digital economy, and to gain the
benefits that cyberspace participation can bring to societies and
people everywhere. The Global Cybersecurity Capacity Centre
(GCSCC), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) have embedded this
approach to capacity building into the core of our cooperation
as members of this international community.

The CMM is the first of its kind in terms of the breadth and
depth in each aspect of cybersecurity capacity. It is built on a
foundation of multi-stakeholder consultation and respect for
human rights, carefully balancing the need for security to enable
economic growth and sustainability while respecting the right
to freedom of expression and privacy.

For the people to better understand what effective cybersecurity
may look like through the experience and learning of the
world, the GCSCC, through broad consultation with over 200
international experts drawn from government, academia,
industry and the technical community, has developed a model
to understand the maturity of cybersecurity capabilities. The
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model, (CMM) approaches
cybersecurity considerations through five distinct areas/
dimensions of capacity, understanding that each dimension is
not necessarily independent of one another.

This application tool, which uses
the CMM as its foundation, is designed
to help a nation assess its current
cybersecurity capacity, and to
prescribe where to invest to enable
a more mature and resilient capacity
and improved security of national
infrastructure

The five dimensions are: National Cybersecurity Policy and
Strategy; Cyber Culture and Society, Cybersecurity Education,
Training and Skills; Legal and Regulatory Frameworks; and
Standards, Organization and Technologies. Each dimension
provides a number of factors and indicators of cyber capacity in
order for a nation to understand the stage of maturity in each
specific consideration. Five stages of maturity have been identified
and these vary from an initial stage of maturity where a nation may
have just begun to consider cybersecurity, through to a dynamic
stage where a nation is able to quickly adapt to changes in the
cybersecurity landscape pivoting around threat, vulnerability, risk,
economic strategy or changing international needs.

In order to ensure that the CMM is applicable to the specific
regional characteristics of Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC), the Inter-American Development Bank, the OAS and
University of Oxford developed an application tool for the region.
This application tool, which uses the CMM as its foundation,
is designed to help a nation assess its current cybersecurity
capacity, and to prescribe where to invest to enable a more
mature and resilient capacity and improved security of national
infrastructure. The application tool, therefore, serves to help

OBSERVATORY

CYBERSECURITY

IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

39

governments or nations make better informed strategic
cybersecurity capacity investments in line with competing
national priorities.
There are a handful of countries across the world that may
fall within a higher stage of maturity. It is unlikely that any
nation would possess evidence to fall within a dynamic
stage of maturity across all factors and indicators of the five
dimensions outlined in the CMM and application tool. Significant
strides in cyber capacity in the LAC region have been made
to improve connectivity across the region. With increasing
Internet penetration rates, it is not surprising that government
and industry stakeholders are concerned about a lack of
cybersecurity capacity, and some have begun the process to
place cybersecurity as a national priority.
It is very encouraging to see that a number of countries have
recently taken the important step of forming and publishing
a National Cybersecurity Strategy, outlining priorities for
investments in these countries with emphasis on securing
critical national infrastructure (CNI), developing legislation to
effectively combat cybercrime, and establishing frameworks for
responsible disclosure of incidents.
The data collected in this study shows that a number of countries
possess a national CSIRT or are in the process of formally
establishing an incident response capability. Where National
Cybersecurity Strategies are not yet developed, we observe an
emerging trend where a national CSIRT takes on a broader role
to coordinate cybersecurity and cooperate with law enforcement
in the instances of attack.
There is great value in developing a national strategy for
cybersecurity through multi-stakeholder consultation and
inter-ministerial approaches. There are excellent examples of
inter-ministerial steering committees and/or task forces in the
region that include industry and civil society representation. For
example, as the report indicates, Jamaica launched its National
Cybersecurity Strategy in January of this year. In doing so, the
country created the National Cybersecurity Task Force. The
exercise of developing a National Strategy is valuable in many
ways, as it brings all stakeholders that may have a responsibility
for cybersecurity to one table. It outlines national priorities,
mandates, and relative authorities, taking into consideration
national priorities tailored for one nation or region. The
Global Cybersecurity Capacity Centre was privileged, through
cooperation with the OAS, to contribute to the development
of Jamaica’s National Cybersecurity Strategy and witnessed its
launch in January of this year.
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Cooperation with international organizations such as Interpol
in the effective combat of cybercrime is also noted, enhancing
capacities to fight crime through development of legislative
frameworks but also specialist investigative training, processing
of electronic evidence and training of judges and the prosecution.
It is also very encouraging to see intra-regional agreements,
such as the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, being highlighted by many member nations
as an important mechanism to fight computer-related crimes.
Another encouraging development is regional cooperation with
examples from Suriname that advocate on behalf of the region
at international fora.

Through the driving force of the
IDB and OAS, the region is the first in
the world to undertake this deep and
broad understanding of cybersecurity
capacity across an entire region using
the CMM

The promotion of cybersecurity skills through building a
knowledge base and raising cybersecurity awareness is an
evidenced priority in the region. Awareness-raising efforts are
a vital tool to change cybersecurity behavior, but should be
implemented in conjunction with other influencing strategies.
Chile, in recent years, has begun conducting targeted awareness
campaigns such as the Safe Internet Campaign and Digital
Consumer Campaign, which seek to raise cybersecurity awareness,
particularly demographics. It is very important to embed positive
information security behaviors, which can result in habitual secure
practice. These practices, supported by user-friendly security
technologies, provide a solid foundation for a cyber-resilient
society.
Also noteworthy are the incentives for training and education, in
the region. There are educational offerings in information security
education and training. Courses on cybersecurity are offered by
universities within a variety of Bachelor and Master’s Degrees.
While this report does not go into the specifics of the courses
offered, it does indicate that some universities in the LAC region

seek accreditation for cybersecurity courses, such as universities
in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Peru, among others.
The Latin America and the Caribbean region is to be commended
in this landmark study, mapping cybersecurity capacity in the
region. Through the driving force of the IDB and OAS, the
region is the first in the world to undertake this deep and broad
understanding of cybersecurity capacity across an entire region
using the CMM. In addition to promoting a comprehensive
approach to cybersecurity capacity building at the national level,
this report in the Latin American and the Caribbean means that
member governments, together with support from the donor and
international community, can make more strategic collaborative
investments in cybersecurity capacity, capitalizing on existing
resources and better directing foreign investment.
The stages of maturity outlined in the model are not designed
to be static, nor solely progressive. It is understood that a nation
may decide, for example, to invest heavily to improve their
legislative frameworks and criminal justice capacity, which
may progress their maturity in one area of capacity from an
initial stage to an established one. Conversely, if a nation stops
conducting an awareness campaign, it will no longer maintain
its higher stage of maturity and will revert to a previous stage.
This exercise has endeavored to capture the current state
of cybersecurity capacity and, with continued support from
excellent partners, such as the OAS and IDB, the CMM could be
applied again to account for the increases in LAC cyber capacity.
The Global Cybersecurity Capacity Centre at the University of
Oxford was established in 2013, to build a global understanding
of efficient and effective cybersecurity capacity building
practices through rigorous academic research. The work of the
Centre is led by the world’s thought leaders in this field. In 2014,
the Global Cybersecurity Capacity Centre, in cooperation with
the IDB and OAS, tailored an application tool for the region to
apply the CMM to enable the evidencing of this study.

Sadie Creese
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Cybersecurity Capability
Maturity Model
The data used to inform this report was collected though an
online survey, developed in collaboration with the Global Cyber
Security Capacity Centre (GCSCC) based on the Cybersecurity
Capability Maturity Model (CMM) developed by the GCSCC. The
online survey was translated into two languages (English and
Spanish) and was piloted initially onsite with four pilot countries
(Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica and Saint Kitts and Nevis).
It was then administered to a wide cross-section of national
stakeholders.
The online survey was distributed to Member States with a
secure password. Points of contact in each member state were
asked to distribute it to their national stakeholders who would
have the requisite information to provide the most complete
background of the cybersecurity in their respective country.
Over 260 responses were received, and the information was then
aggregated and reviewed taking into account complementary
sources of information.
The data was analyzed using the 49 CMM indicators which are
divided into five dimensions: i) National Cybersecurity Policy
and Strategy (Policy and Strategy); ii) Cyber Culture and Society
(Culture and Society); iii) Cybersecurity Education, Training and
Skills (Education); iv) Legal and Regulatory Frameworks (Legal
Frameworks); and v) Standards, Organizations and Technologies
(Technologies). Each dimension has multiple factors which
contribute towards a more mature state of cybersecurity capacity.
Each factor then has several levels of indicators that describe a
state of maturity. The different levels of maturity listed prompt
the respondent to select the level that is most applicable to their
experience of cybersecurity in the country.
The results of the analysis were then sent to each member
state for validation. Country profiles for each member state
were then developed, taking into account statistical data on
the country population, Internet penetration, and mobile phone
subscriptions (all statistics sourced from World Bank DataBank,
last accessed November, 2015 at http://databank.worldbank.
org/data/home.aspx).

Policy and Strategy
Documented or Official National Cybersecurity
Strategy
Strategy development
Organization
Content
Cyber Defense Consideration
Strategy
Organization
Coordination

Culture and Society
Cybersecurity Mind-Set
Government
Private sector
Society
Cybersecurity Awareness
Awareness raising
Confidence and Trust on the Internet
Trust in use of online services
Trust in e-government
Trust in e-commerce
Online Privacy
Privacy standards
Employee privacy
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Education

Technologies

National Availability of Cyber Education and Training
Education
Training

Adherence to Standards
Implementation of standards and minimal acceptable
practices
Procurement
Software development

National Development of Cybersecurity Education
National development of cybersecurity education
Training and Educational Initiatives within Public
and Private Sectors
Training employees in cybersecurity
Corporate Governance, Knowledge and Standards
Private and state-owned companies’ understanding
of cybersecurity

Cybersecurity Coordinating Organizations
Command and control center
Incident response capacity
Incident Response
Identification and designation
Organization
Coordination
National Infrastructure Resilience
Infrastructure technology
National cyber resilience

Legal Frameworks
Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks
Legislative frameworks for ICT security
Privacy, data protection and other human rights
Substantive cybercrime law
Procedural cybercrime law
Legal Investigation
Law enforcement
Prosecution services
Courts
Responsible Reporting
Responsible disclosure
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Critical National Infrastructure Protection
Identification
Organization
Response planning
Coordination
Risk management
Crisis Management
Planning
Evaluation
Digital Redundancy
Planning
Organization
Cybersecurity Marketplace
Cybersecurity technologies
Cybercrime insurance

The Levels of Maturity

STRATEGIC

FORMATIVE
DYNAMIC
STARTUP

ESTABLISHED
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Five levels of cybersecurity capacity maturity have been identified, whereby the
lowest level implies a rather ad hoc level of capacity and the highest strategic
approach and an ability to dynamically adapt or change against environmental
considerations (operational, threat, socio-technical and political).

STARTUP

At this level, either nothing exists or it is very embryonic in nature. It also includes
a thought or an observation about an issue, but not an action.

FORMATIVE

Some features of the sub-factor have begun to grow and evolve, but may be
haphazard, disorganized, poorly defined—or simply new.

ESTABLISHED

The elements of the sub-factor are in place, and working. There is, however, little
consideration given to the relative allocation of resources. Little decision making
has been made concerning the relative investment in the various elements of the
sub-factor. The sub-factor, however, is functional and defined.

STRATEGIC

Strategic does not imply importance; rather, it is about choice. Choices have
been made at a national level regarding which parts of the sub-factor are
important and which are less important for the particular organization/country.
These choices take into consideration an intended outcome once implemented,
which incorporate particular circumstances and other existing national goals.

DYNAMIC

At the dynamic level, there are clear mechanisms in place to alter strategy
depending on the prevailing circumstances. For example, the technology of the
threat environment, global conflict, a significant change in one area of concern
(e.g., cybercrime or privacy). Dynamic organizations have developed methods
for changing strategies, in a “sense-and-respond” way. Rapid decision making,
reallocation of resources and constant attention to the changing environment
are features at this level.
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Policy and Strategy

Culture and Society

Education

Legal Frameworks

Technologies

Antigua and Barbuda
Over the last four years, Internet use by Antigua and
Barbuda’s population has increased markedly, from
47% to 64%.1 With this larger digital community, the
Government of Antigua and Barbuda has begun
to prioritize cybersecurity as a national concern.2
Consultations among stakeholders are taking place
to develop a national cybersecurity strategy and a
national Computer Security Incident Response Team
(CSRIT). Informal cybersecurity responsibilities fall
under the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting,
Telecommunications, Science and Technology, while
the Office of National Drug and Money Laundering
Control Policy serves as the National Point of
Contact for international organizations, including
the OAS. Antigua and Barbuda is also a member of
International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber
Threats of the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU-IMPACT).
Critical national infrastructure (CNI) operators
generally understand risks to cybersecurity
and implement certain security standards and
technologies to improve cyber resilience, although
there is no entity designated to implement
standards uniformly. Furthermore, without a
designated emergency response mechanism, the
country is unable to maintain accurate information
on cybersecurity threats nor respond to events.

mechanism for the private sector, however, and few
cyberattacks are reported to the authorities. In that
regard, the Government of Antigua and Barbuda has
also ratified the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Articles 16, 17(e) and 34(c) of
the Convention recognize the rights of children to
be protected from malicious action, including child
pornography.
The Ministry of Information has also developed
plans for a cybersecurity awareness-raising
campaign in partnership with the Connect Antigua
and Barbuda Initiative, no campaign is currently
underway. Cybersecurity education opportunities
in the country are limited, but the Antigua and
Barbuda International Institute of Technology
offers coursework on the topic. Private sector
firms are becoming increasingly aware about
cybersecurity risks and have begun to take up
initiatives to train employees.

In 2013, the government passed three laws to
accompany the existing Electronic Transfer of Funds
Crimes Act (2006) and strengthen the country’s legal
framework for information and communications
technology (ICT): the Electronics Crimes Act,
Electronic Evidence Act and Data Protection Act.
The Regional Cyber Investigation Laboratory of
the Royal Police Force of Antigua and Barbuda
investigates cybercrime nationally and within the
Caribbean region. It also processes digital evidence
to be presented in cybercrime cases. Antigua
and Barbuda does not have a formal disclosure
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90,900

Mobile phone subscriptions

109,100

People with Internet access

58,176

Antigua y Barbuda

Internet penetration
64%

64%

Policy and Strategy

Legal Frameworks

Official National Cybersecurity Strategy
Strategy development
Organization
Content

Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks
Legislative frameworks for ICT security
Privacy, data protection and other human rights
Substantive cybercrime law
Procedural cybercrime law

Cyber Defense Consideration
Strategy
Organization
Coordination

Culture and Society
Cybersecurity Mind-Set
Government
Private Sector
Society
Cybersecurity Awareness
Awareness raising
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Argentina
Led by the National Program for Critical
Information Infrastructure and Cybersecurity (ICIC)
in coordination with various agencies, academic
institutions and the private sector, the Government
of Argentina has developed a draft National
Cybersecurity Strategy that is currently awaiting
adoption. Argentina is notable for forming one of
the first national CSIRTs in 1994. Since 2011, it has
functioned under the ICIC. ICIC-CERT maintains a
central registry of cybersecurity events and threats.
The Armed Forces run annual Cyber Incident
Response Exercises to share best practices and
review command and control functions; however,
they currently have limited capacity for cyber
resilience.
Previously, CNI was managed more-or-less
informally; however, in June 2015, the Presidency
of the Republic of Argentina issued Decree No.
1067/2015, which restructured government control
of CNI, establishing a National Office within the
Under-secretariat for the Protection of Critical
Information and Cybersecurity Infrastructure,
under the Head Office of the Cabinet of Ministers –
Cabinet Secretariat. This new program will work to
develop cybersecurity norms and standards, as well
as collaborate with the private sector to improve
CNI resilience.

and takes on a number of capacities, including
providing information on how to detect and
report cyberattacks. Recently, the Government
of Argentina also established a Focal Point on
Cybercrime under the Public Prosecutor’s office.
As Argentina’s e-government and e-commerce
services continue to expand, government
agencies have led awareness-raising campaigns
to educate the public about cybersecurity. Two
notable examples are Internet Sano (–Healthy–
or –Sound– Internet) led by the ICIC, which focuses
on best practices for safe Internet use, and With
You on the Web under the Ministry of Justice and
Human Rights, which teaches children, parents
and teachers about the threat of online grooming
(the predatory befriending of children on the web
to lure them into sexual abuse or trafficking). In
addition, a number of universities offer degree
programs in cybersecurity and digital forensics.

Amid increases in cybercrime, the Government
of Argentina constructed a comprehensive legal
framework for ICT, including Penal Code-Law
26.388, and Law 25.326 on data protection. It is also
developing procedural law for handling digital
evidence. While mechanisms are in place for
disclosure, the private sector is not legally required
to report breaches to cybersecurity. Nevertheless,
awareness of cybersecurity risks among businesses
has grown significantly. The Technology Crimes
Division of the Argentina Federal Police Force is
responsible for investigating cases of cybercrime,
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The Bahamas
(Commonwealth of)
The Ministry of National Security of the
Government of The Bahamas is the principal
agency responsible for cybersecurity matters.
Although it has not released a national
cybersecurity policy or strategy, on April 23, 2014,
the Ministry of National Security conducted a
multi-stakeholder workshop with the support of
the Cybersecurity Program of the Organization
of American States on the development of a
national strategy. 36 The Government of The
Bahamas does not have a national Computer
Security Incident Response Team to respond to
cyber events; however, following an attack by
an Islamist extremist group against government
IT infrastructure in May 2015, an expert task
force was established and a free ethical-hacking
training course was offered in June to Bahamian
government and private sector personnel. National
information technology infrastructure in The
Bahamas is managed informally, and there is no
formal categorization of vulnerabilities or threats.

breaches to the authorities. Furthermore, courts
and prosecutors have limited capacity to handle
electronic evidence.
No awareness-raising campaign is currently
underway in the Bahamas, but some opportunities
are available for training in the subject, such as the
International Compliance Association Advanced
Certificate Program in Cybersecurity offered at the
Bahamas Institute of Financial Services.

In 2003, the Parliament of The Bahamas enacted
the Computer Misuse Act, which provides
comprehensive criminalization of and procedural
law for cyberattacks and related malicious acts.
Parliament has also signed the Data Protection
Act (2003) and Electronic Communications and
Transactions Act (2006) which safeguard the
rights of citizens on the web and establish norms
and regulations for e-commerce and other online
services, respectively. Furthermore, The Bahamas
have acceded to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, which includes protection for children
from abuse or exploitation on the Internet.
The Royal Bahamas Police Force handles cybercrime
cases and is planning to establish a specific
Cybercrime Investigations Unit, although the unit is
not yet operational. There is currently no disclosure
requirement in place for the private sector to report
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Barbados
Over the last several years, the Government of
Barbados has taken initial steps to strengthen
its country’s cybersecurity. In 2013, the
Telecommunications Unit of the Ministry of Energy
signed an agreement with the International
Telecommunications Unit (ITU) to establish a
national CSIRT, and the government is currently
in consultative discussions with the Caribbean
Telecommunications Union (CTU) and the
Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation
to develop a Commonwealth Cyber Governance
Model. Implementation of these measures, however,
has been slow, and authorities have cited a lack of
funding for cybersecurity and limited interagency
cooperation as obstacles towards progress.

Three quarters of Barbados’s population is
connected to the Internet, and cybersecurity
stakeholders are concerned that much of society is
unaware of risks and vulnerabilities associated with
using information technology.4 To raise awareness,
Barbados is part of the ITU’s THINKCLICKSURF
campaign. As part of the campaign, the RBPF is
touring primary and secondary schools across
the country to educate students on safe Internet
practices, privacy and online bullying. In higher
education, the University of the West Indies—
Barbados Campus offers courses, but currently no
degree program in cybersecurity.

In June 2015, the Barbados Government
Information Service’s website was targeted by
hackers. Fortunately within hours, authorities
were able to restore the website and mitigate the
attack.3 While the banking sector and some major
businesses have adopted stronger cybersecurity
measures, authorities believe that many private
sector companies and some government agencies
lack adequate structures to defend themselves
from cyber threats.
The Cybercrime Unit of the Royal Barbados Police
Force (RBPF) is the primary agency responsible for
investigating cases of cybercrime. The unit receives
technical training from regional and international
experts in cybersecurity, and is working to create its
own digital forensics lab. With regard to cybercrime,
the RBPF enforces the Computer Misuse Act, 2005,
which includes substantive and procedural law
for cybercrime investigations. Barbados has also
signed into law the Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters Act, Chapter 140a, Section 6, which allows
the Government of Barbados to request assistance
from Commonwealth countries to obtain electronic
evidence.
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Belize
In 2014, the Ministry of National Security organized
a Cybersecurity Ad Hoc Committee, made up of
multiple stakeholders, including academia and the
private sector, to work together on developing a
national cybersecurity strategy, strengthening
cybercrime legislation and building awareness
about cybercrime in Belize. The committee has
received assistance from the OAS Cybersecurity
Program. In addition, Belize is planning a National
ICT Innovation Policy, which seeks to expand
e-government services as well as implement
related cybersecurity measures. Additionally, the
Central Information Technology Organization is
also finalizing its E-Government Policy, Strategy
and Action Plan. The country also participates
in the CTU-Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
HIPCAR Project, an effort to unify ICT innovation
efforts across the region.
Belize has neither a cyber-defense policy nor a
national CSIRT; consequently, cyberattacks are
mainly handled by the IT Unit of the Belize Police
Department. This department notably provided
cybersecurity assistance in coordination with
CARICOM during the 2007 Cricket World Cup, and it
regularly communicates with regional CSIRTs. Belize
has enacted four laws relating to cybercrime, namely:
the Telecommunications Act, Electronic Evidence
Act, Intellectual Property Act and Interception
of Communications Act. Without comprehensive
criminal law, however, law enforcement and the
judiciary face difficulty effectively prosecuting
cybercrime. Accordingly, although there is no
binding agreement for the disclosure of breaches
in cybersecurity, government and the private sector
cooperate to report and address cyberattacks, and
while statistics are limited, the Government of Belize
has noted an increase in incidents in recent years.

strengthened security standards and technology
among agencies and CNI operators; however,
stakeholders have not formulated response plans
or other crisis-management policies in relation to
CNI protection.
With 39% Internet penetration, much of Belizean
society has not developed a cybersecurity mindset.5 In order to raise awareness of cybersecurity
issues, the Belize Police Department participates
in an annual ICT Road Show, which is hosted by
the Ministry of Energy, Science and Technology,
Public Utilities. The Belize Police Department
uses this platform to educate communities on the
opportunities and risks of cyberspace. Next year,
with the support of the private sector, academia
and other stakeholders, the Government of Belize
plans to hold its First Annual Cybersecurity Week.
Further, Belize also hopes to launch the STOP.
THINK.CONNECT public education campaign by
the end of 2015. There are currently no degree
programs in cybersecurity in the country’s
universities, but some private sector companies
do offer training programs.

In response to growing threats to cybersecurity
in the region, government has begun to promote

56

TOTAL POPULATION IN THE COUNTRY

351,706

Mobile phone subscriptions

172,300

People with Internet access

137,165

Belize

Internet penetration
39%

39%

Policy and Strategy

Legal Frameworks

Official National Cybersecurity Strategy
Strategy development
Organization
Content

Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks
Legislative frameworks for ICT security
Privacy, data protection and other human rights
Substantive cybercrime law
Procedural cybercrime law

Cyber Defense Consideration
Strategy
Organization
Coordination

Culture and Society
Cybersecurity Mind-Set
Government
Private Sector
Society
Cybersecurity Awareness
Awareness raising

Legal investigation
Law enforcement
Prosecution services
Courts
Responsible Reporting
Responsible disclosure

Technologies
Adherence to Standards
Implementation of Standards
Procurement
Software development

Confidence and Trust on the Internet
Trust in use of online services
Trust in e-government
Trust in e-commerce

Cyber Security Coordinating Organizations
Command and control center
Incident response capacity

Online Privacy
Privacy standards
Employee privacy

Incident Response
Identification and designation
Organization
Coordination

Education

National Infrastructure Resilience
Infrastructure technology
National resilience

National Availability of Cyber Education and Training
Education
Training
National Development of Cybersecurity Education
National development of cybersecurity education
Training and Educational initiatives
Training employees in cybersecurity
Corporate Governance, Knowledge and Standards
Private and state-owned companies’ understanding

Critical National Infrastructure Protection
Identification
Organization
Response planning
Coordination
Risk management
Crisis Management
Planning
Evaluation
Digital Redundancy
Planning
Organization
Cybersecurity Marketplace
Cybersecurity technologies
Cybercrime insurance

OBSERVATORY

CYBERSECURITY

IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

57

.bo
Policy and Strategy

Culture and Society

Education

Legal Frameworks

Technologies

58

Bolivia
The Agency for the Development of an Information
Society in Bolivia (ADSIB) is the principal agency
managing e-government and cybersecurity
matters in Bolivia. The ADSIB’s objectives include
coordinating efforts to expand information and
communications technology (ICT), raising societal
awareness of cybersecurity and partnering with
the private sector and civil society on projects.6
The Government of Bolivia has not developed
an official cybersecurity strategy or policy.
Furthermore, it previously had to coordinate
incident responses through other countries’ CSIRTs,
for example addressing a threat to CNI through
ArCERT of Argentina; however, in 2015, Bolivia’s
official Computer Security Incident Response Team
(CSIRT-BO) became operational.

on E-Documents, E-Signatures and E-Commerce
intended to improve resiliency of IT infrastructure
and strengthen national cybersecurity. The IITCUP
cites the lack of a formal channel to obtain timely
disclosure of cyberattacks as a major concern for
law enforcement going forward.
While the ADSIB provides a variety of literature
detailing safe Internet use on its website as well
as training seminars, to date the Government
of Bolivia has not led any national awarenessraising campaign on the matter. In contrast,
many universities offer classes on cybersecurity,
albeit mostly at the theoretical level, with limited
technical coursework.

Bolivia strengthened its national IT infrastructure
in 2013 with the development of a national
Internet Exchange Point IXP, called “Punto de
Intercambio de Tráfico”, PIT-BOLIVIA. 7 Critical
infrastructure operators have also implemented ad
hoc security standards and procedures, but there
is no formal collaboration among stakeholders in
this respect.
The Digital Forensics Division of the Scientific
Technical Research Institute of the Police University
(IITCUP) handles national cybercrime cases.
Government has recently been working to build
IITCUP’s capacity. The Division enforces Chapter XI
of the Criminal Code (incorporated in 1997), which
criminalizes unlawful tampering or obtaining of
information over the Internet, and Articles 253 and
254 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide rules
for obtaining electronic evidence. The Plurinational
Legislative Assembly has also passed Law No. 3325
(2006) against human trafficking, child pornography
and other nefarious acts that involve the Internet.
No specific legislation concerning cybercrime exists.
Nonetheless, the country has developed a Draft Law
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Brazil
Brazil has invested heavily in ICT as a way to
promote economic growth and social progress.
In light of its increased adoption of ICT, Brazil
has become a prime target of cyberattacks and
cybercrime, including waves of spear-phishing,
malware, and DDoS attacks leading up to the 2014
World Cup. As it prepares for the 2016 Olympic
Games, the Rio de Janeiro Administration has built
an integrated urban command center.8
In 2010, the Department of Information Security
and Communications published the Reference
Guide for the Security of Critical Information
Infrastructures and the Green Paper on
Cybersecurity in Brazil. These documents served
as foundations for the newly released national
Information Communications Security and
Cybersecurity Strategy of the Federal Public
Administration.9 The Brazilian Armed Forces also
discusses cyber-defense concerns in its 2012 White
Book of National Defense. It recently set up a
formal Cyber Defense Command and a National
Cyber Defense School, in addition to the Army’s
Center for Cyber Defense.
Brazil has many Computer Security Incident
Response Teams (CSIRTs), which range from
government-managed entities to private sector
or academic teams. The Brazilian Internet Steering
Committee (CGI.br) is in charge of coordinating all
Internet service initiatives in the country, and the
Brazilian Network Information Center (NIC.br)
works to implement such initiatives.10 The Brazilian
National Computer Incident Response team, which
operates under CGI.br and NIC.br, is responsible for
incident response and coordination, training and
awareness-raising campaigns. Brazil’s Department
of Information and Communications Security
also maintains a CSIRT, CTIR.gov, which provides
incident-response and data collection services for
the Federal Public Administration.

Brazil’s framework to address illicit cyber activities
is anchored upon Law No. 12.965/2014, the Civil
Rights Framework for the Internet and Law
No. 12.737/2012, which formally criminalizes
cybercrime. A proposed law on Internet privacy
and data retention by Internet Service Providers is
now open for public comment. The Office for the
Repression of Cybercrime of the Federal Police is
the primary entity for investigating cybercrime and
has a digital forensics lab. Some states in Brazil
also have specialized prosecution teams. Although
the private sector is not required to disclose
cyber incidents, the Office for the Repression
of Cybercrime has a working relationship with
companies.
Public understanding of cybersecurity issues in
Brazil is generally low, and organizations such
as CGI.br and NIC.br have sought to address this
by issuing numerous bulletins and organizing
awareness-raising campaigns. The private sector is
becoming more informed about the need for better
protection from cyber threat. Companies and critical
infrastructure operators have implemented privacy
requirements for employees and are developing
procurement and technology standards. A strong
domestic market for cybersecurity technologies also
exists. Academia offers a wealth of opportunities for
education in cybersecurity, with several universities
offering Master’s and doctoral programs.

TOTAL POPULATION IN THE COUNTRY

206,077,898

Mobile phone subscriptions

280,728,796

People with Internet access

119,525,181

Brazil

Internet penetration
58%

58%

Policy and Strategy

Legal Frameworks

Official National Cybersecurity Strategy
Strategy development
Organization
Content

Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks
Legislative frameworks for ICT security
Privacy, data protection and other human rights
Substantive cybercrime law
Procedural cybercrime law

Cyber Defense Consideration
Strategy
Organization
Coordination

Culture and Society
Cybersecurity Mind-Set
Government
Private Sector
Society
Cybersecurity Awareness
Awareness raising

Legal investigation
Law enforcement
Prosecution services
Courts
Responsible Reporting
Responsible disclosure

Technologies
Adherence to Standards
Implementation of Standards
Procurement
Software development

Confidence and Trust on the Internet
Trust in use of online services
Trust in e-government
Trust in e-commerce

Cyber Security Coordinating Organizations
Command and control center
Incident response capacity

Online Privacy
Privacy standards
Employee privacy

Incident Response
Identification and designation
Organization
Coordination

Education

National Infrastructure Resilience
Infrastructure technology
National resilience

National Availability of Cyber Education and Training
Education
Training
National Development of Cybersecurity Education
National development of cybersecurity education
Training and Educational initiatives
Training employees in cybersecurity
Corporate Governance, Knowledge and Standards
Private and state-owned companies’ understanding

Critical National Infrastructure Protection
Identification
Organization
Response planning
Coordination
Risk management
Crisis Management
Planning
Evaluation
Digital Redundancy
Planning
Organization
Cybersecurity Marketplace
Cybersecurity technologies
Cybercrime insurance

OBSERVATORY

CYBERSECURITY

IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

61

.cl
Policy and Strategy

Culture and Society

Education

Legal Frameworks

Technologies

62

Chile
The Ministry of the Interior and Public Safety,
Secretary General of the President and SubSecretary of Telecommunications are the principal
national agencies shaping cybersecurity policy at
the governmental level. While the country has not
issued a national cybersecurity strategy, awareness
among government institutions is widespread.
Government infrastructure features have updated
security technology, and relevant stakeholders
regularly discuss CNI assets and vulnerabilities. The
state also coordinates crisis management planning
and has put redundancy measures in place.
Branches of the Armed Forces of Chile share
information and cyber-defense responsibilities,
but do not have a central command and control
structure. One of Chile’s major challenges
going forward is to strengthen its incidentresponse capabilities: CSIRT-CL, in operation
since 2004, provides incident response for
government websites, but has not been formally
institutionalized at the national level to address
all types of breaches.

stopped numerous cybercrimes in recent years.
Finally, courts have adequate capacity to handle
electronic evidence.
Cybersecurity mind-set is inconsistent in Chilean
society. To raise awareness, in 2013 the Ministry
of Education initiated the Internet Segura (Safe
Internet) campaign to educate youth on privacy and
safe Internet use. A campaign for citizens to beware
of the risks of e-commerce and to understand their
rights as consumers, entitled Consumidor Digital
(Digital Consumer) is also underway. The University
of Chile offers advanced degrees in cybersecurity,
and various online courses and training for
employees are also available. The private sector,
in comparison, has become increasingly aware of
cybersecurity risks, and has implemented plans to
address them.

Chile has established a comprehensive legal
framework to deal with cybercrime. Supreme
Decree No. 1299 describes norms and delineates
roles for handling cybercrime, Law No. 19.223
introduces cybercrimes to the Penal Code, and
Law No. 19.628 covers data protection and privacy.
Although the private sector is not required by
law to disclose breaches, the government works
closely with companies to report and respond to
cyber incidents. According to Chilean authorities,
phishing, malware and hacking are the most
frequent types of cyberattacks in the country. The
Criminal Organizations Investigations Department
and the Department of Criminology of the
Carabineros, Chile’s national police force, carry
out investigations and analyze digital forensics,
respectively. These units have successfully
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Colombia
The National Council of Economic and Social
Policy of the Government of Colombia established
the national cybersecurity policy CONPES 3701
under the auspices of the Ministry of Information
and Communication Technology, Ministry of
Defense, Department of National Planning and
other key national institutions. In addition, a
2014 OAS technical assistance mission to the
country has helped build stakeholders’ capacity
to develop institutional frameworks and policy.
While awareness of CONPES 3701 is widespread,
specific mandates have not been clearly defined.
A comprehensive cyber defense strategy for
Colombia also exists, but is not publically available.
Colombia’s Cyber Emergency Response Team
(ColCERT) is a key institution for cybersecurity
and defense, and shows promise for coordination
with other agencies and the private sector.
Colombia’s CSIRT program mainly functions as
a response mechanism for organization-specific
cyber incidents; risk-management programs have
recently begun to take effect. Also recently, the
Minister of ICT of Colombia indicated that a new
Cybersecurity and Cyber Defense strategy will be
ready by the end of 2015 or early 2016.

country’s digital systems have grown markedly,
in part due to national campaigns, such as the
Ministry of Information and Communication
Technology’s “en TIC confío” (I trust ICT) campaign.
Colombia has over 2000 e-government services
and e-commerce opportunities, which are mostly
conducted in a secure environment. Still, most
private citizens and employees rely on at least
a minimum level of privacy infrastructure, and
there are norms in place that obligate businesses
to implement data-protection policies in the work
place, including Law 1581 (2012) and Decree
1377 (2013). Colombia has also begun to develop
Internet-privacy legislation for formal compliance
with internationally recognized standards.
National cybersecurity education development has
seen marked growth, and public-private forums
and government-funded centers of excellence
have begun to take shape in the country.
Numerous universities, law enforcement and
defense agencies as well as private companies
provide training, including master’s degrees and
accreditation programs.

Colombia has passed effective and comprehensive
criminalization procedural legislation (Law 1273
and Law 906) to address cybercrime, and it
recognizes international treaties such as Interpol
and Europol. Law enforcement and the judiciary
have the capacity to investigate and manage cases
of cybercrime, but lack the training and magnitude
to achieve the same results in the courtroom. Also,
while Law 1581 provides a basic framework for
data protection and disclosure and reporting of
security breaches, cases often go unreported in
the public and private sectors.
Societal consciousness of the importance of
Internet security and privacy and trust in the
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Costa Rica
Costa Rica’s Ministry of Science, Technology and
Telecommunications (MICITT) is the primary
authority responsible for handling issues and
developing policies related to national cybersecurity.
Other institutions, including the Digital Government/
Digital Secretariat, Computer Crimes Section of the
Judiciary, Superintendency for Communications,
Central Bank and Agency for Data Protection have
also played instrumental roles in this area. MICITT
is in the beginning stages of planning a national
cybersecurity strategy.
The year 2012 was a landmark year for
cybersecurity in Costa Rica, with the passing of
Law 9048, which formally introduced cybercrime
into the country’s Penal Code. Costa Rica is also a
State Party to the Inter-American Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (commonly
known as the Nassau Convention) and regularly
coordinates with Interpol. Citizens generally enjoy
the protection of freedom of expression and rights
to privacy under domestic law. Nevertheless,
judicial authorities struggle to effectively
prosecute cybercrime cases, as a limited number of
prosecutors and judges have the capacity to build
and handle cases involving electronic evidence,
although the Public Force (Fuerza Pública) does
manage a digital forensics laboratory.
Additionally, in 2012 the Government of Costa Rica
established CSIRT-CR (housed under the MICITT).
CSIRT-CR is the national agency entrusted with
the task of not only responding to disruptions to
cybersecurity but also of coordinating national
command and control functions. The agency
has received technical assistance from OAS and
other regional and international experts, and
has successfully detected and mitigated major
cybersecurity threats, most notably a 2013 DoS
attack to the Costa Rican Electrical Institute
(ICE). There is currently no public registry of
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incidents, although the government is in the
process of developing one. Costa Rica has no
permanent military, and the Public Force has
limited structures and capacity for building cyber
resilience.
The public sector and CNI organizations have taken
up and promoted international security standards,
such as ISO/IEC 27001, but the private sector has
not yet followed, and the lack of clear norms for
Internet Service Provider (ISP) registry continues to
slow cybersecurity progress. Nevertheless, groups
such as ICE have pushed for software development
standards, and the private sector participates in the
cybersecurity marketplace, investing in information
technology control systems and discussing the need
for cybercrime insurance. Finally, the importance
of employee privacy is recognized in the private
sector and privacy policies are beginning to be
institutionalized.
Public awareness of cybersecurity is generally
low, and society takes few steps to protect
itself from cyber threats. In response, ICE and
other foundations have led awareness-raising
campaigns, however with limited diffusion and
few measurement mechanisms. Opportunities for
cybersecurity education and training, however,
are becoming available in Costa Rica, through
bachelor´s, master´s and certification programs at
Cenfotec University.
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Dominica
Starting with very little existing infrastructure, the
Government of Dominica has taken great strides
in recent years to develop a national cybersecurity
policy and strategy. In coordination with the
OAS, the Commonwealth Cybercrime Initiative
and the CoE, Dominica has drafted a National
Cybersecurity Strategy. In addition to describing
national risks and development goals, the draft
strategy defines mandates for the creation of a
national CSIRT.
Dominica’s paramount counter-cybercrime
authority, the Criminal Investigations Department
of the Commonwealth of Dominica Police Force,
is the sole entity in charge of handling and
investigating cases of cybercrime in the country.
In the absence of a digital forensics lab, it has
nevertheless achieved some considerable success.
The country’s government is currently drafting
comprehensive cybercrime law to be adopted
in Parliament, and is pursuing accession to the
Convention on Cybercrime (commonly known as
the Budapest Convention), an international treaty.
Privacy and data protection legislation, however,
is largely nonexistent.

to institutionalize employee privacy standards.
Civil society, however, is generally unaware of
cyber threats. As part of its draft strategy, the
government is developing awareness-raising
campaigns to address this issue.
The Dominican State College Business Training
Center and a handful of online and private
academic institutions offer cybersecurity-related
education and training, but without coordination
or input from the Ministry of Education nor the
establishment of public-private partnerships.
Nonetheless, the Dominican Government has
hosted a number of regional and international
conferences to share best practices on
cybersecurity.

Although its draft strategy describes important
national risks, Dominica does not have a
coordinated cyber defense policy. Command
and Control functions are handled ad hoc by
government departments in cases of cyber events.
While owners of critical infrastructure understand
cybersecurity risks and CNI technology generally
complies with ITU standards, national resilience
and response efforts are conducted informally,
without any overarching structure.
Leading firms, such as financial institutions, and
some e-commerce services have taken proactive
steps to raise private sector awareness of phishing
and other cyberattacks, and they are beginning
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Dominican Republic
While the Dominican Republic has neither a
national cybersecurity strategy nor a coordinated
cyber defense policy, a number of agencies work
together to address cybersecurity issues under the
Inter-Institutional Commission against High-Tech
Crime. Agencies that take part in this organization
notwithstanding, cybersecurity mind-set within
government is generally low. CNI operators’
adherence to international information technology
(IT) standards and uptake of security technologies
is only beginning to take place. Nevertheless,
CNI operators have the basic capacity to detect,
identify, protect, respond and recover from cyber
threats.
With the passing of Law 53-07 and Law 310-13,
as well as accession to the Budapest Convention,
the Dominican Republic has developed a
comprehensive legislative framework for
criminalizing cybercrime and handling electronic
evidence, regulating spam emails and forging
international cooperation. Furthermore, the courts
have sufficient training and capacity to prosecute
cases involving electronic evidence. Only partial
legislation exists, however, with regard to Internet
privacy and freedom of expression.
The Department for the Investigation of Cyber and
High Technology Crimes of the National Police
and the Cyber-Crime Investigations Division of
the National Department of Investigations are the
two main cybercrime-investigating entities in the
country. As the Dominican Republic does not have a
national CSIRT, the Department for the Investigation
of Cyber and High Technology Crimes also handles
cyber incident responses and regularly coordinates
with other countries’ CSIRTs as well as with Interpol.
Finally, government is improving collaboration with
the private sector to disclose cyber breaches and
provide vulnerability reports.

TOTAL POPULATION IN THE COUNTRY
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Given its growing quantity of Internet users
and availability of e-commerce services, the
Dominican Republic increasingly faces cyber
threats. The country’s government reported 963
cases of phishing in 2013, as well as 432 cases
of banking data theft from 2009–2014.11 Despite
the Dominican Telecommunications Institute’s
(INDOTEL) Healthy Internet initiative (http://
www.Internetsano.do), private sector awareness of
cybersecurity is moderate and societal awareness
of the issues remains low. Nonetheless, private
firms are recognizing employee privacy as an
important concern and are adopting protective
measures. Government and academia are
also working to create relevant programs, as
opportunities for cybersecurity education and
training in the country are limited.
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Ecuador
Although it has not developed a national
cybersecurity strategy, Ecuador has taken strides in
recent years to strengthen its capacity to address
cyber threats. It has designated the Directorate
for Technological Architecture and Information
Security for the promotion of an e-government
platform and the coordination of cybersecurity
management. The Counter-Intelligence and
Strategic Technological Operations Center of the
Ministry of Intelligence handles technical aspects
of the country’s cybersecurity, and a national
CSIRT, EcuCERT, went into operation in November
of 2013. In late 2013, the agencies tested their
mettle when they were alerted of a hackathon
threat aimed at the Ministry of Information that,
fortunately, did not materialize. The military has
not articulated a national cyber-defense policy,
but it is working to assign leaders for a program.
Nevertheless, the county has instituted measures
to protect government infrastructure from
cyberattacks, including Decree 166, which requires
all central public administration technology to
comply with security standards.

with the private sector and devising a training
curriculum on digital evidence for police,
detectives and the courts.
A lack of awareness in society poses one of the
greatest challenges to cybersecurity in the country.
Cyberattacks have increased significantly in
recent years, but the majority of those affected
were unaware of the most effective avenues for
reporting. To address this issue, the Ministry of
Intelligence has led the campaign, Promoting
a Culture of Intelligence. While educational
opportunities and technological development
in cybersecurity are limited, academia and the
private sector have submitted proposals for
developing cybersecurity courses and software.

Law No. 2002-67 outlines general cybercrime law,
and government is seeking multi-stakeholder
support to institute reforms to the Organic
Comprehensive Criminal Code to more adequately
address cybercrime. The government is approaching
the signing of data protection legislation into law.
Ecuador’s constitution provides for freedom of
speech in the press; however, the new Criminal
Code has been criticized for having the potential
to limit citizens’ freedom of expression.12
The Technological Crimes Investigations Unit
of the National Directorate of the Judicial and
Investigative Police is responsible for investigating
cybercrime. It cooperates with Interpol, and has
been working towards greater inter-institutional
cooperation, encouraging information sharing
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El Salvador
El Salvador’s Ministry of Justice and Public Security
is the primary national agency responsible for
cybersecurity matters. It is currently developing
a national cybersecurity strategy, but has not
released a completed draft. It also works to ensure
that government data is backed up and security
standards are adhered to across information
technology infrastructures. The country maintains
a national CSIRT, SalCERT, which responds to
cyberattacks and coordinates with other regional
response teams. SalCERT has had some success
monitoring and addressing threats, but its capacity
is limited due to budget constraints.
Although the Armed Forces of El Salvador
have identified risks and important areas of
infrastructure for protection, it does not have
an official cyber-defense policy. Nevertheless,
government formally manages security for CNI,
and is planning risk management exercises to
establish roles and responsibilities and identify
gaps in cybersecurity.

investigated a number of cases, including one in
which it caught a sexual predator engaged in child
grooming.
With a 30% Internet penetration rate, much of
El Salvadoran society is generally unaware of
cybersecurity. 13 To date, there have been no
awareness-raising campaigns in the country.
Furthermore, universities currently do not have
the capacity to offer cybersecurity educational
opportunities, but government is seeking to build
such programs. In contrast, the private sector
has developed a strong cybersecurity mind-set,
recognizing the need for security for e-commerce
services, and it offers cybersecurity training to
employees.

The Legislative Assembly of El Salvador has
enacted laws on data protection and access to
public information, which establishes norms for
transparency and freedom of information, as
well as protects citizens’ personal information.
It has also drafted cybercrime legislation that is
awaiting adoption. There is a formal mechanism
for requesting disclosure from the private sector
in cases of cybercrime; however, requests must
be issued directly from the Attorney General’s
Office, which can delay investigation efforts. The
Cybercrime Division of the National Civil Police
investigates cybercrime in the country and it has
partnered with the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) to carry out capacity-building
exercises. While the Cybercrime Division does not
have a digital forensics lab, it receives technical
support from SalCERT, and has successfully
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Grenada
In 2012, a partnership between the Government
of Grenada and the ITU assessed the country’s
cybersecurity preparedness and made
recommendations for developing stronger policies.14
Since 2012 Grenada has articulated the need for a
national CSIRT. The National Telecommunications
Regulatory Commission is tasked with cybersecurity
strategy and policy; however, as of 2015 neither a
national strategy nor a CSIRT have been formed.
The Commission also helps coordinate security for
CNI operators, but authorities have stated that it
currently plays a limited role. While government
at-large is generally not trained in cybersecurity,
the country’s primary entity for cyber-defense
and cybercrime investigation, the Royal Grenada
Police Force, has received cybersecurity training
from the United States Government’s Antiterrorism
Assistance Program.

legislation for data protection and freedom of
information, although it has not yet been adopted.
As Internet connectivity expands in Grenada,
many new e-commerce services have become
available. Boards of managers at private firms
have some understanding of cybersecurity and
are considering implementing greater security
standards for technology and privacy for
employees. While CNI technology may follow
the standards applied by initial developers,
its operation is often conducted with limited
governmental control. There are currently no
cybersecurity degree programs or other related
educational opportunities within the country for
Grenada’s citizens.

The ICT division of the RGPF investigates breaches
in cybersecurity and cybercrime. A member of
the force reported that from 2012 to 2015, it
investigated 21 cases; of those that made it to
court, one was successfully prosecuted and one
was in progress. The absence of a formal disclosure
mechanism for the private sector, however, may
impede efforts to uncover cybercrime. While
the RGPF maintains some equipment for digital
forensic analysis, it is in need of updated software
and other tools. Furthermore, the judiciary typically
lacks the digital court capacity necessary to handle
electronic evidence.
In 2013, the Parliament of Grenada passed the
Electronic Crimes Act, which formally added
cybercrime to the Criminal Code and established
procedures for its prosecution. While some
provisions of the law caused scrutiny over their
potential to limit civil liberties, Parliament has
since amended such sections in order to protect
freedom of expression. Grenada has also drafted
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Guatemala
Although leading government agencies have begun
to place priority on cybersecurity issues and assess
the national risk, Guatemala has no specific national
cybersecurity strategy. Its main cybersecurity entity
is CSIRT, CSIRT-GT, a team that has historically been
led by the Ministry of Defense. CSIRT-GT has received
training from the OAS and other international
institutions. Recently, the Ministry of the Interior has
also shown an interest in moving the cybersecurity
agenda forward in Guatemala.
With assistance provided by CSIRT-GT, law
enforcement maintains some capacity to investigate
cyberattacks and cybercrime, but authorities argue
that until comprehensive cybercrime legislation
is passed, the judicial system will have difficulty
effectively prosecuting cases. Furthermore, there
is no policy for disclosure in place and, apart from
certain financial institutions, the private sector
rarely reports cyber events to the government.
Nevertheless, the private sector does have its own
incident response entity, CERT Cyberseg.

Front for Technology and Communication, which, in
addition to promoting anti-cybercrime legislation,
aims to promote cybersecurity awareness and
improve norms and best practices in the private
sector and civil society.
While Guatemala does not have a national-level
strategy for cybersecurity education development,
a technical university and several private firms
provide degrees and certifications in information
security. Also, there are a number of Certified
Information Systems Security Professionals.
The next steps will include the implementation
of a joint public-private training program for
government and private sector employees, to be
administered by CSIRT-GT in partnership with a
service provider.

In the wake of a spike in cyberattacks against
government infrastructure over the last several
years, Guatemalan agencies have begun to take
steps to secure their national assets, albeit with
little formal communication.15 CNI operators have
deployed some software and security measures
that comply with ISO 27000 and other international
standards. Technology infrastructure is often
outsourced, however, and government has minimal
control of it.
Considering Guatemala’s 17% Internet-penetration
rate and largely rural population, take up of a
cybersecurity mind-set in society is inconsistent.16
At the same time, e-government and e-commerce
services in Guatemala have grown considerably in
recent years. Members of Congress have worked
to address this issue by forming the Parliamentary
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Guyana
Since 2013, Guyana and the rest of the Caribbean
region have seen an increase in cyberattacks.17 In
August of that year, the Government of Guyana
established its national Computer Security Incident
Response Team (CSIRT.Gy), under the Ministry of
Home Affairs. As the country’s primary response
mechanism to cybersecurity-related incidents,
CSIRT-Gy provides on-site collaboration, incident
coordination, incident analysis, technical support,
and literature and tips on cybersecurity. It also
regularly coordinates with the OAS and other
national CSIRTs to build technical capacity and
share best practices and information, and it is
beginning to establish lines of communication
with the private sector. CSIRT-Gy’s scope is limited,
however, by the absence of a national cybersecurity
strategy or cyber defense policy and a lack of
awareness of cybersecurity issues in government.
Furthermore, owners of CNI do not always adhere
to security standards or report incidents, and the
state has not formally assessed its CNI assets and
vulnerabilities.

Currently, the government has an ad hoc list of
certified cybersecurity professionals.
In civil society, on the other hand, cybersecurity
awareness is generally low. Although CSIRT-GY has
explored the possibility of an awareness-raising
campaign, to date neither it nor any other agency
has led one. Finally, higher education does offer
computer science degrees; however, Guyana’s
national education strategy does not include
cybersecurity topics into its curriculum.
Recently, the government showed its commitment
to advance the cybersecurity agenda by hosting
a national workshop on cybersecurity threats
and trends, the development of a national
cybersecurity strategy and technical training on
incident response tools.18

When cybercrime occurs, the Criminal
Investigation Department of the Guyana Police
Force is responsible for investigating the case.
While investigations have been carried out with
some success, prosecutors and the judiciary are
inadequately trained to handle electronic evidence.
Legislative gaps are an additional roadblock:
Guyana has some procedural laws for dealing
with computer evidence, but it lacks substantive
cybercrime law or legislation relating to computer
misuse, privacy and data protection.
As opportunities for online banking and other
e-commerce services grow, private sector entities
in Guyana are starting to prioritize cybersecurity as
an important concern. Consequently, stakeholders
have begun to invest in cybersecurity training for
their employees—and not only those with IT roles.
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Haiti
Although faced with limited resources and some
setbacks in recent years, agencies within the
Government of Haiti continue to work towards
elaborating a national cybersecurity strategy and
developing a national CSIRT. A working group
made up of the e-governance unit of the Prime
Minister’s Cabinet, National Telecommunications
Council (CONATEL), national police and Secretariat
for National Security has been established to lay
the framework for a national strategy, and the
group has received assistance from the OAS,
ITU and other international partners. Recently, a
working group was established within CONATEL
with the mandate to develop a strategic plan and a
roadmap for cybersecurity and counter-cybercrime.
While awareness of cybersecurity is growing in
government, preparedness varies by agency. This
is seen in the lack of uniform implementation
of security standards across IT infrastructures.
CONATEL’s main concern, though, has been the
need for cyber incident response capacity, and
it has coordinated with the private sector to
advocate for the creation of a CSIRT.
As part of the CTU-CARICOM HIPCAR Project,
Haitian stakeholders have drafted cybercrime
legislation and Internet privacy laws that are
currently at the consultation phase. Legislative
efforts have stalled, however, as disagreements
over elections have led to the dissolution of most
of Haiti’s Parliament as of January of 2015. 19
Until this political crisis is resolved, it will be very
difficult for the country to adopt a comprehensive
legal framework for cybercrime. Nevertheless, the
Central Directorate of the Judicial Police have had
considerable success investigating and stopping
cybercrime, having captured 69 criminals in 2014,
of whom 11 were convicted of cyber-related
offenses.

TOTAL POPULATION IN THE COUNTRY

82

With an Internet penetration rate of 11%, awareness
of cybersecurity in Haitian society is generally
low.20 To address this, CONATEL has led a series
of events to educate stakeholders and the general
public about cybersecurity. Some universities offer
coursework relating to cybersecurity, as well, but
there are currently no formal degree programs.
Areas of the private sector, such as banks and
telecommunications operators, are well informed of
the importance of cybersecurity and have invested
in training opportunities for employees. While
e-government services are only starting to arrive
in the country, e-commerce services are now widely
available and are generally trusted to be secure.
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Honduras
Lacking a national cybersecurity policy or incident
response team, the Government of Honduras has
limited capacity to proactively address threats
to its cybersecurity. Understanding these risks,
government has taken a number of measures,
including: working to revamp its national security
strategy to involve cybersecurity and cybercrime
issues; attending international fora hosted by the
OAS and other institutions on crisis management
planning; and incorporating digital programs into
such agencies as the National Communications
Commission and the Presidential Direction of
Results-Based Management, which is in charge of
the state’s Digital Agenda. Also, CNI stakeholders
are implementing security technology and
international standards, including the Information
Systems Audit and Control Association, ISO
27002 and ITIL, to better protect national assets.
Management of security technology, however,
is uncoordinated and often outsourced to third
parties, and there is no policy in place for the
disclosure of security breaches.

The private sector provides a counter-example in
terms of its cybersecurity mind-set. Measures to
protect employee privacy, however, have yet to
be effectively implemented. With support from
the government, some private organizations of
the banking sector in Honduras have established
high-level policies and cybersecurity guidelines
for their organizations. These documents provide
a general cybersecurity policy for employees
within these organizations. Finally, while there
is little development of cybersecurity education
at the national level, many international IT
companies and a few universities offer training
in cybersecurity for Honduran students and
employees.

Honduras lacks a legislative framework for ICT
security; its legislature is currently pursuing
reforms to its Penal Code that would introduce
laws against cybercrime. The Information
Crime Department of the National Police is the
country’s sole agency responsible for investigating
cybercrime, but it lacks a digital forensics lab or
national cybercrime statistics.
The Government of Honduras has enacted partial
legislation regarding privacy, data protection and
protection of freedom of expression. Amid a low
level of Internet penetration (19%) and high levels of
gang-related violence, however, society is generally
distrustful of online services provided by the
government and mostly unaware of cyber threats.21
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Jamaica
In 2013, the Government of Jamaica had no
cybersecurity policy or strategy in place. Two years
later, it has designed a comprehensive national
strategy, released on January 28, 2015, and it is
creating a national CSIRT. At the helm of these
developments is the National Cybersecurity Task
Force, which was established under the Ministry of
Science, Technology, Energy and Mining. The OAS
Cybersecurity Program and other international
organizations have assisted Jamaica in
developing its CSIRT. Notably, following a spate of
cyberattacks against government websites in late
2014, the OAS sent a team of experts to Kingston
to provide incident management support.22 Cyber
defense authorities have received post-incident
training, but unlike civilian government, they
do not have a unified policy. The next major
cybersecurity challenges for the Government of
Jamaica will be to ensure widespread adherence
to standards and coordinate CNI security, as
operators have some capacity to protect their
critical infrastructures from threats, but security
is not formally managed by government.

Private sector companies have begun to manage
cybersecurity risks and implement privacy policies
for employees, but awareness of the importance of
cybersecurity varies considerably in greater society.
To address such gaps in knowledge, the National
Cybersecurity Task Force has a Memorandum of
Understanding with the National Cybersecurity
Alliance’s STOP.THINK.CONNECT program, an
international campaign aimed at educating the
public about Internet safety. In addition, Jamaica’s
National Cybersecurity Strategy includes a mandate
to implement cybersecurity into education
curricula, which are currently in its preliminary
stages.

In March of 2010, Jamaica passed the Cybercrimes
Act. Corresponding to changes in technology and
threats, in 2013 Parliament organized a committee
to report on the law’s status and make revisions
as needed. The Communication Forensic and
Cybercrime Unit of the Jamaican Constabulary
Force is a fully operational law enforcement
agency designated for cybercrime investigation.
The Cybercrime Unit has its own digital forensics
lab. One challenge law enforcement faces is the
underreporting of incidents by affected parties; the
Ministry of Science, Technology, Energy and Mining
has therefore been pushing for the legislature to
bring a law for responsible disclosure policy into
effect. Finally, although Jamaica has specific
cybercrime legislation, only partial legislation
exists for privacy and data protection.
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Mexico
In 2012, the Government of Mexico created the
Specialized Information Security Committee,
which was tasked with the development of a
National Strategy for Information Security. The
former is currently setting the parameters for
a draft strategy. Mexico is developing a written
information security policy that considers cyber
defense to be under the Armed Forces. The
country’s Computer Security Incident Response
Team, CERT-Mx, is a member of the global Forum
for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST)
and follows a Collaboration Protocol with other
governmental agencies. CERT-Mx is highly involved
in CNI protection. Stakeholders coordinate
infrastructure security management and share
information on CNI assets and vulnerabilities.
Across government agencies, technologies are
regularly updated and backed up and adhere
to the provisions of the Administrative Manual
for General Management of Information and
Communications and Cybersecurity Technologies,
which was developed based on international
standards such as ISO 27001, ITIL and Cobit, among
others. Moreover, digital redundancy plans are also
in place.

institutions and academia offer conferences on
cybersecurity. Some training opportunities are
available for employees including certification
programs through the private sector. Recently,
the Mexican non-government organization,
National Institute for Transparency, Access to
Information and the Protection of Personal
Data initiated a campaign proposing stronger
personal data protection laws, as well as greater
transparency and availability of information to
the public. In addition to its advocacy work, the
latter organization publishes reports and leads
campaigns to raise citizens’ awareness of their
rights as users of information and communication
technology.

The Scientific Division of the Federal Police of
Mexico investigates national cybercrimes. It
works closely with CERT-Mx, and has received
training from non-profits and various international
organizations. Recent reports indicate an increase
in phishing and advanced persistent threats (APT)
in the country and a decrease in denial of service
attacks. While law enforcement has extensive
investigation capability, Mexico is still developing
cybercrime legislation, which makes prosecuting
such acts difficult.
With an Internet penetration rate of 44%, an effort
will need to be undertaken to inform Mexican
society about cybersecurity issues.23 Government
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Nicaragua
The Committee for Science and Technology
(CONICYT) of Nicaragua works to develop national
policy and raise awareness of cybersecurity, while
the Commission for Electronic Government in
Nicaragua advances e-government programs
and facilitates discussion between government
and critical infrastructure industries. To date,
Nicaragua has not developed a national
cybersecurity strategy or policy, and the country
does not have a formal Computer Securiy
Incident Response Team (CSIRT) to respond to
cyber incidents. CONICYT and the Commission of
Electronic Government therefore see as part of
their mission the imperative to convince legislators
and top government officials to invest more
heavily in cybersecurity and enact policies, laws
and standards to better protect national interests
from cyber threats.

must formally request information from the
relevant ISP. A 2014 study conducted by the
Antivirus software company, ESET, showed that
at least 50% of all Nicaraguan companies have
been subject to cyberattack.24 While businesses
generally implement security standards, they often
do not train employees in cyber security; however,
a number of universities do offer coursework and
specialized training on the topic.
In May 2015, CONICYT partnered with academia
and the private sector to launch the country’s first
Safe Internet Use Week, a series of talks, fora and
activities dedicated to raising public awareness
about cybersecurity and promoting best practices
for safe use of IT.25

The Nicaraguan Criminal Code contains clauses for
prosecuting cybercrime and in 2012, the National
Assembly signed Data Protection Law No. 787.
While there is no formal office for cybercrime
investigation, the Special Crimes Division and the
Directorate of Police Intelligence of the National
Police routinely handle cases involving electronic
evidence. The National Police force is also equipped
with a Central Crime Laboratory, which provides
digital forensic analysis for the other divisions. While
personnel occasionally collaborate with regional
and international organizations—a notable example
being a case in which Interpol and Nicaragua
cooperated with Spain to uncover a pedophile
ring—overall, international cooperation remains
limited.
Although the Criminal Code requires that any
person share information relating to a crime under
investigation to the appropriate authorities, the
private sector is not legally obligated to disclose
breaches in cybersecurity; instead, investigators
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Panama
Since May 2013, the Government of Panama has
been working to implement its National Strategy
for Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure
Protection, developed by the National Authority
for Governmental Innovation. The strategy details
36 tasks that relate to 6 pillars of cybersecurity and
identifies roles and responsibilities. This document,
together with a position paper on “Resilience
of Critical Infrastructure, Protection of Minors
on the Internet and Cybersecurity”, establishes
goals and delineates roles and responsibilities.
Since then, government agencies have begun the
initial stages of developing internal cybersecurity
plans. The publications also seek to address a
lack of awareness among stakeholders about CNI
protection, which authorities have indicated as a
major concern. While some security standards are
in place, there is currently limited coordination
among operators for CNI protection. The
government has established digital redundancy
measures, however, and is beginning to lead crisis
management training for response teams and CNI
operators. In the case of a cyberattack or related
event, CSIRT Panama is the agency in charge of
responding to and mitigating the incident.

Although there is no mechanism requiring private
sector companies to report disruptions to their
cybersecurity, the authorities work closely with
banks, hydroelectric energy suppliers, and other
critical infrastructure sectors to obtain information
on cyberattacks.
A number of institutions, including the University of
Technology of Panama, offer advanced degrees in
cybersecurity. While other educational and training
opportunities are available in the country, many
are offered on an ad hoc basis. Groups such as
the Isthmus Training Institute deliver regular
trainings to critical infrastructure personnel and
emergency responders. In 2013, Panama joined
the international STOP.THINK.CONNECT campaign,
which aims to promote safe practices on the
Internet.

With amendments to the country’s Penal Code
and laws concerning the obtaining of evidence,
Panama has updated national legislation to more
effectively combat cybercrime. Data protection
has also been in place since 2009. In 2014, Panama
officially acceded to the Budapest Convention, the
first international treaty addressing cybercrime.
Panama handles cases of cybercrime on two fronts:
through the Investigative Unit for Computer Crimes,
under the Directorate of Judicial Investigation, and
through the Special Prosecutor for Crimes against
Intellectual Property and Information Security.
Authorities have indicated a sharp increase in
cyberattacks in recent years, with 262 cases in 2013.
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Paraguay’s National Secretariat of Information
and Communications Technology (SENATICS) is in
charge of forming national cybersecurity policies.
The Government of Paraguay has not adopted a
national cybersecurity strategy, but it has been
working with the Organization of American States
since November 2014 to develop one. Operating
under SENATICS, Paraguay’s national Computer
Security Incident Response Team, CERT-py,
responds to cyberattacks, maintains a central
registry of national cybersecurity incidents and
promotes cybersecurity awareness. It has received
training from the OAS and the United States
Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance
Program. Although data received from ISPs and the
banking sector has been limited, in 2014 CERT-py
noted an increase in denial of service attacks, with
hacking still constituting the highest percentage.

Legal Frameworks

Operators of CNI have begun to implement
standards and technologies to better defend the
country’s assets from cyber threats. Nevertheless,
the CNI is managed informally, and there has
been limited discussion among stakeholders
on risk management and emergency response
planning.

Technologies

Over the last few years, the Government of
Paraguay has passed laws to bolster its legislative
framework to address cybercrime. Law No. 4439
(2011) modified the Penal Code to include types
of cybercrime, as well as child pornography. In
addition, Law No. 1286/98 provides that entities
are required to report acts that are punishable
by law to the appropriate national authorities;
however, enforcement for cybersecurity-related
offenses has been less successful. In response,
the government has established stronger lines of
communication with the banking sector. While
laws relating to data protection and privacy are
in place, many are less recent and do not explicitly
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address digital information. The Specialized Unit
for Computer Crime of the Office of the National
Police is responsible for investigating cybercrime,
and it houses its own digital forensics lab.
Paraguayan authorities have indicated the lack
of societal and private sector awareness of
cybersecurity. To address this gap in knowledge,
SENATICS launched the Connect Yourself Safely
Paraguay Campaign, which informs society about
cyber threats with a special focus on youth safety.
The government has also partnered with STOP.
THINK.CONNECT. While some institutions of higher
learning offer coursework in cybersecurity, there
are currently no degree programs in this field.
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Peru
With over 12 million Internet users (40% of the
country’s population), Peru is a regional hub of
digital activity and commerce and, consequently,
is prone to risks to cybersecurity.26 Data shows that
cyber incidents increased by 30% in 2013, and the
country experienced a spike in malware attacks
during the 2014 World Cup in Brazil. Fortunately,
Peru’s Computer Security Incident Response
Team PeCERT, successfully responded to these
attacks. In addition to incident response, PeCERT
discusses cybersecurity issues with the police,
military and the private sector, and is updating
and expanding its capacities. The Government
of Peru has requested technical assistance from
the Organization of American States to develop
a cybersecurity framework for the country, for
which the National Office of Electronic and IT
Governance (ONGEI) has assumed responsibility.
While stakeholder awareness has increased as a
result of recent efforts, the absence of a strategy
and a clear chain of command continues to impede
the strengthening of the country’s cybersecurity.
The armed forces also have a basic level of cyberdefense capacity, but have no cyber-defense
policy.

The private sector and operators of CNI have seen
some take up of security standards, including
software development processes. The ONGEI also
provides guidelines on crisis management; the
scope of responsible reporting, however, remains
low, as security technologies and CNI are managed
informally. Peruvian agencies are discussing the
potential for cybercrime insurance and other
mechanisms to better protect CNI.
While e-government and e-commerce services
continue to expand in Peru, societal awareness
of cybersecurity is genera lly low. ONGEI
provides online literature on this topic, but no
comprehensive awareness-raising campaign is
currently in effect. Many national universities and
private companies do offer education and training
in cybersecurity; however, adequate technology
and experienced teaching staff are often limited.

Three key pieces of legislation guide Peru’s
legal framework for cybersecurity: Law 27309,
which added cybercrime to the Penal Code; Law
29733 on Data Protection; and Law 30096, which
established legal norms relating to cybercrime. The
High-Tech Investigation Division of the National
Police Force is Peru’s chief unit responsible for
cybercrime. Equipped with forensic laboratory
capacity, the Division uncovered a number of
recent cyberattacks leveled against high-level
governmental institutions. Persistent challenges
include limited technical capacity to handle
electronic evidence in the courts and no disclosure
policy for the private sector.
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Saint Kitts and Nevis
With around 65% Internet penetration, Saint
Kitts and Nevis is one of the most connected
country in the Caribbean.27 Citizens have access
to an increasing number of e-government
and e-commerce services. In certain areas,
cybersecurity capabilities have not yet matched
the needs of this growing online community. Saint
Kitts and Nevis has neither a national cybersecurity
strategy nor a cyber-defense policy. Cybersecurity
matters are mainly handled by the Ministry
of Youth Empowerment, Sports, Information
Technology and Communications and Post, which
deals with information and communications
technology issues more generally. Stakeholders
have taken steps to protect CNI from cyber threats,
including: updating security technology, adhering
to software specifications and keeping informed of
CNI assets and vulnerabilities. The government has
limited capacity, however, to respond to incidents,
as it has not created a Computer Security Incident
Response Team. To address this issue, in March
2015, Saint Kitts and Nevis sent officials to an OAS
Cybersecurity TRANSITS training course dedicated
to the development of national Computer Security
Incident Response Teams.

As e-commerce opportunities are abundant in
Saint Kitts and Nevis, private sector management
is becoming increasingly aware of threats to
cybersecurity and has begun some risk management
planning. For instance, companies such as the
multinational communications service provider,
LIME, require employees to undergo cybersecurity
training.
In order to raise cybersecurity awareness in the
Caribbean, Saint Kitts and Nevis hosted a regional
public-private meeting in September 2014.28 Local
opportunities for cybersecurity education or
training, however, are limited.

Saint Kitts and Nevis does not have a law or
protocol in place that deals specifically with
cybercrime, although authorities inform that the
government is currently discussing the adoption
of a legal framework. Nevertheless, it has created
draft privacy and data protection legislation and
has recently revised procedural laws for obtaining
electronic evidence. The Local Intelligence Office
of the Royal Saint Christopher and Nevis Police
Force, which coordinates with Interpol, handles
cybercrime cases, among other duties. While the
force has some capacity to investigate cybercrime,
it must outsource digital forensic analyses. The lack
of a disclosure policy for private sector businesses
further complicates cybercrime investigation.
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Saint Lucia
In response to a cyberattack by a self-identified
Islamic State hacker against neighboring Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines in Spring 2015, the
Government of Saint Lucia has announced plans to
strengthen the country’s cybersecurity through a
multi-layered approach, including tougher security
standards for CNI and increased capacity to detect
and mitigate cyber threats.29 Leading the initiative
is the Director of Public Sector Modernisation
of the Ministry of Public Service, which oversees
the innovation of government technology
infrastructure, expansion of e-government
services and cybersecurity issues. Saint Lucia is
also a member of the alliance of the International
Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats of the
International Telecommunications Union. Taking
into account these recent steps, Saint Lucia has not
developed a formal national cybersecurity strategy
or policy, nor does it have a national Computer
Security Incident Response Team.

however, and there is no established website or
hotline to report cases relating to child online
protection.
To date, the government of Saint Lucia has not led a
national cybersecurity awareness-raising campaign
for society at large, and educational opportunities
for cybersecurity in the country are limited.
Nevertheless, Saint Lucia recently contributed to
cybersecurity at the regional level by hosting the
eighth Caribbean Internet Governance Forum and
Cybersecurity Workshop, held on August 29–30,
2014.31

Article 267 of the Saint Lucia Criminal Code (2003)
provides legislation on computer fraud and related
cybercrimes, and Article 330 criminalizes the sale
and production of child pornography. Saint Lucia
also has enacted procedural law on the search
and seizure of electronic evidence. The country
has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, as well as to the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child relating to
the sale of children, child prostitution and child
pornography, the latter of which provides more
detailed procedures on combating the offense.
Cybercrime cases are handled by the Royal
Saint Lucia Police Force. It receives support from
the Bankers Association of Saint Lucia, which
has equipped it with new computers to build
its cybercrime investigation capacity. 30 Private
sector companies are not required by law to
report breaches in cybersecurity to the authorities,
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Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines
While the principal agency responsible for
cybersecurity in St. Vincent and the Grenadines is
the Information Technology Unit of the Royal St.
Vincent and the Grenadines Police Force, the Office
of the Prime Minister also plays an informal role as
a facilitator for national discussions surrounding
cybersecurity strategy and policy. Currently, a
national strategy is in the planning phase, and
a national Computer Security Incident Response
Team is in development. Once these objectives
are completed, St. Vincent and the Grenadines will
have increased capacity to plan for proactive, and
not just reactive, cybersecurity measures. While
information on critical infrastructure protection
was limited for this study, one notable recent
development has been the country’s partnership
with other states in the Caribbean Region to adopt
a shared Automated Fingerprint Identification
System.

Two laws, the Electronic Evidence Act (2004) and
the Electronic Transactions Act (2007), underpin
a basic legislative framework for cybersecurity
in the country; however, authorities believe that
these laws require updating and strengthening to
effectively deal with cybercrime.
Internet penetration in St. Vincent and the
Grenadines has grown markedly in recent years,
from 38.5% of the population in 2010 to 56%
in 2014. 32 Furthermore, the government has
undertaken an ambitious One Laptop Per Student
initiative.33 This expansion in web access certainly
engenders greater participation and inclusion on
the Internet, but has also corresponded to increased
incidences occurring on schools’ social networks.
While government has acknowledged this growing
concern, it has not yet developed a program or
awareness-raising campaign to address it.

On May 4, 2015, St. Vincent and the Grenadines’
official government website was attacked by a
self-identified Islamic State hacker. The Information
Technology Unit of the Royal St. Vincent and
the Grenadines Police Force is responsible for
responding to and investigating cyberattacks and
cybercrime. It receives technical assistance from
the United States Government and participates
in regional trainings hosted by the Organization
of American States, CTU, interpol and other
regional and international organizations. The
unit does not have a digital forensics laboratory
and sends evidence to Antigua and Barbuda for
analysis; however, it has recently acquired some
equipment to develop laboratory capacity within
the country. Although companies are not required
to report breaches in cybersecurity, the Information
Technology Unit cooperates with the private sector
to investigate cyber incidents.
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Suriname
At the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly in
October 2014, a representative from the Permanent
Mission of Suriname spoke on behalf of South
American states, emphasizing the importance
of protecting critical infrastructure from cyber
threats while preserving the rights of citizens to
information and privacy. 34 Although Suriname
has not historically been a common target for
cyberattacks, growing cybersecurity threats in
the region have prompted its government in
2012 to begin to develop a national strategy and
revamp its defunct national Computer Security
Incident Response Team, SurCSIRT. The Bureau
of National Security, in cooperation with the
Central Intelligence Security Agency, are tasked
with consulting with stakeholders and drafting
the national cybersecurity strategy, as well as
reinstating SurCSIRT; however, progress has been
slow on the response front as SurCSIRT is not yet
operational. Currently, the primary national agency
involved in cybersecurity is the Central Intelligence
Security Agency, which investigates cyberattacks,
provides information to the national police and
works closely with the private sector. According
to authorities, government as a whole has limited
awareness of cybersecurity issues. In the field of
cyber defense, the Ministry of Defense’s national
defense policy includes measures relating to
international communications technology security.

Private sector and CNI stakeholders are becoming
more concerned with their level of cybersecurity.
Government maintains a general list of CNI assets
and vulnerabilities, and private firms, especially
in the banking and telecommunications sectors,
are discussing privacy protection measures and
investing in training employees in cybersecurity.
Similarly, these industries tend to comply with ISO
27001 standards and aim to raise awareness among
other sectors. While digital redundancy measures
are not in place across all agencies, they have been
implemented at Internet exchange points.
Societal awareness of cybersecurity, nonetheless, is
generally low as no national campaigns have taken
place and 40% of the population is connected
to the Internet. 35 In addition, few educational
opportunities exist in the country for citizens
interested in working in cybersecurity.

While Suriname has general laws concerning the
privacy of individuals, it does not have a legal
framework for dealing with cybercrime. The Office
of the Attorney General is primarily responsible for
handling national cybercrime cases. While criminal
justice authorities have some capacity, the lack of
digital forensic services or responsible reporting
mechanisms entails a great challenge to the
effective prosecution of cybercrime.
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Trinidad and Tobago
With an Internet penetration rate of 65% in
2014—up from 48.5% in 2010—the Government of
Trinidad and Tobago has actively sought to pursue
an uptake in information and communications
technology to protect its digital assets, and foster
economic development through the articulation of
a national cybersecurity strategy, the identification
of a competent authority, and the establishment
of cyber incident response capabilities.
In response to a string of cyberattacks in 2011,
Trinidad and Tobago’s Medium-Term Policy
Framework officially recognized the role that
information and communications technology
plays in advancing national development and
economic growth and the need to develop
effective cybersecurity initiatives to protect
this core infrastructure. 37 In December 2012,
the Ministry of National Security released a
comprehensive national strategy detailing cyber
risks to the country and delineating the roles and
responsibilities of agencies. However, no unified
cyber defense strategy exists and there is limited
coordination between cybersecurity and cyber
defense operations, although different branches of
the military do share cyber defense responsibilities
among themselves. This year Trinidad and
Tobago will officially launch the country’s first
national Computer Security Incident Response
Team, TTCSIRT, which will work closely with the
Organization of American States, International
Telecommunications Union and other international
organizations to develop incident response
capacity.

such as ISO 27001, is becoming widespread across
government, telecommunications providers,
security services and the financial sector.
The Ministry of National Security has petitioned
Parliament to adopt a Cybercrime Bill, which
would provide the legal framework to deal with
cybercrime. The country has also a data protection
law, but it is only partially proclaimed and lacks
enforcement mechanisms. The Cybercrime Unit of
the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service handles
cybercrime investigation and is equipped with
a digital forensics laboratory. The successful
prosecution of cybercrime, however, is still
hampered by the absence of a formal mechanism
to report cyber incidents, as well as a lack of digital
capacity to investigate charges against this type
of crime.
Although the government has not yet led a national
awareness-raising campaign, various public and
private organizations, such as the University of
Trinidad and Tobago and the Telecommunications
Authority of Trinidad and Tobago, have joined
efforts to conduct workshops and other programs to
educate the public about cybersecurity. The private
sector has also encouraged international training
and accreditation programs for employees. While
some universities offer courses on ethical hacking,
there are no cybersecurity degree or certification
programs in the country.

Owners of CNI do not have crisis response or
reporting mechanisms in place. To address this
gap, the National Cybersecurity Strategy calls for
building competency among key stakeholders
and developing incident management measures.
Furthermore, adherence to international standards,
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Uruguay
As of 2014, Uruguay had a high Internet penetration
rate of 61%, which has been steadily rising from
46.4% in 2010.38 The Government of Uruguay has
sought to increase the uptake of information
and communications technology and protect its
information assets via cybersecurity policies, incident
response capabilities, training and workforce
development, and legislation, thus helping to foster
the Uruguay economy into the IT age.
The Government of Uruguay passed Presidential
Decree 452/009 in 2009, which requires all
government agencies to develop cybersecurity
policies. Uruguay does not have a specific national
strategy for cybersecurity, but its Information and
Knowledge Society includes cybersecurity in its fiveyear Digital Agenda for 2011–2015, and will further
emphasize cybersecurity in the next iteration of its
five-year plan.39 Furthermore, Uruguay’s National
Defense Policy incorporates cyber defense
measures. The country’s national Computer
Security Incident Response Team mechanism,
CERTuy, established in 2008, regularly coordinates
with other regional Computer Security Incident
Response Teams and international organizations.
In addition to incident response, CERTuy provides
statistics on cyberattacks and issues alerts on
emerging risks. Uruguay also relies on incident
analysis and response from CSIRT-ANTEL of the
National Telecommunications Administration,
which was founded in 2005 to address issues
relating to cellular phone data and services.
The Government of Uruguay formally manages
security for CNI and shares information on the
infrastructure’s assets and vulnerabilities. It is also
currently strengthening security and employee
privacy standards. Uruguay is a regional leader in
security software development and a marketplace
for new technologies and cybercrime insurance.
Government agencies execute risk management
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exercises to effectively coordinate response assets.
In cases of emergency, the National Emergency
System would issue redundancy communication.
The Computer Crime Unit of the National Police
is the agency responsible for investigating
cybercrime. It maintains a digital forensic
laboratory and receives capacity building
support from the Organization of American
States and other organizations. In recent years,
the unit has detected an increase in cybercrime.
The Government of Uruguay has drafted a legal
framework for cybersecurity and has adopted Law
No. 18.331 on Data Protection. However, it has not
adopted criminal laws specific to cybercrime and
has no disclosure mechanisms in place for the
private sector. Uruguay is a party to MERCOSUR
Digital, which aims to normalize e-commerce and
cybersecurity across Member States. Furthermore,
major private sector areas and the banking
industry are well-educated on cyber threats and
strategies to protect against them.
Academia and the public and private sectors
offer opportunities for training and education
in cybersecurity, and the government has been
working to bolster cybersecurity educational
initiatives. It has also launched national awarenessraising campaigns, namely Connect Yourself Safely,
led by CERTuy, and Your Data Has Worth. Protect
It, led by Uruguay’s Information and Knowledge
Society. Uruguay has also partnered with the
United States Department of Homeland Security’s
STOP.THINK.CONNECT campaign.
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Venezuela
Venezuela’s lead agency for national cybersecurity,
the National System for Cyber Telematics Incident
Management (known as VenCERT) performs multiple
roles, namely, responding to cyber incidents, keeping
statistics on cyberattack trends and evaluating and
strengthening national cybersecurity infrastructure.
As cyberattacks, including government-website
defacements and distributed denial-of-service
attacks, continue to increase in the country,
VenCERT’s response capacity has been limited.40 It
has recently increased its staff size, but requires new
techniques and tools to keep pace with emerging
cyber threats.
Venezuela has neither a national cybersecurity
policy nor a cyber-defense strategy, but it has
adopted a number of laws that together constitute
a comprehensive legal framework for cybercrime.
The Special Law against Computer Crime (Law
37.313) was enacted in 2001 and the National
Assembly has recently passed the Interoperability
Act (2012) and Info-Government Act (2013) which
establish standards and norms for electronic
exchange, as well as some procedural law.
Although the Constitution provides for freedom
of expression, there are no laws in place to deal
specifically with online privacy or freedom of
expression.

Through its plan, SUSCERTE formally manages
security for CNI technology, issues digital
certificates and maintains statistics on incidents.
Operators of the CNI have begun to adopt
security measures to comply with international
standards, and have the basic capacity to protect
infrastructure from cyberattacks.
In addition to issuing digital certificates for
government and CNI technology and keeping
statistics, SUSCERTE has lead the Information
Security Begins with You campaign, which aims to
educate the public on cybersecurity through talks,
fora and workshops. A number of cybersecurity and
cybercrime degree programs are also available
in the country. Nevertheless, a lack of societal
awareness of cybersecurity and limited privacy
protection for citizens continues to present
challenges to Venezuela’s cybersecurity regime.

Three agencies form the country’s primary
response to cybercrime: the Cybercrime Division
of the Center for Scientific, Penal and Criminal
Investigations National Center for Digital Forensics
and the Superintendency of Electronic Certification
Services (SUSCERTE). Government routinely
provides for training for personnel of the Center
for Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigations
to ensure that they are up to date on cybercrime
trends.
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TOTAL POPULATION IN THE COUNTRY

30,693,827

Mobile phone subscriptions

30,528,022

People with Internet access

17,495,481

Venezuela

57%
Internet penetration

57%

Policy and Strategy

Legal Frameworks

Official National Cybersecurity Strategy
Strategy development
Organization
Content

Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks
Legislative frameworks for ICT security
Privacy, data protection and other human rights
Substantive cybercrime law
Procedural cybercrime law

Cyber Defense Consideration
Strategy
Organization
Coordination

Culture and Society
Cybersecurity Mind-Set
Government
Private Sector
Society
Cybersecurity Awareness
Awareness raising

Legal investigation
Law enforcement
Prosecution services
Courts
Responsible Reporting
Responsible disclosure

Technologies
Adherence to Standards
Implementation of Standards
Procurement
Software development

Confidence and Trust on the Internet
Trust in use of online services
Trust in e-government
Trust in e-commerce

Cyber Security Coordinating Organizations
Command and control center
Incident response capacity

Online Privacy
Privacy standards
Employee privacy

Incident Response
Identification and designation
Organization
Coordination

Education

National Infrastructure Resilience
Infrastructure technology
National resilience

National Availability of Cyber Education and Training
Education
Training
National Development of Cybersecurity Education
National development of cybersecurity education
Training and Educational initiatives
Training employees in cybersecurity
Corporate Governance, Knowledge and Standards
Private and state-owned companies’ understanding

Critical National Infrastructure Protection
Identification
Organization
Response planning
Coordination
Risk management
Crisis Management
Planning
Evaluation
Digital Redundancy
Planning
Organization
Cybersecurity Marketplace
Cybersecurity technologies
Cybercrime insurance
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Reflections on the Region
Melissa Hathaway, Jennifer McArdle and Francesca Spidalieri

The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) regions are accelerating
their focus on cybersecurity and moving it to the top of their
policy and social agenda. Government leaders cannot ignore
the fact that cybersecurity incidents are increasing in both scope
and scale. Recognizing their responsibility to their country and
citizens, they must take the necessary steps and investments
to address the resilience of their country’s core services and
infrastructures to enable them to speedily recover from cyber
incidents, while at the same time continue to embrace the
opportunities that come from having a connected society.
The 32 participating countries have different approaches,
attitudes and priorities towards cybersecurity. The following
high-level observations capture the trends in the region.
1. Governments recognize the importance of providing
affordable access to information communications technology
(ICT) services for business innovation, growth, and the delivery
of public services. Yet, Internet penetration is still quite low
(averaging less than 50%) in around half of the LAC region.
Economic development initiatives across the region are calling
for broadband investments and infrastructure modernization to
propel their countries into the digital age.
2. Adopting a national cybersecurity strategy is arguably one
of the most important elements of a country’s commitment
to securing the cyber infrastructure, services and ICT business
environment upon which its digital future and economic
wellbeing depend. Some LAC countries have prioritized
cybersecurity as a national concern and are establishing formal
cybersecurity policies and building the capacities of relevant
agencies. To date, only six LAC countries have adopted
cybersecurity strategies: Brazil, Colombia, Jamaica, Panama,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. Other countries, including
Argentina, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Costa Rica,
Dominica, El Salvador, Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and
Suriname, are currently in the process of articulating a potential
strategy.
3. Society is largely unaware of the risks and vulnerabilities
associated with the use of ICT. It is important for governments to
describe the risks and opportunities associated with increasing
connectivity and dependence on the Internet. Different awarenessraising initiatives—such as the ones that have started to emerge
in many LAC countries and that have helped to build a shared
understanding of the importance of cybersecurity—may also lead
to action. Two examples are Venezuela’s Information Security
Begins with You campaign and the international campaign
STOP.THINK.CONNECT., which aim to educate the public on
cybersecurity issues through public talks, fora, and workshops.

Initiatives such as these are important because they can raise
awareness of the cyber risks inherent to a country and encourage
development of specific solutions to increase cyber resilience.
4. The establishment of trusted public-private partnerships and
formal information-sharing mechanisms remains limited in the
region. Most national authorities maintain open and active lines
of communication and collaboration with critical sectors and key
enterprises, and they recognize the importance of sharing timely
and actionable intelligence. Yet, mistrust among stakeholders
has diminished collaboration and the absence of recognized
clearinghouses or brokers of authoritative information still
hampers the ability of most LAC countries to establish formal
information-sharing mechanisms.
5. Crisis response or reporting mechanisms are in nascent stages
across the region and there is limited capacity to proactively
address cyber threats. About half of LAC countries have
established and operationalized Computer Security Incident
Response Teams or computer emergency response teams. Other
states are evaluating the requirements to aggressively implement
this type of capability. Some countries, such as Colombia, already
have mature incident response initiatives and as such, can provide
incident response services for government and private sector
entities.
6. Efforts to develop comprehensive legal frameworks to fight
cybercrime, a major goal of the cybersecurity strategy of the
Organization of American States, are underway across the region.
Although only 2 of the 32 Member States of the Organization of
American States—the Dominican Republic and Panama—have
acceded to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, almost all
Member States have increased their law enforcement efforts
domestically and have updated national legislation to combat
cybercrime and strengthen data-protection and privacy laws. The
successful prosecution of cybercrimes in the region, however,
is still hampered by the absence in most states of a formal
mechanism to report cyber incidents. Even if an incident is
reported, most countries have insufficient forensics capabilities
to investigate and prosecute crimes, or the criminal justice system
has not developed the capacity to handle electronic evidence or
enforce existing and updated cybercrime laws.
7. Some governments are taking advantage of their increased
Internet connectivity to explore technology development
opportunities, expand their internal technology industry and
launch interesting cyber research and development programs
(e.g., Start-Up Chile and Costa Rica’s Visión 2018). They have also
started to provide incentives in the form of tax credits, grants and
scholarships, to promote the development of a local technology
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industry and encourage innovation, cybersecurity education,
capacity building and jobs creation.
It is encouraging that cybersecurity and resiliency have moved
to the top of the policy and social agendas in the LAC region.
While no country is cyber ready, many countries are beginning
to take significant steps to assert their specific cybersecurity
challenges in economic terms and to commit limited resources
to achieve their goals. While gaps remain in cybersecurity
preparedness across LAC—as seen in the summaries of each
country’s cybersecurity capabilities and efforts—the entire
region is progressing and strengthening its commitment to
create a more secure, resilient and connected society.
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Contributions
The Inter-American Development Bank and the Organization of American States would like
to extend their sincerest thanks to the experts who and organizations that contributed to the 2016
Cybersecurity Report. Both organizations especially recognize the following organizations for their
contributions to this report.

Antigua and Barbuda

Brazil

•
•

•
•
•

Ministry of Information
Office of the Prime Minister

Argentina

•
•

•
•
•

Ministry of National Security
National Program for Critical Information
Infrastructure and Cybersecurity
Sub-Secretariat for Critical Infrastructure Protection
and Cybersecurity

•
•

Brazilian Intelligence Agency
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee
Brazilian National Computer Security Incident
Response Team
Center for Technology and Society – Getúlio Vargas
Foundation
Department of Information Security and
Communications
Institute for Technology and Society
Institutional Security Cabinet

Chile
The Bahamas
•
•

Ministry of National Security
Royal Bahamas Police Force

Barbados
•

Office of the Attorney General

Belize
•
•
•

Belize Police Department
Central Information Technology Organization
National Security Council Secretariat

•
•
•

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of the Interior
Ministry of Telecommunications

Colombia
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Colombia.co
Colombian Chamber of Information Technology
and Telecommunications
ISAGEN, EPM
Military Forces of Colombia
Ministry of Information and Communications
Technology
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of National Defense
National Association of Industrialists of Colombia
National Police
UniAndes, War College, Uniminuto, UPBz

Bolivia
•

Agency for the Development of an Information
Society in Bolivia 			
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Costa Rica

El Salvador

•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•

Attorney General of the Republic
Costa Rican Institute of Electricity
Judicial Investigations Department
Ministry of the Presidency
Ministry of Science, Technology and
Telecommunications
Superintendence of Telecommunications
University of Costa Rica

Dominica
•
•
•
•
•

Dominica Association of Information Technology
Professionals
Dominica State College
Information and Communications Technology Unit
Ministry of Information and Telecommunications
National Bank of Dominica

Dominican Republic
•
•
•

Attorney General of the Republic
Dominican Telecommunications Institute
National Police

Ecuador
•
•
•
•
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Telecommunications Regulation
and Control Agency
Armed Forces of Ecuador
Attorney General of Ecuador
Ministry of Defense

Ministry of Justice and Public Security

Grenada
•

Royal Grenada Police Force

Guatemala
•
•
•
•
•

CSIRT-gt
Ministry of the Interior
Public Ministry
Superintendence of Telecommunications
Technical Secretariat of the National Security
Council

Guyana
•
•
•
•
•

CSIRT.gy – Ministry of Home Affairs
Guyana Energy Agency
Guyana Defence Force
Guyana Police Force
University of Guyana

Haiti
•

National Telecommunications Council

Honduras

Panama

•
•
•

•
•

•
•

COINDIS
National Telecommunications Commission
Ministry of Foreign Relations and International
Cooperation
National Police of Honduras
National Property Management System

Jamaica
•
•
•
•
•
•

Jamaica Bank Association
Jamaica Constabulary Force
Ministry of National Security
Ministry of Science, Technology, Energy and Mining
Public Ministry
University of the West Indies

Mexico
•
•
•
•
•

Attorney General’s Office
Mexican Internet Association, A.C.
Mexican Petroleum
Secretariat of the Interior
Specialized Committee on Information Security

Nicaragua
•

National Authority for Governmental Innovation
Panama Canal Authority

Paraguay
•
•
•

Attorney General’s Office
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
National Secretariat of Information and
Communications Technology

Peru
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Joint Command of the Armed Forces
Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Foreign Relations
Ministry of the Interior
National Office of E-Government and Information
National Police of Peru
Public Ministry – Prosecutor’s Office

Saint Kitts and Nevis
•
•
•
•

National Engineering University		
•
•

Financial Services Regulatory Commission
LIME
Ministry of Energy, Finance, Trade and Industries
Ministry of Youth Empowerment, Sports,
Information Communications and Technology,
Telecommunications and Post
Royal Saint Kitts and Nevis Police
Saint Kitts Electricity Company, Ltd.
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Saint Lucia

Uruguay

•

•

Government of Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
•

Royal Saint Vincent and Grenadines Police Force

Suriname
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Attorney General’s Office
Banking Network of Suriname
Chamber of Commerce and Industries
DATASUR
Parbonet
Ministry of Energy, Finance, Trade and Industries
Special Security and Intelligence Service
Suriname Intelligence Agency
TELESUR

Trinidad and Tobago
•
•
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Ministry of National Security
The National ICT Company

•
•

Agency of E-Government and Information Society
and Awareness
ANTEL
Ministry of Defense

Venezuela
•

Superintendence of Electronic Certification Services

Appendix
Detailed Methodological Framework

Policy and Strategy
Documented or Official National
Cybersecurity Strategy
Strategy development
Organization
Content
Cyber Defense Consideration
Strategy
Organization
Coordination
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Documented or Official
National Cybersecurity Strategy

A comprehensive national cybersecurity
strategy identifies the interests and roles
of the range of actors that contribute
to, are responsible for, or are affected
by cybersecurity in order to create a
coordinated and cohesive framework.
This strategy often includes several
issue areas and identifies roles and
responsibilities of various stakeholders
engaging with cybersecurity, including
industry, civil society, and individuals,
and will stress the importance
of mechanisms to address their
requirements and leverage their
expertise.

Strategy Development

STARTUP

No evidence of a national cybersecurity strategy exists. If a cyber component does
exist, it may be the responsibility of one or more departments of government. A
process for development has begun without stakeholder consultation.

FORMATIVE

An outline of a national cybersecurity strategy has been articulated, built on
government consultation. Consultation processes have been established for key
stakeholder groups, possibly involving international assistance.

ESTABLISHED

A national cybersecurity strategy has been established; a specific mandate to
consult across sectors and civil society has been agreed; data and historic trends
are used to plan; and some understanding of national cybersecurity risks and
threats drives capacity building at the national level.

STRATEGIC

National cybersecurity strategy is knowledgeably implemented by multiple
stakeholders across government; strategy review and renewal processes are
confirmed; regular scenario and real-time cyber exercises are conducted;
cybersecurity strategic plans drive capacity building and investments in security;
and metrics and measurement processes are established, implemented and
inform decision making.

DYNAMIC

Continual revision of cybersecurity strategy is conducted to adapt to changing
socio-political, threat and technology environments, driving the multistakeholder decision-making process; trust- and confidence-building measures
are undertaken to ensure the continued inclusion and contribution of all
stakeholders including enhancing public-private partnership, society at large
and international partners.
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Policy and Strategy

Organization

STARTUP

No overarching entity exists for cybersecurity coordination. If budgets exist,
they reside in disparate public offices.

FORMATIVE

A coordinated cybersecurity program has been designed and disseminated;
budgets may still be distributed; and inter-departmental co-operation is still
limited.

ESTABLISHED

A single cyber program has been designated within each government entity;
a departmental owner or coordinating body with a consolidated budget
exists; the program is defined, with goals, milestones, and metrics to measure
progress; and clear roles and responsibilities for cybersecurity functions within
government have been agreed.

STRATEGIC

Evidence of iterative application of metrics and resulting refinements to
operations and strategy across involved governments in cybersecurity; and risk
assessment and management exists.

DYNAMIC

A national body has been appointed to disseminate and drive implementation of
the cybersecurity strategy; a singular national cybersecurity posture exists with
the ability to reassign tasks and budgets dynamically, according to changing risk
assessment of the cybersecurity environment; and international cooperation is
solidified at the organizational level.

Documented or Official National
Cybersecurity Strategy
Strategy development
Organization
Content
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Content

STARTUP

Various national strategies may exist with a reference to cybersecurity or none
at all. If they exist, the content is generic, not necessarily aligned with national
goals, and does not provide actionable directives.

FORMATIVE

Content includes links between cybersecurity and national risk priorities, but is
generally ad hoc and lacks detail.

ESTABLISHED

The content of the national cybersecurity strategy is linked explicitly to national
risks, priorities and objectives; and content includes public awareness raising,
mitigation of cybercrime, incident response capability and national critical
infrastructure protection.

STRATEGIC

National cybersecurity strategy content is updated, based on results of the
application of metrics and measurements that drive decision making and guide
resource investment.

DYNAMIC

The content of the strategy is modified in response to the cybersecurity
environment; new content relating to cybersecurity objectives is regularly
incorporated in the strategic plan; and leadership and promotion of an
internationally secure, resilient and trusted cyberspace is articulated.

Documented or Official National
Cybersecurity Strategy
Strategy development
Organization
Content
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Policy and Strategy

Cyber Defense Consideration

Strategy

There may be events that impact on
national security interests relating
to network security, cyber resilience,
incident response and information
sharing that require the engagement
of defense ministries and agencies.
Therefore, preparing a strategy that
coordinates between all organizations
involved is needed to ensure an
integrated approach to confronting
threats to national security. This
assessment does not seek to assess
technical or military capacity, but
focuses on readily observable attributes,
such as strategic planning, organization
and coordination.

STARTUP

A national security policy and national defense strategy exists and may contain
a digital or information security component, but no cyber defense policy or
strategy exists.

FORMATIVE

Specific threats to national security in cyberspace have been identified, such as
external threat actors, insider threats, supply system vulnerabilities and threats to
military operational capacity, but a coherent response strategy does not yet exist.

ESTABLISHED

A national cyber defense policy or cyber defense White Paper exists and outlines
the military’s position in its response to different types and levels of cyberattacks, including cyber-enabled conflicts of a conventional, kinetic nature, and
offensive cyberattacks aimed to disrupt infrastructure, including emergency
response.

STRATEGIC

National cyber defense complies with international law and is consistent with
national and international rules of engagement in cyberspace.

DYNAMIC

The evolving landscape threat in cybersecurity is captured by way of repeated
reviews to ensure that cyber-defense policies continue to meet national security
objectives; rules of engagement are clearly defined; and the military doctrine
that applies to cyberspace is fully developed and takes note of significant shifts
in the cybersecurity environment.
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Organization

STARTUP

There is no management of cyber defense. If it exists, it may be distributed
among the armed forces and/or some other government organizations. There is
no clear command structure for cybersecurity in the armed forces.

FORMATIVE

Cyber defense operation units are incorporated into the different branches of
the armed forces, but no central command and control structure exists.

ESTABLISHED

There is a defined organization within the ministry of defence responsible for
conflict, using cyber means.

STRATEGIC

Highly specialized expertise with advanced strategic cyber capabilities and full
situational awareness is integrated into national defense strategy.

DYNAMIC

The ministry for defense contributes to the debate in developing a common
international understanding of the point at which a cyberattack might trigger a
cross-border response.

Cyber Defense Consideration
Strategy
Organization
Coordination
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Policy and Strategy

Coordination

STARTUP

The national armed forces possess no—or limited—capacity for cyber resilience
in order to reduce vulnerabilities of national security interests, nor a defense
network infrastructure.

FORMATIVE

Cyber defense capability requirements are agreed between the public and
private sectors in order to minimize the threat to national security.

ESTABLISHED

Coordination exists in response to malicious attacks on military information
systems and CNI; and a mechanism exists to exchange information that informs
threat analyses and intelligence gathering.

STRATEGIC

Some analytical capacity exists to support the coordination of and resource
allocation for national cyber defense, possibly including a cyber-defense
research center.

DYNAMIC

The entity in charge of cyber defense coordinates the integration of
strategies relating to cyber events between government, military and critical
infrastructures, including the management of budgets, and it identifies clear
roles and responsibilities. This process then feeds into the re-evaluation of the
national security position of the country.

Cyber Defense Consideration
Strategy
Organization
Coordination
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Culture and Society
Cybersecurity Mind-Set
Government
Private sector
Society
Cybersecurity Awareness
Awareness raising
Confidence and Trust on the Internet
Trust in use of online services
Trust in e-government
Trust in e-commerce
Online Privacy
Privacy standards
Employee privacy
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Cybersecurity Mind-set

Government

A cybersecurity mind-set includes the
values, attitudes, practices and habits,
of individual users, experts and other
actors in the cybersecurity ecosystem.
Different actors are required to have
varying
cybersecurity
mind-sets,
based on their roles and duties in the
ecosystem, including the government,
private sector, academics and experts,
in addition to expected responsible
online behavior. Socio-economic factors
contribute to different perceptions of
cybersecurity so that they may impact
the delivery of effective cybersecurity.

STARTUP

Minimal or no recognition of a cybersecurity mind-set within government
agencies.

FORMATIVE

Leading agencies have begun to place priority on cybersecurity by identifying
risks and threats.

ESTABLISHED

Cybersecurity best practices are widely known across government at all levels.

STRATEGIC

Most agencies across all levels of government have embedded a proactive
cybersecurity mind-set, informing strategic planning.

DYNAMIC

The cybersecurity mind-set is habitual and informs all information technology
initiatives. The cybersecurity mind-set serves as a foundation for employees of
ministries to approach their responsibilities independently.
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Culture and Society

Private Sector

STARTUP

Business and industry have no—or minimum—recognition of the need to
prioritize a cybersecurity mind-set.

FORMATIVE

Leading firms have begun to place priority on a cybersecurity mind-set by
identifying high-risk practices.

ESTABLISHED

A cybersecurity mind-set has been engrained across business and industry.

STRATEGIC

All organizations, including small- and medium-sized enterprises across most
industries have fostered a proactive cybersecurity mind-set, which informs
strategic planning.

DYNAMIC

The cybersecurity mind-set serves as a foundation for individual approaches
within the private sector with regard to employment responsibilities and
informs all initiatives relating to information technology.

Cybersecurity Mind-Set
Government
Private sector
Society
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Society

STARTUP

Society is unaware of cyber threats and unable to take concrete cybersecurity
measures or society is aware of cyber threats but takes no proactive steps to
improve cybersecurity.

FORMATIVE

A cybersecurity mind-set is adopted, although it is inconsistent throughout
society; and programs and materials have been made available to train and
improve cybersecurity practices.

ESTABLISHED

Societal consciousness of the secure use of online systems has been developed,
and a growing proportion of users have the skills to manage their privacy
online, and protect themselves from intrusion, interference or unwanted access
of information by others.

STRATEGIC

A growing number of users utilizes secure practices online as a matter of habit
and security awareness is engrained; and most users have the information,
confidence and practical tools to protect themselves online, while support
and resources are provided to vulnerable members of society, including the
protection of minors.

DYNAMIC

Users demonstrate a cybersecurity mind-set, habitually employing more secure
practices in their everyday use of online networks; and the cybersecurity skill
set of a country’s population is advanced so that threats that face society can be
effectively addressed by users.

Cybersecurity Mind-Set
Government
Private sector
Society
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Culture and Society

Cybersecurity Awareness

Awareness raising

This factor presents the need for
programs to raise cybersecurity
awareness with special emphasis on the
perception of cyber risks and threats.

STARTUP

The need for awareness of cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities across the
public and private sectors is not recognized or is at an early stage of discussion.

FORMATIVE

Awareness-raising campaigns are established with defined targets, but are ad
hoc covering all groups, and not closely linked to cybersecurity strategy; and
seminars and online resources are available for target audiences, although
efforts to coordinate and measure them are required.

ESTABLISHED

A national program for cybersecurity awareness, based on consultation with
stakeholders, exists that addresses a wide range of audiences; and multistakeholder engagement can be evidenced in the delivery of awareness-raising
and relevant products.

STRATEGIC

Metrics are established for awarenes-raising campaigns and the results inform
future drives, taking into account gaps or failures; the program is supported by
quality measures in support of the re-use of material; and a central online portal
that links to relevant information exists, is well known, and is readily accessible.

DYNAMIC

Performance measurements for awareness-raising campaigns inform the
redistribution of resources and national strategy renewal processes; and
stakeholders provide feedback to enhance the design of these campaigns for
target groups.
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Confidence and Trust
on the Internet

This factor presents aspects such as
trust in the use of online services,
e-government and trust in e-commerce.
The level of trust by individuals in
using the Internet determines the
extent to which they will provide
personal information online. This factor
addresses the extent to which users
within the country or organizations
have confidence in online servers,
e-government
mechanisms,
and
e-commerce entities to safely manage
user data in a way as to protect user
privacy. One measure of this reliance
is the extent to which users provide
personal information online.

Trust in use of online services

STARTUP

Minimal or no use of online services; and confidence in online services is not
a concern. Therefore, no coordinated actions are established by operators of
Internet infrastructure.

FORMATIVE

Trust in online services is identified as a concern and infrastructure operators
consider measures to promote trust in online services. However, measures are
not established.

ESTABLISHED

Efforts to provide more secure online services have been implemented; a
national coordinated program to promote confidence in online services has
been established; and budget allocation for security measures for online
services is minimal.

STRATEGIC

Program effectiveness measures are implemented to promote confidence,
including consideration of secondary impacts, the results of which are used
to inform resource allocation; and measures assessing trust in online services
include the sense of control by individuals with regard to providing personal
data online.

DYNAMIC

Through the iterative application and assessment of quantitative and qualitative
metrics in online infrastructure and an improvement in service development, the
confidence in online services increases; and individuals assess the risk of using
online services, continually adjusting their behavior based on the assessment.
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Culture and Society

Trust in e-government

STARTUP

Minimal or no government offering of e-services. If minimal e-services are
offered, the government has not publicly promoted the necessary secure
environment.

FORMATIVE

The range of government e-services continues to expand in recognition of the
need to implement security measures to promote confidence in e-services; and
undesirable online practices are discussed between multiple stakeholders.

ESTABLISHED

Breaches have been identified, acknowledged and disclosed in an ad hoc
manner by government; the public sector coordinates actions to avoid attacks
on personal information; and high-level Internet crimes are prioritized; and
compliance to Internet and web standards to protect the anonymity of users is
promoted.

STRATEGIC

Disclosure of information is by default; government is driven by cybersecurity
concerns; privacy-by-default as a tool for transparency is promoted; usergenerated content processes are employed to provide feedback on ineffective
material; and procedural measures are in place to ensure efficient management
of online content.

DYNAMIC

E-government services are continually improved in order to promote a
transparent, open and secure system that people can trust; and impact
assessments on privacy protection in e-government processes regularly take
place and contribute to strategic planning.

Confidence and Trust on the Internet
Trust in use of online services
Trust in e-government
Trust in e-commerce
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Trust in e-commerce

STARTUP

E-commerce services are not offered. If they are offered, the environment is
insecure and users lack adequate knowledge of e-commerce services.

FORMATIVE

E-commerce services are minimal and not fully organized; the need for security
in e-services is recognized by stakeholders and users; and investment dialogue
between service providers has begun.

ESTABLISHED

E-commerce services are fully established in a secure environment; and multiple
stakeholders invest in e-commerce.

STRATEGIC

Enhanced service functionality, provision of feedback mechanisms and personal
information protection are established to ensure business continuity.

DYNAMIC

Regular performance measurements of e-commerce services drive and inform
strategic planning; and terms and conditions provided by e-commerce services
are clear to all users.

Confidence and Trust on the Internet
Trust in use of online services
Trust in e-government
Trust in e-commerce
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Culture and Society

Privacy online

Privacy Standards

This factor discusses issues such
as online privacy and freedom of
expression. Specifically, privacy issues
include the sharing of personal data
in the public and private sectors. The
data protection component of privacy
is addressed separately in Dimensions
4 and 5. Countries with sophisticated
cybersecurity strategies will not
compromise freedom of expression in
the name of network security.

STARTUP

Discussion has begun at the level of government for privacy issues with
stakeholder engagement.

FORMATIVE

Laws and policies promoting access to personal data to be collected and stored
are considered across government and other public institutions.

ESTABLISHED

Relevant actors from civil society are actively driving change in practices, laws,
and regulations that impinge on freedom of expression and privacy issues; and
government is considering the adoption of human rights legislation with a focus
on privacy.

STRATEGIC

Adherence to regionally and internationally recognized standards for human
rights in relation to privacy exists.

DYNAMIC

Actors, policies and practices that shape freedom of expression and privacy are
clearly identified and are central to decisions; and compliance to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is achieved.
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Employee Privacy

STARTUP

Minimal or no discussion among private sector leaders regarding privacy issues
in the workplace.

FORMATIVE

Privacy in the workplace is recognized as an important component of
cybersecurity and is beginning to be institutionalized.

ESTABLISHED

Employers maintain privacy policies that provide a minimum level of privacy to
employees.

STRATEGIC

Employees are sensitized to their privacy rights and obligations within the
organization based on strategic planning; the organization conducts external
audits to ensure compliance with privacy standards; and compliance to best
practices in human rights relating to privacy in the workplace is achieved and
assessed through audits.

DYNAMIC

Privacy impact assessments are regularly conducted and feed into policy revisions.

Privacy online
Privacy standards
Employee Privacy
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education
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National availability of Cyber
Education and Training

This section examines the country´s
resources/funding aimed to increase
the
availability
of
cybersecurity
education and training. Such resources
should reflect the needs of the active
cybersecurity environment.

Education

STARTUP

Minimal or no educational offerings in information security exist, but there is
no recognized provider of cybersecurity education; and no accreditation in
cybersecurity education exists.

FORMATIVE

Marketplace for information security education and training exists with evidence
of take up and the initiatives of professionals are directed towards increasing
attractiveness of cybersecurity careers and relevance to wider leadership roles.

ESTABLISHED

Some education in cybersecurity at the national and institutional levels exists,
ranging from primary to post-graduate levels, including vocational education in
modular form.

STRATEGIC

Educational offerings are weighted and focused, based on an understanding
of current risks and skills requirements; metrics are developed to ensure that
educational investments meet the needs of the cybersecurity environment and
access to educators is available in terms of cybersecurity, specifically relating to
cybersecurity specialists.

DYNAMIC

Integration and synergy across educational elements exist; prevailing
cybersecurity requirements are considered in the redevelopment of any general
curricula; research and development is a leading consideration in cybersecurity
education; and content in education programs aligns with practical cybersecurity
and operational challenges.
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Education

Training

STARTUP

Minimal or no training in cybersecurity exists.

FORMATIVE

Training in information security exists, but is ad hoc and uncoordinated; and
training courses, seminars and online resources may be available for targeted
demographics, but measures of effectiveness do not exist.

ESTABLISHED

Stakeholders invest in cybersecurity training which extends only beyond being
applicable to executives, management and a full range of employees who are
in IT roles; the needs of society are well understood and training requirements
are documented; and modes and procedures of training are assessed for
effectiveness and some metrics are established.

STRATEGIC

A range of high-quality cybersecurity training courses is available and these
are internationally recognized; and the connection of training and educational
programs to national and institutional cybersecurity strategy priorities is clear.

DYNAMIC

Public and private sector training exists collaboratively, is available locally and
is constantly adapting to the changing environment as it seeks to build skill
sets drawn from the public and private sectors; and public-private sponsored
incentives for training exist.

National Availability of Cyber Education
and Training
Education
Training
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National development of
Cybersecurity Education

This factor relates to the importance
of the development of cybersecurity
education. An assessment is being
made of cybersecurity education
programs, high-quality university and
further education degrees, courses on
cybersecurity and the establishment of
national and international cyber centers
of excellence.

National development of cybersecurity education

STARTUP

Few or no professional instructors exist in cybersecurity; there are no programs
to train instructors in cybersecurity; and budget justification for education and
research either does not exist or is only now being discussed.

FORMATIVE

Incentives for training and education exist; budget lines for training and research
and development are identified with an office established for the development
and delivery of the program; and stakeholder involvement is established to
ensure continuity.

ESTABLISHED

There are public- and private-sector efforts to establish programs to enhance
skills and capability in cybersecurity; national education and skills priorities
are informed by broad multi-stakeholder consultation; international academic
partners have been consulted for lessons learned; government-funded centers
of excellence in cybersecurity exist; accessibility to cyber education and skills,
alignment of education with real world problems and funding dedicated to
national research exist.

STRATEGIC

Government budget and spending on cybersecurity training and education
is increased based on the return on investment; government initiatives that
are directed towards increasing attractiveness of cybersecurity careers are
informed by a gap analysis of existing skills; and cooperation and collaboration
between stakeholders is enhanced.

DYNAMIC

Accredited high-quality university and further education degrees and courses
on cybersecurity exist; cybersecurity education programs maintain a balance
between preserving core components of the curriculum and promoting adaptive
processes that respond to rapid changes in the cybersecurity environment;
and international cyber centers of excellence are established by replicating
programs led by world class institutions.
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Education

Training and Educational
Initiatives

This factor relates to the development
of training and educational initiatives
within the public and private sectors.
Cybersecurity
training
programs,
can enhance employees’ skill sets so
that they have the ability to support
cybersecurity issues as they occur.
Cybersecurity knowledge exchange
can also promote continuous skill
development.

Training employees in cybersecurity

STARTUP

Cybersecurity training programs are not performed; few trained IT personnel
are designated to support cybersecurity issues as they occur; and skill sets may
exist but are not strategically located and tools are limited to authorized users.

FORMATIVE

There is no knowledge transfer from trained cybersecurity employees; and due
to limited training, there is only an informal use of existing tools, models, or
templates for cybersecurity planning with no automated data integration.

ESTABLISHED

Knowledge transfer from trained cybersecurity employees exists on an ad hoc
basis; job creation initiatives for cybersecurity are established and encourage
employers to train staff; structured cybersecurity training programs exist that
specify precise roles and responsibilities; some data systems, tools and models
are available with limited trained personnel to operate them; and technical
training is still required.

STRATEGIC

There is a sufficiently established cadre of skilled employees trained in
the organization’s cybersecurity issues, processes, planning and analytics;
the cybersecurity skills development program is integrated, optimized and
automated; and levels of professionalism in information assurance and
cybersecurity are more evident across the public and private sectors.

DYNAMIC

Cybersecurity knowledge exchange to promote skills development is
continuous; life-cycle management of cybersecurity training is used to inform
future training programs; data systems, tools, and models are used by a wide
range of practitioners; and automated data integration is now possible due to
advanced cybersecurity skill set.
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Corporate Governance,
Knowledge and Standards

Private and state-owned companies’
understanding of cybersecurity is critical
in their application of best practices
within their governance structure.
Executive boards should understand
the risks that companies face, some of
the primary methods of attack and how
their company deals with cyber issues
and evaluate them.

Private and State Owned Companies’ Understanding

STARTUP

Boards have minimal or no understanding of cybersecurity; and fiduciary duty
considerations are not discussed.

FORMATIVE

Executive boards have some awareness of cybersecurity issues, but not how they
might affect the organization or what direct threats they may be faced with.

ESTABLISHED

Executive boards understand how companies are at risk, in general, some of
the primary methods of attack, and how their company deals with cyber issues
(usually entrusted to the Chief Information Officer); and incident management
is largely reactive.

STRATEGIC

Executive boards are aware of their strategic assets, have put specific measures
in place to protect them, and know the mechanism which protects them; the
executive board can allocate specific funding and assign people to prevent
cyber risk; corporate contingency plans are in place to address various cyberbased attacks and their aftermath; executive board members are provided
with some cybersecurity education; and the board has a clear sense of cyber
fiduciary duties.

DYNAMIC

Executive boards are able to change cybersecurity strategy quickly and
appropriately; new threats are considered at every board meeting, and funding
and attention is reallocated to address those threats; the executive board is
looked to as a source of knowledge in corporate cybersecurity governance;
governance is based on cyber risk and improves governance, specifically in this
area.
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Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks

Legislative frameworks for ICT security

This factor relates to the search for ways
to encourage governments to enable the
development of a secure Internet and
online environment with appropriate
and adequate laws and regulations.
This
includes
legal
frameworks
relating to ICT, privacy, human rights,
data protection and substantive and
procedural cybercrime law, all of which
warrant international cooperation.

STARTUP

Legislation relating to ICT security does not yet exist or is in the process of being
developed. If in the process, efforts to draw attention to the need to create
a legal framework on cybersecurity have been made and may include a gap
analysis.

FORMATIVE

Experienced partners have been asked to support the establishment of legal
and regulatory frameworks; and key priorities in creating cybersecurity legal
frameworks have been identified, but not yet established through multistakeholder and public/private consultation.

ESTABLISHED

Comprehensive ICT security legislative and regulatory frameworks that address
cybersecurity have been implemented; and legislation protecting the rights of
individuals and organizations in the digital environment has been adopted.

STRATEGIC

Existing laws and regulatory mechanisms have been reviewed, identifying
gaps and overlaps; areas which need improvement have been prioritized; the
integrity, confidentiality, availability and overall security of digital information
and ICT is ensured through regular review and improvement of legal and
regulatory measures.

DYNAMIC

Mechanisms are established to optimize the ICT security sector by amending
or enacting legislation and by harmonizing ICT legal frameworks with other
policies, laws, standards and best practices; and measures are in place that
contribute towards the development of international best practices which will
inform the national legislative framework.
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Legal Frameworks

Privacy, data protection and other human rights

STARTUP

Privacy and data protection legislation does not exist or is in the process of
being developed; and domestic law fails to recognize fundamental human and
civil rights in connection with cyber-related offenses.

FORMATIVE

Partial legislation exists regarding privacy, data protection and freedom of
expression.

ESTABLISHED

Comprehensive data protection legislation and regulatory procedures have
been implemented; and domestic law provides for the individual’s right to
privacy, specifically to the notice, purpose, consent, security, disclosure, access
and integrity of personal information.

STRATEGIC

A comprehensive structure within the criminal justice system is in place to
combat cyber-related offenses while respecting human rights; and the country
is engaged and works with international organizations on privacy and data
protection.

DYNAMIC

The country has adopted appropriate legislation, especially to foster
international cooperation and mutual legal assistance, in order to combat
criminal offenses against privacy and data protection by facilitating detection,
investigation, and prosecution at the domestic and international levels. If
applicable, it will ratify or accede to international data protection treaties and
other agreements.

Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks
Legislative frameworks for ICT security
Privacy, data protection and other
human rights
Substantive cybercrime law
Procedural cybercrime law
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Substantive cybercrime law

STARTUP

Substantive criminal laws against cybercrime do not exist. Cybercrime is
addressed ad hoc by way of general laws.

FORMATIVE

There is partial legislation with regard to substantive criminal law that relates
to legal and regulatory frameworks that include some aspects of cybercrime;
substantive criminal law for cybercrime is being discussed among lawmakers,
and the drafting of the law is in process.

ESTABLISHED

Existing legislation criminalizes a variety of crimes that involve electronic
evidence which may be covered by a specific legislation or addressed within
the Criminal Code.

STRATEGIC

The country adheres to relevant regional and international best practice and
norms on cybercrime law, allocating resources according to national priorities.

DYNAMIC

The country constantly seeks to implement international best practice on
cybercrime into domestic law; it is an active contributor to the global discourse
on improving international cybercrime enforcement instruments; and measures
are in place to exceed minimal international security benchmarks at the national
level..

Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks
Legislative frameworks for ICT security
Privacy, data protection and other
human rights
Substantive cybercrime law
Procedural cybercrime law
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Legal Frameworks

Procedural cybercrime law

STARTUP

Adequate procedural criminal law relating to cybercrime and the use of electronic
evidence in other crimes does not exist or general procedural criminal law exists,
but is applied ad hoc to cybercrime and the use of electronic evidence in other
cases.

FORMATIVE

Procedural criminal law relating to electronic evidence is being developed;
and procedural criminal law is applied ad hoc to cybercrime, although the
development of specific cybercrime offenses has not begun.

ESTABLISHED

Comprehensive criminal procedural law and related evidentiary requirements
have been implemented; and best practices are applied by law enforcement by
exercising procedural powers.

STRATEGIC

In the case of cross-border investigations, procedural law stipulates what
actions are to be conducted under particular case characteristics, in order to
successfully obtain electronic evidence.

DYNAMIC

The country adheres to international best practices on criminal procedures
relating to cybercrime and the acquisition of electronic evidence, while
continually seeking to implement these measures into domestic law; it serves as
an active contributor to the global debate on improving international cybercrime
enforcement; and measures are in place to exceed minimal international security
baselines, contributing to the development of international best practices.

Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks
Legislative frameworks for ICT security
Privacy, data protection and other
human rights
Substantive cybercrime law
Procedural cybercrime law
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Legal Investigation

Effective implementation of legal
and regulatory frameworks through
investigative tools is important to
improve
cybersecurity
capacity.
Law enforcement, prosecutors, and
court officials need the appropriate
investigative capacity to process
electronic evidence and combat
cybercrime, including how to assess,
obtain and handle digital evidence
and utilize appropriate procedural
instruments.

Law enforcement

STARTUP

The capacity of law enforcement authorities to prevent and combat computer
related crimes does not exist.

FORMATIVE

Some investigative capacity exists to investigate crimes involving electronic
evidence and to obtain electronic evidence, in accordance with domestic law;
however, this is minimal.

ESTABLISHED

A comprehensive institutional capacity to investigate and manage cybercrime
cases and crimes involving electronic evidence has been established, including
human, procedural and technological resources, full investigative measures,
digital chain of custody and evidence integrity management and formal and
informal collaboration mechanisms with national (public and private sector
actors) and international stakeholders.

STRATEGIC

Law enforcement officers receive continuous training based on relative
responsibilities and new, evolving threat landscapes, and they are able to utilize
sophisticated digital forensic tools to investigate complex cybercrimes and
crimes that involve electronic evidence; and domestic law enforcement agencies
collaborate with regional and international counterparts in investigations.

DYNAMIC

Resources dedicated to fully operational cybercrime units, including advanced
investigative capabilities and data integrity management; statistics and trends
that would enhance the investigation of criminals may be collected and
analyzed in order to support a comprehensive understanding of the online
criminal environment and inform strategic decision making; and domestic law
enforcement agencies are participating fully in cross-border investigations and
networks.
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Legal Frameworks

Prosecution services

STARTUP

Prosecutors are not trained adequately and do not have the capacity to
prosecute computer-related crimes; no resources exist to understand or review
electronic evidence.

FORMATIVE

A limited number of prosecutors have the capacity to build a case based on
electronic information, but this capacity is largely ad hoc, not institutionalized
and lacks formal collaboration mechanisms with law enforcement.

ESTABLISHED

Institutional capacity to prosecute and handle cybercrime cases and cases that
involve electronic evidence is established; and sufficient human training and
technological resources exist.

STRATEGIC

There are institutional structures in place that allow for a clear distribution of
tasks and obligations within the prosecution services at all levels of government; a
strategic relationship between law enforcement agencies and prosecution services
exists that allows for rapid and accurate judicial proceedings; and measurements,
statistics and trends involving successful conviction rates are analyzed.

DYNAMIC

Prosecutors have the capacity to prosecute successfully complex cybercrimes
in-country and undertake cross-border collaboration; and training is
institutionalized and dynamic, taking into account new and evolving threat
landscapes.

Legal Investigation
Law enforcement
Prosecution services
Courts
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Courts

STARTUP

Judges do not apply electronic evidence comprehensively.

FORMATIVE

A limited number of judges has the capacity to preside over a case on cybercrime,
but this capacity is largely ad hoc and not systematic; and judicial resources or
training in cybercrime do not exist.

ESTABLISHED

Sufficient judicial resources and training are available to ensure effective and
efficient prosecution of cybercrime and electronic evidence cases.

STRATEGIC

The court system has organized itself, to ensure a strategic relationship
between judiciary and prosecution services, allowing for rapid and accurate
judicial proceedings; and cooperation mechanisms to ensure the execution of
extraterritorial orders are in place.

DYNAMIC

The judiciary receives continuous training based on relative responsibilities and
evolving threat landscapes; and the judicial system is aware of constant changes
in the cybersecurity environment and allocates resources where appropriate.

Legal Investigation
Law enforcement
Prosecution services
Courts
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Legal Frameworks

Responsible Reporting

A responsible disclosure policy in
place can offer specific guidelines
and statements to address how a
vulnerability can be disclosed. It can
enhance security capacity by averting
vulnerability and preventing any
future damage. This factor relates
to a vulnerability disclosure model
or reporting methodology where a
party (reporter) privately discloses
information that relates to a weakness
of a product vendor or service provider
(affected party) and allows the affected
party time to investigate the claim, as
well as to identify and test a remedy
or resource before coordinating the
release of a public disclosure on the
issue.

Responsible disclosure

STARTUP

The need for a responsible disclosure policy in public and private sector
organizations is not acknowledged.

FORMATIVE

A vulnerability disclosure framework is in place, which includes a disclosure
deadline, scheduled resolution, and acknowledgement report; and ability is
demonstrated through enhanced public-private cooperation of the sharing of
technical details of the vulnerability with other stakeholders who can distribute
the information more broadly.

ESTABLISHED

Organizations have developed the ability to receive and disseminate
vulnerability information; and software and service providers accept bug and
vulnerability reports and address them while informally refraining from legal
action against a party that responsibly discloses information.

STRATEGIC

An analysis of the technical details of the vulnerability is published and advisory
information is disseminated according to roles and responsibilities; responsible
vulnerability disclosure processes, including deadlines, for all involved
stakeholders (product vendors, customers, security vendors and the public)
are set; and regulations may be in place to mandate vulnerability reports from
critical infrastructure operators and owners.

DYNAMIC

Responsible disclosure policies are continually reviewed and updated, based
on the needs of affected stakeholders; responsible disclosure mechanisms are
synchronized internationally; and national and international processes are in
place for review under tight deadlines.
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Technologies
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Adherence to Standards

Implementation of standards and minimal acceptable practices

This factor relates to the issue of
development
and
implementation
of security standards and minimal
acceptable security best practices by
the private and public sectors, as well as
standards on procurement and software
development.

STARTUP

Either no standards or practices have been identified for information security, or
identification is ad hoc and lacks a concerted effort to implement such standards.

FORMATIVE

Information security standards have been identified for use and there have
been some initial signs of promotion and take up within government, the public
sectors and national infrastructure protection (CNI) agencies; and there is
minimal implementation of national and international standards.

ESTABLISHED

Nationally agreed baseline of cybersecurity-related standards and least
acceptable practices have been identified and adopted widely across the
public sector and CNI organizations; adoption and compliance is measured and
reported, with adoption oversight from government; and the use of standards to
mitigate CNI supply systems risk is considered.

STRATEGIC

Standards are adopted in the context of budgeting decisions, and resources
are allocated according to risk assessments and debate between the public
and private sectors, as well as other stakeholders; sector-specific standards
are being developed and implemented; and evidence of contribution to
international standards bodies exists, as do thought leadership and the sharing
of experiences by organizations.

DYNAMIC

Continual process improvement is applied to the choice of adopted standards
and practices, promoting fluid implementation; evidence of collaborative
risk management exists in non-compliance decisions across sectors and CNI,
adapting to the evolving cybersecurity landscape; and evidence exists of mature
debate in industry and wider society on the use of standards and practices that
are based on continuous needs assessments.
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Technologies

Procurement

STARTUP

No evidence of use of cybersecurity-related standards in guiding procurement
processes—although some recognition of guidance is available but there is no
effort to utilize it.

FORMATIVE

Cybersecurity standards in procurement practices and procedures are being
developed.

ESTABLISHED

The implementation of standards in procurement practices meets international
IT guidelines, standards and practices and is evidenced through measurement
and quality assessments of process effectiveness.

STRATEGIC

Critical aspects of procurement and supply, such as prices and costs, quality,
timescales and other value-added activities are continually improved in the
context of wider resources planning across enterprises; skills of procurement
professionals can be benchmarked and assessed against competencies outlined
in procurement standards; and internal stakeholders have a comprehensive
understanding of e-sourcing or e-tendering systems and purchase-to-pay systems
in order to implement these tools when performing key tasks in procurement and
supply.

DYNAMIC

Organizations have the ability to monitor the use of standards in procurement
processes and support deviations and non-compliance decisions in real
time through risk-based decision making; and best practices are included in
procurement and compliance incorporates quality assurance.

Adherence to Standards
Implementation of standards and minimal
acceptable practices
Procurement
Software development
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Software development

STARTUP

There is no identification of software development standards within the public
and private sectors or there is some identification, but only limited evidence, of
take up.

FORMATIVE

Methodologies for software development processes focusing on integrity and
resilience are being discussed and promoted by government and professional
communities; and evidence exists of organizations within the CNI and the public
sector supplying or seeking to adopt standards in code development, as well as
achieving accreditations with the government ’s promotion of secure practices.

ESTABLISHED

Government has an established program to promote the adoption of standards
in software development for public- and private-sector systems, including the
tracking of standards compliance; and high-integrity systems and software
development techniques are present within educational and training offerings.

STRATEGIC

Cybersecurity considerations are incorporated in all stages of development and
processes; core development activities (including configuration and document
management, security development and lifecycle planning of software) have
been adopted; and the selection of standards, resources and decision making
are made through risk assessment.

DYNAMIC

Adherence to Standards
Implementation of standards and minimal
acceptable practices
Procurement
Software development
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Software development projects continually assess the value of standards and
reduce or enhance levels of compliance according to risk-based decisions;
cybersecurity requirements are built into the procurement lifecycle (needs
requirements, requests for proposals and contract); and in the case of
government software, assessments are made throughout the lifetime of the
contract.

Technologies

Cybersecurity Coordinating
Organizations

This factor relates to the existence and
activity of computer security incident
response teams and the command and
control center at the national level, in
terms of capacity in incident response
and the mitigation of threats.

Command and control center

STARTUP

A cybersecurity command and control center does not exist or is being
considered at the national level.

FORMATIVE

Command and control function is informally performed by national incident
response capability or by another entity with no formal coordination authority.

ESTABLISHED

A command and control organization is identified and exists, but has no
automated gathering, processing or analysis; formal executive command and
control of cyberspace is a national strategic matter; and a general view of
current security capabilities is understood, but lacks situational awareness.

STRATEGIC

A command and control center with enhanced automation is established,
providing basic national situational awareness; and the selection of command
and control center objectives is made as part of resource planning and strategic
policy development.

DYNAMIC

A national cyberspace command and control center is fully developed,
and receives and correlates information from incident response capability
organizations, public and private entities, layered service providers, critical
Information Infrastructure, and defense and intelligence organizations, and
is highly automated, providing advanced situational awareness; and active
situational awareness is coordinated with the national executive office.
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Incident response capacity

STARTUP

Incident response capacity is not coordinated and is performed in an ad hoc manner.

FORMATIVE

An incident response team or personnel exists in the country, with specific roles
and responsibilities; and activity is concentrated on detecting and responding to
organization-specific cyber incidents.

ESTABLISHED

A national incident response capability is established and involves key
stakeholders, particularly through public-private partnerships; the financial
sustainability of incident response capability is considered and planned
through the involvement of key stakeholders; a vulnerability management
plan is developed and implemented; incidents are categorized, consistent
with response plans; response and recovery plans are in place and managed; a
national vulnerability database assessment of impact on critical functions exists;
information is shared, consistent with response plans; and key stakeholders are
aware of existing national incident response capability and their responsibilities.

STRATEGIC

National incident response capability supports the establishment of sectorspecific capabilities; resources and information are shared through enhanced
coordination and collaboration with local, regional and international incident
response teams; assessment of the effectiveness of the Computer Security
Incident Response Teams feeds into the resourcing of the CSIRT; reporting of
incidents occurs across sectors and response plans, and corresponding recovery
plans are tested; forensics services are offered; and information sharing is
voluntarily promoted among external stakeholders.

DYNAMIC

Cybersecurity Coordinating Organizations
Command and control center
Incident response capacity
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National incident response capability is financially sustainable and politically
supported, regardless of political transition; and international cooperation
exists, aimed at shaping best practice among expert groups.

Technologies

Incident Response

Not all cyber incidents can be mitigated,
so identifying which of these events
constitute national-level threats can
help narrow the scope of responsibility.
Also, an organized and coordinated
approach to incident response ensures
threats can be dealt with in the most
efficient way possible.

Identification and Designation

STARTUP

National level incidents are not identified nor catalogued.

FORMATIVE

Certain cyber events or threats have been categorized and recorded as nationallevel incidents or challenges.

ESTABLISHED

A central registry of national-level cyber incidents is established.

STRATEGIC

Regular, systematic updates to the national-level incident registry are made
and prioritized; and some capacity exists for focusing analytical resources for
incident response.

DYNAMIC

Capacity for adapting focus on incident identification and analysis is dynamic in
response to environmental changes and may include cyber defense considerations.
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Organization

STARTUP

National incident response is limited or non-existent; and response, if any, is
reactive and ad hoc.

FORMATIVE

Private sector organizations that are key to national cybersecurity have been
identified and contacted, with no formal coordination or information-sharing
mechanisms established with the public sector; and a central body has been
designated to collect emergency threat information, with no specific mandate
for a national cyber response agency.

ESTABLISHED

A routine, coordinated relationship exists between the public and private
sectors for national-level incident responses with limited scope, but response is
still reactive; and response capacity is established and funding for basic function
has been identified.

STRATEGIC

Distinct and formal cybersecurity roles and responsibilities have been
established for government, critical infrastructure, enterprise, and individual
systems; and resources allocated to emergency response are adequate to meet
the cybersecurity threat environment.

DYNAMIC

An early warning capacity is incorporated into the mission of the emergency
response organization that seeks to shape/manage the threat landscape before
responding to specific challenges; and tools for early detection, identification,
prevention, response and mitigation of zero-day vulnerabilities are embedded
in emergency response organization(s).

Incident Response
Identification and designation
Organization
Coordination
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Technologies

Coordination

STARTUP

Responsibility of incident response may or may not have been allocated
informally to a member of staff within each government agency and ministry.

FORMATIVE

At the national level, official agency and ministry leads for incidents have been
designated and publicized, although channels of communication between
these leads remain ad hoc and inconsistent.

ESTABLISHED

Coordinated national incident response is established and published, with clear
processes and defined roles and responsibilities; and lines of communication
are prepared for crisis situations.

STRATEGIC

Technical capabilities now exceed coordinating responses and include incident
analysis and support; and proactive services and security quality management
services across sub-national and sectorial organizations are established.

DYNAMIC

Incident response adapts to the threat environment; multi-level national
coordination between all levels and sectors is central to incident response;
and coordination exists between regional and international incident response
organizations.

Incident Response
Identification and designation
Organization
Coordination
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National Infrastructure
Resilience

This factor focuses on infrastructure
technology and national infrastructure
resilience. Infrastructure technology
underpins daily life and ensures the
country continues to function socially
and economically. The government
and private sectors are capable of
protecting the information systems of
the country and the operators of critical
infrastructures to ensure better national
resilience.

Infrastructure technology

STARTUP

Internet services infrastructure is unreliable. When it is reliable, the services are
affordable but with low uptake of service rates. Availability of technology to
support e-commerce and business-to-business interaction is a concern, but few
or no coherent actions have been established.

FORMATIVE

Non-strategic deployment of technology and processes in public and private
sectors is performed; and online government services, information and digital
content are available online, but implementation and process are limited.

ESTABLISHED

Technology and processes deployed meet international IT standards, guidelines
and best practices; use of the Internet for communication between all
stakeholders is integrated into everyday operating practice; Internet is used for
business e-commerce and electronic transactions and authentication processes
and measures are established.

STRATEGIC

Rigorous security processes have been established across private and government
sectors, especially for security risk management, threat assessment, incident
response and business continuity; regular assessment of processes and national
information infrastructure security according to standards and guidelines are
conducted; and measurable benefits for businesses from additional investments
in technology are assessed.

DYNAMIC

Acquisition of infrastructure technologies is effectively controlled, flexibly,
according to changing market dynamics; costs for infrastructure technologies
are continually assessed and minimized; and processes are fully automated,
often incorporated into the technology itself.
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Technologies

National resilience

STARTUP

Government has minimal or no control of technology infrastructure; networks
and systems are outsourced, with potential adoption from unreliable third-party
markets; and there may be a dependence on other countries for cybersecurity
technology.

FORMATIVE

National infrastructure is managed informally, with no documented processes,
roles and responsibilities; and there is regional support for cybersecurity
technology and infrastructure in the country.

ESTABLISHED

National infrastructure is formally managed, with documented processes,
roles and responsibilities, and limited redundancy; regional support for
cyber technologies is supplemented by a national program for infrastructure
development.

STRATEGIC

Risk-based management and best practices with formal vulnerability analysis is
conducted; and assessments of national resilience for CNI and essential services
are conducted to protect information systems of the country and the operators
of CNI and essential services.

DYNAMIC

There is effectively controlled acquisition of critical technologies with
managed strategic planning and service continuity processes in place; high
availability of critical technologies as part of the formal governance framework
is mainstream; and scientific, technical, industrial and human capabilities
are being systematically maintained, enhanced and perpetuated in order to
maintain the country’s independent resilience.
National Infrastructure Resilience
Infrastructure technology
National resilience
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Critical National Infrastructure
Protection

While different governments may
identify different entities as critical
infrastructure, it is important that the
proper steps be taken to provide the
cybersecurity necessary to protect
these crucial assets. These steps should
be based on careful planning and
appropriate risk management.

Identification

STARTUP

Some or no understanding of CNI assets and vulnerabilities, and no formal
categorization and vulnerabilities have been identified.

FORMATIVE

A general list of CNI assets, without identified risk-based priorities, has been
created.

ESTABLISHED

An audit of CNI assets is performed on a regular basis; and dissemination of CNI
asset audit lists are discussed with relevant stakeholders, based on a model of
public-private partnership.

STRATEGIC

CNI risks have been prioritized according to vulnerability and impact, which
guides strategic investment; vulnerability and asset management processes
of CNI assets have been determined and established so that repeated security
improvements can be made; and a distinction has been drawn between CNI
assets and essential services for day-to-day activity.

DYNAMIC

Priority listing of CNI assets is regularly re-appraised to capture changes in
the threat environment; and the impact of cybersecurity risk on the business
operations of owners of CNI assets, including direct and opportunity costs,
impact on revenue, and hindrance to innovation are understood and
incorporated into future planning.
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Technologies

Organization

STARTUP

There is little to no interaction between government ministries and owners of
critical assets; and no formal collaboration mechanism exists.

FORMATIVE

A mechanism is established for regular vulnerability disclosure between the public
and private sectors, but the scope of reporting requirements has not been specified.

ESTABLISHED

Defined reporting requirements between CNI asset owners and the public
sector are sufficient to address national security needs.

STRATEGIC

There is a clear understanding of the responsibilities and liabilities of the
owners and operators of CNI assets; and cooperation and coordination exists
with national security ministries and agencies.

DYNAMIC

In regulating CNI assets, a balance between meeting national cybersecurity
needs and cost implication has been struck.

Critical National Infrastructure
Protection
Identification
Organization
Response planning
Coordination
Risk management
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Response planning

STARTUP

Response planning to an attack on critical assets may have been broadly
discussed, but no formal plan exists.

FORMATIVE

Protection of critical assets includes basic cybersecurity awareness and data
security policies, but no protection processes or procedures have been agreed.

ESTABLISHED

Information protection procedures and processes have been established,
supported by adequate technical security solutions; risk management
procedures are used to create a response plan template in the event of an
incident; communication links are proven and analysis and harm mitigation
measures are undertaken and exercises are conducted in the likelihood of an
event.

STRATEGIC

Assessment of the severity of an incident on critical assets is regularly conducted
and response planning is based on that assessment; and improvements in
response mechanisms are conducted routinely in order to promote strategic
responses.

DYNAMIC

Recurrent monitoring of security to ensure that protective measures
demonstrate continual effectiveness while indicating which technologies,
policies or processes require change; and an insurance market for cybersecurity
that is established and options for re-insurance have been explored to support
business continuity.

Critical National Infrastructure
Protection
Identification
Organization
Response planning
Coordination
Risk management
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Technologies

Coordination

STARTUP

Informal procedures for dialogue between the public and private sectors may
be developed, but lack parameters for information sharing and are, generally
either on an individual or unstructured basis, or are non-existent.

FORMATIVE

Dialogue has occurred to determine which industries and bodies are critical
to the national cyber ecosystem; an informal community of CNI operators has
been established; and regular dialogue between tactical and executive strategic
levels regarding cyber risk practices is evident.

ESTABLISHED

Formal internal and external CNI communication strategies have been defined
and are consistent across sectors with an endorsed communication strategy
and clear point of contact; and the government’s policy perspective, decisionmaking process and mechanisms for managing and ensuring cybersecurity are
agreed and consolidated.

STRATEGIC

A public awareness campaign to facilitate the CNI communication strategy
is established with a point of contact for this information; cybersecurity
requirements and vulnerabilities in CNI supply systems have been clearly
identified and managed; and a vulnerability review process has been
implemented.

DYNAMIC

Critical National Infrastructure
Protection
Identification
Organization
Response planning
Coordination
Risk management

Trust has been established between the government and CNIs with respect
to data security and exchange-of-threat information, which informs strategic
decision making; cybersecurity risk management is part of the organizational
culture and actively reflects the network operating environment; and high-level
board members are able to make informed risk management decisions based
on reliable intelligence and communicate them effectively.
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Risk management

STARTUP

Threat awareness by CNI operators exists minimally, or not at all; basic riskmanagement skills and understanding may be incorporated into business
practices, but cybersecurity is subsumed into IT and data protection risk and is
not recognized more broadly.

FORMATIVE

Some awareness and training has been provided so that incident management
can be applied efficiently; access control is implemented and training is provided;
and the CNI industry has basic capabilities to detect, identify, protect, respond
and recover from cyber threats, but such capabilities are uncoordinated and vary
in effectiveness.

ESTABLISHED

Minimum security measures and guidelines for cyber CNI best practices have
been established; incident response procedures have been defined and all
appropriate entities participate actively; insider threat detection is accounted
for; a legal basis for CNI network (operator and user-side) security has been
established; and implementation of CNI standards is monitored and reviewed.

STRATEGIC

Cybersecurity is firmly embedded into general risk management practice; security
measures are developed to ensure business continuity of CNI in the context of
the prevailing risk environment; and resources are allocated in proportion to the
assessed impact of an incident to ensure timeliness and effectiveness of incident
response.

DYNAMIC

Critical National Infrastructure
Protection
Identification
Organization
Response planning
Coordination
Risk management
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Regular audit practices to assess network and systems dependencies are
implemented, which informs continual reassessment of risk portfolio; selfregulation is encouraged; procedures to optimize the legal framework
concerning CNI by amending existing legislation or enacting new legal
regulations are in place as needed.

Technologies

Crisis Management

Crisis management is more than
incident response. Cyber exercises,
for example, can simulate a variety
of roles, from attackers, to defenders,
communications teams, coordinating
bodies, and several others, all of which
are crucial in the event of an actual
crisis. Planning and evaluating crisis
management applications provides
stakeholders with the capacity to deal
with real world scenarios.

Planning

STARTUP

Minimal or no understanding that crisis management is necessary for national
security; exercise design and planning authority has been allocated in principle,
but planning has not been outlined.

FORMATIVE

A preliminary needs assessment of measures that require testing has been
undertaken as a simple exercise scenario, limited in size, geographic scope,
resources and coordination; key stakeholders are included in the planning
process.

ESTABLISHED

A realistic, high-level scenario informs a plan to comprehensively test
information flows and decision-making and new information is fed into the
exercise at key points; external monitors are applied or professional training is
provided for internal monitors.

STRATEGIC

Planning process includes Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and
Time-bound (SMART) objectives, Public Key Infrastructures (PKI), engagement
of participants, outline of their role in the exercise, and articulation of benefits
and incentives for participation; and trust is developed well in advance through
recruitment and pre-exercise briefing process and guaranteed confidentiality.

DYNAMIC

Exercise program is wide in its geographic scope and participation, as well
as in its political/technical complexity; the exercise addresses international
challenges and produces scalable results for policy development and strategic
decision making; and outside observers participate and contribute to the
process.
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Evaluation

STARTUP

No evaluation of crisis management protocols and procedures has been
conducted; and results from exercises do not inform overall crisis management.

FORMATIVE

General awareness of crisis management techniques and goals exist; and
exercise is evaluated and commentary is provided by participants on an ad hoc
basis, but does not feed into decision making.

ESTABLISHED

Stakeholders are included in the evaluation process; measurable indicators of
success are gathered, including questionnaires, repeated testing, follow-ups,
and lessons learned; findings are collated, analysed and fed into the decisionmaking process; and findings are evaluated against national and international
crisis management best practices.

STRATEGIC

SMART and PKIs produce structured, measurable results that will inform useful
recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders; customized, sectorspecific reports are prepared for each stakeholder, while securing sensitive
information; and crisis management evaluation results inform national strategy
implementation and budgetary allocations.

DYNAMIC

Evaluation of the country’s participation in international crisis management
exercises is provided to the international community, so that lessons learned
can contribute towards a global understanding of crisis management.

Crisis Management
Planning
Evaluation

174

Technologies

Digital Redundancy

Where communication by electronic
means is disabled, building backup
coordination links between emergency
responders that do not rely on digital
communications networks is crucial to
enhance cyber policy and strategy.

Planning

STARTUP

Digital redundancy measures may or may not be considered.

FORMATIVE

Stakeholders convene through public-private partnerships to identify gaps and
overlaps in emergency response asset communications and authority links;
emergency response asset priorities and standard operating procedures are
established in the event of a communications disruption along any node in the
emergency response network.

ESTABLISHED

Emergency response assets are hardwired into a fail-safe communication
network; and appropriate resources are allocated to hardware integration,
technology stress testing and personnel training and crisis simulations drills.

STRATEGIC

Outreach and education of redundant communications protocols are
undertaken for key stakeholders and are customized to their unique roles and
responsibilities.

DYNAMIC

Stakeholders contribute to international efforts in redundancy communication
planning.
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Organization

STARTUP

Current emergency response assets have not been identified; if identified, they
lack a level of integration.

FORMATIVE

Emergency response assets are mapped and identified, possibly including
details of their location and their designated operators.

ESTABLISHED

Communication is distributed across emergency response functions, geographic
areas of responsibility, public and private responders, and command authorities.

STRATEGIC

Emergency response assets test interoperability and function effectively
under compromised communications scenarios; results then inform strategic
investment in future emergency response assets.

DYNAMIC

Optimized efficiency is in place to mediate extended outages of systems;
national assets can act to assist neighbors in event of an international crisis
or incident; and emergency response interoperability mapping and drills are
proposed, scheduled and undertaken on an annual basis.

Digital Redundancy
Planning
Organization
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Technologies

Cybersecurity Marketplace

This section discusses the issues of
availability of network and information
cybersecurity technologies, specialist
support for deployment and cyber
insurance as a way to protect against
losses that occur directly to the
insurance holder. Similarly, they aim
to protect against losses from another
organization or individuals affected by a
security breach.

Cybersecurity technologies

STARTUP

Few or no technologies are produced domestically; and international offerings
may be restricted or sold at a premium.

FORMATIVE

Security technology and processes in government and private sector are
available and deployed; domestic market provides generic, non-specialized
products; offerings are not market driven; and security considerations are now
embedded in software and infrastructure.

ESTABLISHED

Information technology control systems are created and managed; domestic
cybersecurity products are produced by local providers; technologies are
deployed in-country to detect and record cyber incidents, including sophisticated
attacks; and advanced security technology and processes in sensitive enterprise
networks are deployed to enable secure information exchange.

STRATEGIC

Cybersecurity technologies, including software, abide by secure coding
guidelines and best practices, adhering to internationally recognized standards;
security technologies and processes across sectors are up to date, based on
strategic risk assessments; and risk assessments also inform the application of
market incentives towards prioritized products to mitigate identified risks.

DYNAMIC

Security features in software architecture are continually updated as required;
security functions in software and computer system configurations are
automated in the development and deployment of security solutions; national
dependence on foreign technologies is mitigated through enhanced domestic
capacity; and domestic market cybersecurity products are exported to other
countries and are considered superior products.
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Cybercrime insurance

STARTUP

The need for a market in cybercrime insurance has not been identified, based on
an assessment of financial risks for public and private sectors.

FORMATIVE

The need for a market in cybercrime insurance has been identified as a result
of an assessment of financial risks for public and private sectors; and sharing of
best practices in assessment and risk reduction, including development and use
of appropriate standards and varied products, is now being discussed.

ESTABLISHED

Market for cybercrime insurance is established and encourages information
sharing among participants; and products suitable for small- and medium-size
enterprises are on offer.

STRATEGIC

Cyber insurance offers a variety of options to mitigate consequential losses and
coverages are selected based on strategic planning needs and identified risk.

DYNAMIC

A vibrant, innovative and stable cyber insurance market exists and adapts to
emerging risks; planned risk reduction programs are constantly reviewed
and maintained; insurance premiums and reward programs are offered for
consistent cyber-secure behavior; and insurance products are aligned with
dynamic applications of cybersecurity standards and practices.

Cybersecurity Marketplace
Cybersecurity technologies
Cybercrime insurance
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